Paper bullets: the Office Of War Information and American World War II print propaganda by Porter, Austin
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2013
Paper bullets: the Office Of War
Information and American World
War II print propaganda
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/34333
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
Dissertation
PAPER BULLETS: THE OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION 
AND AMERICAN WORLD WAR II PRINT PROPAGANDA
by
AUSTIN PORTER
B.F.A., Kansas State University, 2002
M.A., The University of Kansas, 2007
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
2013
©  Copyright by 
 AUSTIN PORTER
 2013
Approved by
First Reader          
  Patricia Hills, Ph.D
  Professor of History of Art & Architecture
Second Reader         
  Keith Morgan, Ph.D
  Professor of History of Art & Architecture
Acknowledgements
 Numerous individuals provided valuable assistance with this project.  My thanks 
goes first to Patricia Hills, whose support and criticism guided this investigation since its 
inception.  These chapters began in her seminars on American art history, and her 
thoughtful analysis and encouragement inspired my research and writing.  Similarly, 
Keith Morgan provided critical commentary and counsel throughout my doctoral studies.  
I am indebted additionally to the other members of the dissertation defense committee, 
Wendy Wick Reaves, William Moore, and Greg Williams, who each delivered valuable 
assessments and assistance.  Finally, I am thankful for the continued support of Charles 
Eldredge, whose classes fueled my early curiosities concerning the relationship between 
American art and culture.
 Several institutions provided crucial support during the research and writing 
process.  The American Council of Learned Societies and the Henry Luce Foundation 
furnished a decisive yearlong fellowship that allowed time for editing and defense 
preparation.  Similarly, the Mr. and Mrs. Raymond J. Horowitz Fellowship Fund 
contributed a vital year of support through the Department of History of Art & 
Architecture at Boston University.  A Sara Roby Foundation Fellowship at the 
Smithsonian American Art Museum in Washington, D.C. also granted an intellectually 
stimulating year of research that yielded significant progress.  I am also grateful to the 
Department of History of Art & Architecture, Boston University, for a two year teaching 
fellowship that allowed me to complete my coursework unencumbered.
iv
 Numerous librarians, archivists, and curators provided assistance that revealed 
new and exciting discoveries along the way.  First and foremost, my thanks goes to the 
staff at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).  I am especially 
indebted to the Still Picture Research room archivists at the College Park, Maryland 
facilities, who cheerfully pulled countless boxes at my request.  My thanks also to 
NARA employees at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New 
York; the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri; and the Dwight 
D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas.  I am similarly grateful to the 
special collections staff at the Archives of America Art and the National Museum of 
American History, both in Washington, D.C.  Thanks also to the reading room personnel 
at the Library of Congress, and to the special collections librarians at the New York 
Public Library.  Additional thanks to Joann Moser, Curator at the Smithsonian American 
Art Museum and my fellowship advisor at that institution, and to Sarah G. Forgey, 
Curator at the Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort Belvoir, 
Virginia, who shared with me the wonderful collection of art at the U.S. Army’s Museum 
Support Center.  I would also like to thank Virginia Ward, Library Coordinator at the 
Franklin Institute, Philadelphia, who provided assistance obtaining photocopies of rare 
material.
 Finally, my thanks to numerous friends and family members who provided much 
needed support.  I am particularly appreciative for the criticism and camaraderie from the 
predoctoral fellows reading group at the Smithsonian American Art Museum and the 
v
National Portrait Gallery, where early drafts of the text were scrutinized.  At Boston 
University I benefited significantly from the benevolence of numerous fellow graduate 
students, especially Kenneth Hartvigsen and Judy Ditner, who both read chapters and 
delivered helpful advice and encouragement.  I am also very grateful to my entire family, 
whose relentless love and understanding made this all possible.  Special thanks to Mom, 
Dad, Nick, and Grandad “Herbert.”  Finally, my most devoted and emphatic thanks goes 
to Karley, who read countless drafts, discussed each chapter in detail, and provided 
unconditional support during this long process.  Most importantly, she never failed to 
make me laugh.   
vi
PAPER BULLETS: THE OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION 
AND AMERICAN WORLD WAR II PRINT PROPAGANDA
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AUSTIN PORTER
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Patricia Hills, Professor of History of Art & Architecture
ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation analyzes American World War II propaganda generated by the 
Office of War Information (OWI), the nation’s primary propaganda agency from 1942 to 
1945.  The visual rhetoric of printed OWI propaganda, including posters, brochures, 
newspaper graphics, and magazine illustrations, demonstrated affinities with advertising 
and modern art and exhibited an increasingly conservative tone as the war progressed.  
While politically progressive bureaucrats initially molded the OWI’s graphic agenda, 
research reveals how politicians suppressed graphics that displayed the war’s violence, 
racial integration, and progressive gender roles in favor of images resembling commercial 
advertisements.  To articulate the manner in which issues of American self-representation 
evolved during the war, this study examines the graphic work of artists and designers 
such as Charles Alston, Thomas Hart Benton, Charles Coiner, Ben Shahn, and Norman 
Rockwell.
 The investigation unfolds across four chapters.  The first chapter examines the 
institutional origins of American World War II propaganda by exploring the shifting 
vii
content of New Deal promotional efforts during the 1930s and early 1940s.  This analysis 
is critical, as government agencies used propaganda not only to support economic 
recovery during the Great Depression, but also to prepare Americans for war before the 
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.  The second chapter analyzes the ways OWI increasingly 
suppressed depictions of violence as the war progressed. While the agency distributed 
traumatic images of Axis hostility early in the war, such work was later deemed “too 
aggressive” by former advertising executives turned federal bureaucrats who preferred 
more friendly, appealing graphics.  The third chapter focuses on propaganda intended for 
African Americans, whose support for the war was divided due to racist Jim Crow 
legislation.  This section analyzes OWI efforts to address the nation’s largest racial 
minority through posters, brochures, and newspaper graphics. The fourth chapter 
examines the OWI’s efforts to influence middle-class white women, a demographic of 
consumers whose influence grew as the war progressed.  This includes an examination of 
the OWI’s role in modifying the “Rosie the Riveter” mythology in contemporary 
advertising to encourage women to pursue jobs outside of factory work.  
viii
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Introduction
 In the summer of 1942 the United States Office of War Information (OWI), the 
nation’s primary propaganda agency during World War II, distributed a poster promoting 
the combined efforts of American industry and military forces (fig. 1).1  Designed by 
David Stone Martin, Strong in the strength of the Lord featured three arms raising 
different iconic objects towards the poster’s upper right corner.2  The laborer’s hand at 
left, protected by a workman’s glove that extends past the wrist, lifts a heavy wrench.  At 
the center a soldier’s muscled arm, covered partially at the bicep by a torn green shirt, 
raises a rifle outfitted with a bayonet.  Finally, the female worker’s arm on the right, 
noticeably thinner than the other two and protruding from a light blue, decorated sleeve 
below, hoists a small open-ended wrench.  The combined gesture of these arms promoted 
mixed-gender American labor and the military as powerful forces unified in their support 
of the war effort.
 The uplifting symbolism of Martin’s graphic was enhanced by three lines of text 
above, which read: “Strong in the strength of the Lord / we who fight in the people’s 
cause / will never stop until that cause is won.”  The first line, “Strong in the strength of 
the Lord,” suggested these toned, determined arms possessed a physical power fueled by 
divine sources.  The textured, reddish hues in the poster’s background amplified this 
evocative spirituality.  The second line, “we who fight in the people’s cause,” referred to 
the socio-economic diversity of American and international forces aligned against the 
totalitarian Axis regimes.  Furthermore, the anonymity of Martin’s figures (and lack of 
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patriotic iconography) complemented the rhetorical power of the phrase “the people” to 
promote a united Allied force that transcended specific nationalities.  The text’s final line, 
“will never stop until that cause is won,” refers again to the determination of “the people” 
in the face of the international crisis.  By combining emotionally charged text and image, 
Martin’s Strong in the strength of the Lord downplayed the violence of modern warfare, 
and instead offered a message of positive “public uplift” by emphasizing a democratically  
united front.3
 The text in Martin’s graphic, though biblical in tone, originated from the final 
lines of Vice President Henry Wallace’s well-known “Common Man” speech.4  Delivered 
on May 8th, 1942 to the Free World Association in New York, Wallace’s address 
comprised one of the war’s most well-known attempts to explain the Allied mission in the 
international conflict.  Wallace, a longtime supporter of President Roosevelt’s progressive 
New Deal, here characterized the war as a “fight between a slave world and a free 
world.”  He called on democratic peoples to resist the evils of fascism by emphasizing 
education, social justice, and the “rights of the common man” worldwide.  When 
combined with Wallace’s words, Martin’s graphic, which appeared across the nation as a 
poster and in newspapers, developed an ideological charge that celebrated American 
military and industrial might while also subtly acknowledging the diverse Allied forces.5 
 Though a high minded call for unity, Martin’s Strong in the strength of the Lord 
resulted from less grandiose circumstances and later received critical reviews from OWI 
officials.  In fact, Martin created the original painting without knowing what text would 
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accompany his image.  Agency records reveal that Martin’s work rested against an office 
wall for six weeks with no copy until an unknown agency administrator eventually 
“pulled that [text] out of Wallace’s speech” and added it to the design.6  This seemingly 
haphazard insertion led to serious criticism from OWI administrators who expressed 
doubt concerning the poster’s effectiveness.  Ken Dyke, an agency official and former 
advertising executive, wrote in an interoffice memo that Strong in the strength of the Lord 
fell into the “‘So What?’ department of poster art.”  Dyke feared government funds spent 
on posters that demonstrated symbolically driven imagery such as this “would be 
classified as wasteful expenditures.”  He doubted that Martin’s graphic “is either great art 
or that it leaves anyone except possibly a small percentage of the clergy with any 
message that will particularly inspire them to greater action.”  Though Dyke 
acknowledged his opinion may be in the minority, he concluded that: “I cannot help 
expressing strongly my feeling that this is not what the shooting is all about.”7 
 Dyke’s criticism of Martin’s poster addressed ideological issues concerning OWI 
graphics that troubled agency officials and artists throughout the war.  First, by referring 
to “poster art,” Dyke suggested that posters had the capacity to express artistic qualities 
beyond the limitations associated with commercial graphics.  Determining how to 
generate propagandistic content—and whether said content should more strongly 
resemble art or advertising—proved a difficult process that artists and administrators 
struggled to reconcile.  Second, Dyke feared that posters failing to communicate 
messages effectively would lead to charges of an inefficient use of government resources.  
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This concern unsettled agency administrators as the OWI often came under attack from 
critics of the Roosevelt administration for a variety of reasons, including charges that the 
agency did little more than serve as a reelection bureau that harbored political leftists.  As 
a result, defining what information OWI graphics should express became complicated by 
determining how the agency should communicate this data.  Martin’s Strong in the 
strength of the Lord thus represented one of thousands of attempts to shape and maintain 
public opinion that developed from a constant negotiation between OWI artists, 
bureaucrats, and American politicians.
 My dissertation examines the ongoing struggle to develop printed propaganda for 
domestic American audiences at the OWI during World War II.  I argue that while many 
early OWI graphics projected visual analogues of democratic themes promoted by liberal 
politicians such as Wallace, as the war progressed an increasingly conservative U.S. 
Congress altered the agency’s ideological agenda.  This shift, mirrored in American 
political rhetoric that celebrated consumption and corporate influence over New Deal 
liberalism, dynamically redirected the tone and content of OWI graphics.8  Though led 
initially by former New Dealers who subscribed to Wallace’s “Common Man” thesis, the 
OWI began downplaying such themes in favor of increasingly nationalistic and 
conservative content in the spring of 1943.9  As a result, agency propaganda that 
addressed issues such as racial integration, progressive gender roles, and the violent 
realities of war were suppressed.  These rejected works, designed by politically active 
modern artists such as Ben Shahn, Peter Blume, and William Gropper, were repudiated 
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for an advertising aesthetic practiced by commercial illustrators such as Norman 
Rockwell.  Thus, while battles raged overseas, visual distinctions between propaganda 
and advertisements became increasingly blurred, an effect contemporary critics referred 
to as the “selling” of the war.10 
 The following analysis of printed OWI propaganda unfolds across four chapters.  
The first chapter investigates the institutional origins of American World War II 
propaganda by exploring the shifting content of New Deal promotional efforts during the 
1930s and early 1940s.  This analysis is critical, as government agencies used propaganda 
to not only support economic recovery during the Depression, but also to prepare 
Americans for war before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941.  My 
second chapter examines the drastic change in the OWI’s use of violent imagery.  While 
the OWI and the agency it replaced, the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), both 
distributed traumatic images of Axis hostility early in the war, such work was later 
deemed “too aggressive” by former advertising executives turned federal bureaucrats 
who preferred more friendly, appealing graphics.  The third chapter focuses on OWI 
propaganda intended for African Americans, whose support for the war was divided due 
to racist Jim Crow legislation.  This section analyzes propagandistic imagery such as a 
widely distributed brochure titled Negroes and the War (1943), and newspaper graphics 
drawn by Charles Alston, an African American artist whose work appeared exclusively in 
black newspapers.  The fourth chapter examines the OWI’s efforts to influence middle 
class white women, a demographic of consumers whose influence grew as the war 
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progressed.  This includes an examination of the OWI’s role in modifying the “Rosie the 
Riveter” mythology in contemporary advertising imagery to encourage women to pursue 
jobs outside of factory work.  
 By weaving these different visual campaigns together, this project reveals a 
complicated series of visual constructs that provides a new, critical understanding of 
American World War II propaganda and U.S. wartime culture.  As few events hold a 
more powerful symbolic resonance in the collective American memory, a rigorous 
analysis of the government’s role in generating visual components of the so-called “Good 
War” challenges accepted notions of the era’s visual culture.  Indeed, many Americans 
nostalgically regard the War as a near mythical time characterized by national unity, clear 
divisions between good and evil, and the impetus to an economic boom.11  Yet OWI 
publications—distributed at home and abroad—reveal a much more complicated vision 
of American culture.  In countless posters, brochures, cartoons, and other printed 
graphics, the OWI addressed labor strikes, racial divisions, illegal black markets, the 
radical transformation of gender roles, and more.  
 This project addresses significant issues long overlooked by scholars.  While 
historians have explored the relationship between the U.S. Government and the arts 
during both the Great Depression, through New Deal agencies, and the Cold War, through 
cultural diplomacy, surprisingly little critical analysis has examined the relationship 
between modern art, World War II propaganda, and the advertising industry.12  As many 
propagandists were artists, advertising executives, and museum administrators before the 
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war, my study emphasizes the inherent connection between propaganda, commercial 
imagery, fine art, and social history.  I consider the tension between individuals 
(including artists and bureaucrats), and institutions (such as art museums and advertising 
firms), in the struggle to determine the rhetoric of American war propaganda.  My project  
thus breaks new ground by synthesizing domestic OWI campaigns along with key 
political, cultural, and aesthetic factors to reveal the complexities of American self-
representation during a time of international crisis.
 No critical study has yet analyzed multiple forms of American World War II print 
propaganda in a single volume.  Although numerous scholars have addressed American 
propaganda created during the early 1940s, much of this literature ignores differences 
between government and commercial graphics.  Furthermore, previous studies have too 
often avoided discussing the ideological justification for propaganda, including the 
reasons behind shifts in content.  A few relatively recent publications have provided a 
more critical analysis of World War II propaganda, including an overview of war posters 
by William Bird and Harry Rubenstein, and an insightful analysis of government 
photographs by George Roeder.13  Maureen Honey’s study of the relationship between 
the OWI and women’s magazines demonstrates how government messages were inserted 
into commercial publishing.14  Similarly, the work of Frank Fox has explored how 
corporate advertisers worked with the OWI to develop war themed imagery.15  Though 
helpful, these publications emphasize a single medium, an approach that unfortunately 
downplays how propagandistic messages developed across various printed forms to 
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address different audiences.  
 Until fairly recently, historians of American art have largely overlooked World War 
II propaganda and the role of the OWI.  The tendency to ignore the historic and cultural 
importance of this material is likely a result of propaganda’s reputation as purely patriotic 
imagery that shares strong affinities with commercial art.  A handful of art historians have 
addressed the relationship between the OWI and artists, including Shi Pu Wang and Erica 
Doss, who have both examined the network of art, artists, and federal and corporate 
patronage during the era.16  Michele Bogart has also discussed the intricacies of the 
relationship between modern and commercial art in the early twentieth century.17  
Similarly, Andrew Hemingway and Jonathan Harris have written extensively on federal 
art and ideology with an emphasis on New Deal art programs.18  The work of these two 
latter scholars provides a useful model for understanding the underlying structure of the 
relationship between government art, popular culture, and class.  
 Several scholars have also addressed issues relating to the politics of wartime 
sexuality, gender, and race.  Analysis by Melissa Dabakis, Melissa McEuen, and Donna 
Knaff provides helpful discussions of popular graphics depicting women and variations 
on the “Rosie the Riveter” mythology.19  Helpful critical studies of wartime racial issues 
include works by Daniel Kryder, who has analyzed the political and logistical 
consequences of Jim Crow, and Stacy Morgan and Lauren Rebecca Sklaroff, both of 
whom have examined African American art and culture during the Depression and war 
years.20  Similarly, the work of John Dower explores the role of race in propaganda and 
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popular culture in relation to the Pacific War.21 
 Finally, a handful of scholars have studied the government agencies that produced 
World War II propaganda, including the OWI.  This scholarship includes a useful 
historical overview by Allan Winkler, which addresses the OWI’s structural organization 
and emphasizes overseas activities.22  Additional studies, such as that by Sydney 
Weinberg, examine specific personnel problems that arose during the OWI’s relatively 
short existence.23  In addition to this scholarship, my dissertation also draws on 
publications that emphasize social history in order to place World War II propaganda in 
its proper historical context.  These sources include studies from scholars such as John 
Morton Blum, Paul Fussell, and Richard Lingeman, as well as oral histories by Studs 
Terkel.24 
The Ideology of Government Promotion and 
the Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt
 As this entire dissertation focuses on the analysis of government propaganda, it is 
necessary to consider the theoretical issues ingrained in such material.  Various social, 
religious, and business groups, including corporations, churches, and labor unions, 
disseminated propaganda long before the twentieth century.  While the visual, aural, or 
linguistic form may vary depending on countless historical and technological factors, 
propaganda’s basic goal is to persuade an intended audience.  Whether engaged in a war, 
combating an economic depression, or operating in a relatively stable historical era, the 
ideological content of government propaganda (often referred to by its creator as 
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“information”) is inseparable from the agenda of the state that oversees its distribution.  
As historical circumstances contribute significantly to the form such material takes, the 
analysis of propaganda provides historians with  the opportunity to understand not only 
the ideology of the state, but also the wider cultural realm in which said material was 
produced.  Often, the use of propaganda is most prevalent in circumstances where a 
dominant group seeks to strengthen its control of a less powerful group.
 For the last thirty years many historians have turned to the concept of hegemony 
to understand this system.  Hegemony, as developed most famously by the Italian Marxist 
Antonio Gramsci, refers to the process by which a dominant power, typically the state, 
maintains its authority over the masses.  Though he did not provide a specific definition, 
in an often cited quotation Gramsci referred to hegemony as “the ‘spontaneous’ consent 
given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life 
by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is ‘historically’ caused by the prestige 
(and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and 
function in the world of production.”25  While a complete analysis of hegemony as it 
applies to World War II propaganda is far beyond the scope of the present study, there are 
several key factors to note here.  First, the “spontaneous” consent of the masses Gramsci 
references alludes to the manner in which dominated groups often allow, or at least 
contribute to, their own domination.  This does not indicate that portions of society are 
composed of complete fools, nor does Gramsci imply as such.  Rather, the concept of 
hegemony suggests a system in which the dominant group uses language, media, laws, 
10
and traditions to circumscribe the choices available to the dominated.  As a result, the 
masses often fail to recognize their lack of accessible options for alternative modes or 
even resistance.  In order to understand how this process functions in a given society, 
Gramsci’s theory relies on details specific to historic and intellectual contexts.26  
Additionally, it is important to note that the hegemonic process is never complete, and 
dominant groups regularly adjust, through various mechanisms, the means by which they 
maintain power.  Finally, dominant groups rarely, if ever, succeed in achieving total 
domination.  Indeed, pockets of resistance, in various forms and possessing fluctuating 
levels of influence, exist in even the most violent and oppressive circumstances.  
 The era of Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency provides fertile cultural ground in 
which to study the hegemonic process as the numerous economic and military crises that 
exploded during the 1930s and early 1940s resulted in overt government attempts to mold 
public opinion.  The objects resulting from these campaigns, which included a range of 
media, provide historians with ample evidence of how the administration’s agenda and 
ideology evolved continuously.  This flood of material, including but not limited to press 
releases, plays, paintings, posters, and films, contrasts with the relative dearth of 
propaganda created during more stable eras, when the hegemonic process becomes more 
subtle.27  In contrast to eras of relative stability, during Roosevelt’s presidency the federal 
government exhibited itself in countless ways in everyday American life.  Beginning in 
1933, these efforts sought to encourage public support for the series of initiatives 
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installed by the Roosevelt administration referred to as the New Deal. The present study 
explains how these efforts continued in a modified form during World War II.  
 As noted by the art historian Jonathan Harris, during the New Deal the 
government engaged in an extensive attempt to encourage particular notions of patriotism 
and service based around a “‘national-popular’ rhetoric supporting Roosevelt’s reformist 
policies.”28  In Harris’ analysis, federal art programs installed by the New Deal 
constituted one aspect of a much larger, culturally rich process offered by the 
Administration as a solution to the economic crisis.  At the same time, these programs 
attempted to advance a racially progressive agenda that countered the racism of Jim 
Crow.29  Government sponsored art programs, as with other New Deal agencies, thus 
promoted federal attempts to improve the nation’s economic and social outlook through a 
culturally diverse rhetoric.  
 Many New Deal agencies introduced a level of government involvement in the 
daily lives of Americans quite unlike previous federal programs, and as a result, the 
public’s reaction was decidedly mixed.  Faced with nearly 25% national unemployment 
during the Depression, many citizens embraced Roosevelt’s reforms.  However, New 
Deal agencies also met fierce resistance for what many regarded as an unprecedented and 
unnecessary government presence in American culture.  Critics, primarily from the 
political right, blasted the New Deal as an undemocratic, unconstitutional, politically 
radical program.  To explain their goals while combating criticism, many New Deal 
agencies engaged in aggressive self promotional campaigns featuring a range of media 
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strategies that employed posters, press releases, photographs, and films.30  American 
artists played a significant role in this process, which continued into the Second World 
War.
Campaigning for War
 The visual rhetoric projected by government propagandists during the Roosevelt 
administration represented a diverse amalgamation of styles and content drawn from 
sources such as corporate advertising and modern art.  This process began during the 
1930s, when agencies such as the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and the 
Rural Electrification Administration (REA) distributed graphics characterized by highly 
stylized, abstract forms, fields of flat color, and at times an innovative use of 
photographic montage.  As discussed in the first chapter, the artists who created these 
designs, including Charles Coiner and Lester Beall, were successful commercial artists 
known for promoting the use of modern art in advertising.  Conversely, other agencies, 
most notably the Resettlement Administration (RA), created posters and other graphics 
evoking contemporary interest in documentary and social concerns.  Examples of this 
approach appeared in the work of RA artists such as Ben Shahn and Charles Pollock.  
The relationship of government graphics to modern art was complicated further by the 
diverse spaces in which these promotions appeared.  During the 1930s government-issued 
posters hung not only in federal buildings and county fairs, but also at institutions such as 
the Museum of Modern Art, which celebrated select New Deal posters as examples of 
modern, and specifically American design.  The widespread distribution of a variety of 
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federal graphics during the Depression provided an important precedent for later efforts 
during World War II.
 Yet even before the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor the Roosevelt administration 
established government agencies to create propaganda that addressed the American role 
in the war.  As discussed in the first and second chapters, these bureaus included the 
Office of Government Reports (OGR), the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD), and the 
Office of Facts and Figures (OFF).  Though these agencies had different functions, they 
combined to lay the groundwork for the OWI, established in the summer of 1942.  While 
several government offices, including the Treasury Department and each branch of the 
military, created their own propaganda during the war, the OWI served as a highly 
influential agency from midway through 1942 to the war’s end in 1945.  By establishing 
contacts in nearly all forms of modern media, including film, publishing, radio, and 
newspapers, the OWI subsequently monitored and influenced the content of printed 
graphics seen by millions of Americans.  
 The following study of the OWI’s domestic print propaganda campaigns reveals 
several overlapping issues that provide a greater understanding of the era.  First, 
propaganda addressed fears held by government officials related to domestic issues 
overlooked often in popular histories.  For example, although many Americans strongly 
supported the war effort after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Roosevelt administration 
regarded the reinforcement of wartime confidence at home as a priority, particularly as 
the war dragged on.  This concern resulted in an abundance of patriotic-themed imagery 
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that promoted the American military as a powerful, cohesive force.  Printed propaganda 
also distributed information on topics such as health issues, domestic espionage, the 
rationing of consumer products, and related government programs all designed to 
strengthen the larger war effort.  The range of topics addressed by print propaganda thus 
combined nationalist enthusiasm with government efforts to alter the public’s behavior.
 Printed World War II propaganda also displayed visual stereotypes that demonstrate 
prevalent social trends and cultural expectations from the era.  This tendency became 
prevalent by the end of the war in particular, as propaganda increasingly resembled 
contemporary advertising.  For example, while historians often note the wartime 
economy provided women and minorities with previously unavailable opportunities to 
work, most U.S. propaganda failed to exhibit the realities of the diverse wartime labor 
force.  Instead, many war posters, advertisements, and other graphics depicted workers as 
thin, statuesque white Americans with high cheekbones and perfect teeth.  This “cleaned-
up, cosmetically enhanced version of reality” ignored the culturally diverse members of 
the domestic front who supported the war effort.31  Although the OWI did create imagery 
targeting racial minorities as discussed in chapter three, attempts to address diversity in 
propaganda decreased significantly as the war progressed.  
 The OWI also provided an opportunity for a handful of artists to support the war 
with their creative talent.  Many artists, as with other citizens, sought to contribute their 
unique skills to the war effort, an issue that art magazines addressed often at the time.  As 
a result, the stable of American propagandists who created visual imagery ranged from 
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unknown commercial ad men to well-known artists whose work hung in New York 
museums and galleries.  This diversity resulted in a variety of styles being utilized by 
artists holding various backgrounds, levels of training, and political beliefs.  My study 
considers a range of these examples, including works created by established “fine” artists 
that have been overlooked previously by art historians both for their status as propaganda 
and their association with “low culture” commercial media.  
 Finally, in many ways World War II propaganda provides an opportunity for 
historians of American art and visual culture to reconsider the federal government’s 
interest in the visual arts.  While art historians typically discuss government programs 
such as the Federal Art Project (FAP) and the United States Information Agency (USIA) 
in relation to the Depression and the Cold War respectively, the OWI has received far less 
attention.  Thus, this study argues that World War II propaganda represents a critical 
transition in federal support and manipulation of the visual arts between the New Deal 
liberalism of the 1930s and the Cold War corporatization of modern art during the 1950s.  
 My dissertation does not provide a comprehensive account of all the propaganda 
produced by the OWI, nor do I analyze the complicated structural evolution of this large 
bureaucracy.  Instead, my attention focuses on how the OWI developed methods of 
targeting specific domestic audiences through different print media.  This approach 
includes the consideration of posters and newspaper graphics produced by the OWI, as 
well as magazine advertisements designed by commercial agencies that received OWI 
assistance.  Finally, I also examine posters the OWI never distributed because of their 
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controversial content.
 Ultimately, my dissertation argues that by late 1943, an increasingly conservative 
Congressional delegation, fearful of possible Communist influence within federal 
agencies, forced a drastic change in style and content in American war propaganda.  This 
transformation was achieved in part by slashing OWI budgets and forcing artists and 
administrators who refused to support the government’s visual agenda out of federal 
service.  Thus, rather than engaging with the socially conscious method of representation 
used by many progressive artists during the 1930s, American World War II print 
propaganda largely conformed to an idealized commercial realism that later dominated 
Cold War era advertising.
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Chapter 1: From Fighting the Depression to Fighting the Axis: 
New Deal Propaganda Goes to War
 In 1942 the Office of War Information (OWI) distributed a particularly dramatic 
poster (fig. 1.1).  This attempt to encourage support for the war referenced the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor, a theme common with many propagandistic graphics.  Bernard 
Perlin, the artist who designed the image, split the composition diagonally with the words 
“Avenge December 7.”  In the lower right corner, a large number seven seems to emerge 
from an exploding battleship.  This wounded craft, silhouetted against a fiery blast, 
evokes imagery seen in contemporary newspaper photographs.1  The upper portion of the 
poster is dominated by a muscular young sailor, identifiable as such by his slightly torn 
blue uniform.  Placed before a dark and cloudy background, this young man glares from 
behind his large raised right fist in a gesture intended to call the viewer to action.  
 While not unique in its theme, Perlin’s poster is notable for several reasons.  First, 
by stating the date of the Japanese attack Perlin continued a trend established by 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who in his address to a special joint session of Congress 
on December 8th, 1941, referred to the previous day as “a date that will live in infamy.”  
Both Roosevelt and Perlin, therefore, memorialized a specific traumatic date that 
resonated with many Americans regardless of their location during the attack that drew 
the U.S. into the war.2  Additionally, Perlin’s expressive typography provides a powerful 
but somewhat vague message.  Set at a dynamic angle and colored bright red with a 
sketchy, textured appearance, Perlin’s letterforms suggest a conceptual connection to the 
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explosion in the lower right corner.  Yet while the term “avenge” is emphasized in capital 
letters, the poster does not provide any explicit directions as to how viewers should 
respond to this command.  Conversely, many other posters that referred to Pearl Harbor 
gave more explicit instructions—such as “enlist” or “conserve.”  Finally, Perlin’s 
dramatic use of scale, expressive typography, and foreboding colors share unmistakable 
qualities with commercial imagery.  In this case the prominently placed, dramatically lit 
sailor seems akin to a Hollywood actor in a movie poster, while the smaller, violent scene 
in the lower right mimics the vignettes often included in contemporary theater ads and 
lobby cards.  
 Perlin’s dramatic OWI design differed from posters featuring similar content 
created by other government agencies.  For example, New Deal agencies established 
during the Great Depression, such as the Work Projects Administration (WPA; previously  
named Works Progress Administration until 1939), also distributed posters calling for 
viewers to “avenge” Pearl Harbor (1942, fig 1.2).3  This smaller poster, designed by an 
unknown artist in the months following the Japanese attack, depicted an American sailor 
from the chest up in the lower foreground.  The words “Avenge Pearl Harbor!” appear in 
bright red letters across the upper half of the image.  Though he faces the viewer, the 
sailor glares upward perhaps towards a dogfight similar to the one behind him between 
aircraft bearing insignia of Japanese and American fighters.  A message along the bottom 
of the poster encourages the viewer to “JOIN the NAVY Now!”  Unlike Perlin’s poster, 
this WPA graphic, likely printed as a silkscreen, references Pearl Harbor specifically 
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while promoting enlistment in the Navy as a clear means to avenge the Japanese attack.  
Additionally, while Perlin’s work exhibits a dramatic commercial art sensibility, the 
WPA poster features a more linear style and flat, primary colors suggesting the technical 
limits of silkscreen printing.
 These two posters, printed contemporaneously by different federal agencies, 
represent more than a convenient comparison in style and content.  In fact, they point to a 
critical transition in the U.S. government’s use of images during the Great Depression 
and World War II.  This evolution began years before Pearl Harbor during the 1930s, 
when the Roosevelt administration established a series of initiatives known as the New 
Deal.  Designed to counteract the social and economic effects of the Depression, New 
Deal agencies employed artists and public relations professionals to explain the 
government’s plan for recovery.  These employees designed posters, brochures, and films, 
organized traveling exhibitions, created photographs, and generated press releases.  As a 
result, during the 1930s a flood of federal propaganda came from the public relations 
department of various bureaus.  Despite their diversity in content and style, graphics 
created by New Deal agencies shared a similar underlying ideology: regardless of their 
source, they promoted the role of government in aiding the nation’s recovery through 
social, cultural, and economic programs.4  Conservative political opponents attacked 
these promotions as unnecessary expenditures that delayed the economic market’s natural 
rebound and instead served as partisan promotions of the Roosevelt administration.5  
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 During the early 1940s New Deal agencies began shifting their focus from 
fighting the Depression at home to domestic defense and the impending war abroad.  
Following the Pearl Harbor bombing and subsequent declaration of war in December 
1941, national fears related to the economy subsided as agencies began fervently 
supporting the war with recruiting posters and military training graphics.  This evolution 
concluded in 1943 when Congress eliminated the WPA, thus ending a critical source of 
federal jobs and arts funding that had provided assistance to millions of Americans during 
the preceding years.  Significantly, 1943 also saw the first anniversary of the OWI, a 
propaganda bureau whose content increasingly mirrored commercial advertising as the 
war progressed.  Thus, while federal agencies created during the New Deal and the war 
provided American artists with opportunities during times of crisis, the political 
justifications for the creation of the imagery they distributed differed significantly.
 This chapter analyzes the ideological evolution of government posters and other 
graphics created between FDR’s first inauguration in 1933 and the establishment of the 
OWI in the summer of 1942.  I argue that the shift in government propaganda described 
above was intertwined with numerous cultural, economic, and social issues relating to the 
nation’s military buildup.  As the Pearl Harbor posters discussed previously demonstrate, 
the artists who created graphics for New Deal and war propaganda agencies presented 
content differently, even when addressing similar topics.  This diversity resulted from 
trends in modern and commercial art, as well as from a complicated power struggle 
between artists and federal bureaucrats over the relationship between art and the state.  
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While several scholars have examined how the U.S. government transitioned from 
fighting the Depression to fighting the war, my analysis reveals the development of an 
associated visual rhetoric as war slowly approached, then exploded into American life.6  
 This chapter begins with an examination of government attempts to mold public 
opinion before the economic crash in 1929, including efforts to encourage American 
involvement in World War I.  The second section compares New Deal promotions created 
by the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and the WPA, which both used national, 
though very different publicity strategies in the 1930s.  Following this analysis, the third 
section considers the promotional efforts of government agencies designed to provide 
assistance to rural communities, including the Resettlement Administration (RA) and the 
Rural Electrification Administration (REA).7  The fourth and final section examines the 
creation of government graphics featuring war-themed content in the late 1930s and early  
1940s, including imagery that prepared Americans for the possibility of war even before 
the Pearl Harbor attack.  
Advertising America: Promoting Government Before the Great Depression
 The U.S. government began using modern public relation strategies thirty-five 
years before World War II.  Similar to corporations and other large, well-funded 
institutions, the government employed press agents to distribute press releases, establish 
contacts with the media, and generally attempt to shape a more positive public opinion of 
the state.  Historians often identify President Theodore Roosevelt, FDR’s distant cousin, 
as the first chief executive to employ such strategies.8  In 1905, the first Roosevelt 
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administration began using press agents to drum up support for various purposes, 
including initiatives related to the Forest Service and the creation of the Panama Canal.  
A controversy ensued when Congress discovered that the Panama Canal Commission 
hired a press agent to combat what Secretary of War William Howard Taft referred to as 
incorrect impressions “circulated maliciously” by enemies of the proposal.9  Less than 
one year later, in 1906, Congressman Joseph Bailey (D-TX) referred to the work of 
Forest Service press agents as “propaganda” on the floor of the House, the first, but 
certainly not the last instance of such a declaration.10  Soon after, Congress outlawed 
federal agencies from hiring press agents.  Presidential administrations later worked 
around this legislation by changing the official titles of employees, and thus government 
attempts to mold public opinion continued.11 
 Government propaganda efforts increased dramatically during World War I nearly 
twelve years later.  After the U.S. declared war on the Central Powers in 1917, national 
propaganda campaigns became increasingly prevalent, dramatic, and visually similar to 
commercial imagery.  Unlike previous government attempts to sway public opinion, the 
First World War required a national propaganda agency generating much larger, more 
intense campaigns.  In April 1917, shortly after the U.S. entered the war, President 
Woodrow Wilson formed the Committee on Public Information (CPI), the nation’s 
official World War I propaganda office.12  The CPI was also known as the Creel 
Committee after its director George Creel, a former Wilson campaign strategist and 
muckraking journalist.  Creel enlisted the popular commercial illustrator Charles Dana 
26
Gibson to oversee the production of dynamic, eye-catching war posters.13  Famous for his 
“Gibson Girl” drawings of wealthy, elegant women, Gibson recruited a group of well-
known, largely volunteer commercial artists, including J.C. Leyendecker and James 
Montgomery Flagg, to design posters promoting the sale of war bonds, army enlistment, 
and general patriotism.  Flagg’s iconic “I Want You” recruitment poster, one of the most 
well-known works of the CPI, is still used today by U.S. Army recruiting offices (1917, 
fig. 1.3).  As numerous scholars have noted, Flagg’s design benefited not only from its 
strongly patriotic message, but from Uncle Sam’s aggressively pointed, foreshortened 
finger that engages viewers directly.14  Along with placing posters in public spaces such 
as post offices and train stations, the CPI’s Advertising Division hired industry 
professionals to solicit donations of advertising space in newspapers and magazines from 
patrons who paid the cost of printing in return for a brief mention of their donation.15  
The CPI also organized discussion groups, distributed press releases, and trained 75,000 
so-called “four minute men” to campaign verbally for the war effort in movie theaters 
and on street corners with short, four minute speeches.16
 As most CPI artists were commercial illustrators, World War I propaganda shared 
strong formal similarities with advertisements.  Thus, many CPI posters exaggerated 
aspects of the war abroad and of conditions at home in order to achieve effective results.  
For example, in addition to the forceful patriotism seen in Flagg’s Uncle Sam poster, 
reoccurring themes included masculine strength, motherly sentiment, feminine sexuality 
(fig. 1.4), and a violent, bloodthirsty enemy.  The latter theme, at times particularly 
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sensationalistic, was an effective method to justify the use of violence against the enemy.  
One well-known example characterized the Germans as ferocious apes intent on rape and 
destruction (fig. 1.5).  Such graphics shared a narrative similar to widely spread atrocity 
stories of crimes committed by the Central Powers against innocent women and children 
throughout war-torn Europe.  One war bonds poster displayed the blood-soaked boots of 
a German soldier in reference to similar rumors of the savage and murderous “Hun” (fig. 
1.6).17
 President Wilson eliminated the CPI following the Armistice in November 1918, 
and the agency soon developed a decidedly mixed legacy.  Initially celebrated as a 
success, many Americans remembered the CPI and its participating artists as patriotic 
contributors to the suppression of isolationist, pacifist, and other anti-war movements.18  
In 1920 Creel published his memoirs, which provided extensive details on how the CPI 
whipped Americans into a nationalistic frenzy.  Titled How We Advertised America, Creel 
noted the importance of domestic psychological warfare by emphasizing that the “fight 
for the minds of men,” was characterized by battle lines that ran “through every home in 
every country.”19  Although he carefully avoided using the term “propaganda” when 
referring to the CPI’s work, Creel admitted the agency was part of “a plain publicity 
proposition, a vast enterprise in salesmanship, the world’s greatest adventure in 
advertising.”20  Not surprisingly, the advertising industry claimed the victory in Europe as 
at least partially their own.  Three days after the Armistice, the industry journal Printers’ 
Ink declared “the war has been won by advertising, as well as by soldiers and 
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munitions.”21  More recently, historians such as Jackson Lears have noted that the 
relationship between the CPI and advertising marked the “first time that government 
policy itself had been systematically promoted through commercial techniques of mass 
persuasion.”22  Additionally, the art historian Michelle Bogart notes that CPI artists saw 
their work as a positive experience that “enhanced illustrators’ artistic reputations, and 
generated much positive commentary.”23  Thus, the combined efforts of government 
bureaucrats and commercial artists during World War I was seen initially as an effective, 
beneficial strategy for all parties.
 By the 1920s however, many Americans began questioning the Creel Committee’s 
zealousness.  During the war, supporters of intervention became so rabid in their 
“patriotism” that threats against and beatings of isolationists and pacifists were not 
unknown.  Immigrants, particularly Germans, faced an especially difficult situation, as 
seen in the lynching of a Dresden native in Illinois in April 1918.24  The CPI’s 
inflammatory rhetoric, atrocity stories, and related images featuring militant, bloodthirsty 
enemies soon became suspect in the interwar era.  While such graphics worked well 
during the war, the historian J. Michael Sproule has noted Allied veterans pointed out that 
atrocity stories were mostly exaggerations, and that “the Germans had behaved no worse 
than any other combatants.”25  Such realizations led many Americans to question not only 
the costs of U.S. involvement in the war, but also the manner in which the CPI had 
promoted the war using flashy advertising techniques.  
29
 Critics began questioning the ethics of the CPI’s methods and the credibility of 
Creel’s success.  Simultaneously, the term “propaganda” began to take on an increasingly 
negative connotation in American culture.  Several journalists and academics set the 
standards of this argument in the 1920s by encouraging the scientific study of propaganda 
and the management (or manipulation) of public opinion.  Many well-known former 
supporters of the CPI became significant critics of Creel, including Walter Lippmann, a 
journalist and theorist, and Harold Lasswell, a scholar of propaganda and media.26  
Known for his work on the psychological aspects of public opinion and advertising, 
Lippman wrote a scathing review of How We Advertised America which argued that 
Creel’s avoidance of the term “propaganda” did not lessen the CPI’s use of duplicitous 
persuasion methods.  Lippmann noted that in opposition to its stated mission of 
disseminating honest information, the CPI instead purveyed “news and argument which 
put America in the best possible light and sustained the fighting morale.”27  Such 
criticism encouraged the public’s increasing skepticism of all forms of propaganda and 
mass-persuasion, including advertising.
 As commercial artists played a key role in encouraging American support for 
World War I, advertising itself came under significant scrutiny beginning in the 1920s.  
Numerous historians have noted that critics of advertising, including editorialists, 
academics, and consumer advocates, increased their attacks at a time when advertising 
became more prevalent in American society.28  A debate soon emerged over the ability of 
advertising to manipulate consumer behavior.  While business leaders advocated for 
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unrestricted promotional opportunities, Lasswell and other critics offered scientific 
analysis demonstrating the ability of propaganda and advertising to mold public 
opinion.29  The increasingly unclear boundaries between advertising and fine art muddied 
this dispute further.  Previously, most critics considered fine art distinctly separate from 
commercial art by promoting the former as a purer form of creative expression not 
limited by the needs of the commercial market.  Yet during the 1920s and 1930s an 
increasing number of advertising executives promoted fine art aesthetics as a marketing 
technique.30  The following section examines how government agencies became 
enmeshed in this debate when the Roosevelt administration began promoting the New 
Deal with graphics that shared formal similarities with modern art and design.   
From “First” to “Second” New Deal: Promoting the NRA and WPA
 Shortly after President Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in April 1933, his 
administration began establishing agencies to combat the effects of the Great Depression.  
As components of a series of reforms known as the “New Deal,” these new bureaus often 
created self-promoting campaigns to encourage public support for their agendas.  Two 
offices in particular, the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and the Works 
Progress Administration (WPA), generated a prominent presence in Depression-era visual 
culture.  While these agencies had different goals and used different visual rhetoric, their 
promotions represent early attempts by the Roosevelt administration to mold public 
opinion.  Significantly, each agency is aligned with specific chronological periods of 
Roosevelt’s presidency.  The NRA, established near the end of FDR’s “First Hundred 
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Days” in June 1933, distributed patriotic graphics featuring semi-militaristic themes of 
national unity that reappeared in war propaganda during the 1940s.  Although NRA 
graphics generated a significant amount of attention—both positive and negative—the 
agency was declared unconstitutional in 1935.  Shortly after, the White House pushed a 
series of legislative initiatives referred to colloquially as the “Second” New Deal.  This 
effort led to the creation of numerous new bureaus, including the WPA, an agency with 
wide ranging goals that promoted its agenda through posters, exhibitions, and press 
releases from 1935 until 1943.  Unlike NRA publicity, WPA promotions displayed 
diverse content based on the agency’s responsibility to aid numerous government 
promotional efforts.  Though they did not exist contemporaneously, the goals of both the 
NRA and the WPA shared a similar underlying ideological mission to encourage citizens 
to support the President’s plans for economic recovery.31
 A controversial, short lived agency, the NRA intended to jump-start a pummeled 
economy through a series of federal regulations.32  Its primary method for reform 
involved the creation of a series of laws, known as codes, designed to regulate labor and 
industry.  These codes attempted to reshape and improve working conditions, wages, 
prices, and production.33  The NRA achieved some success, and scholars have noted the 
agency ended overproduction resulting partially from unregulated labor laws.  Perhaps 
one of the agency’s greatest successes came in the stabilization of the cotton industry, 
where the NRA established production quotas, inaugurated an industry wide forty-hour 
work week, and forced the end of child labor in cotton mills.34 
32
 To promote its agenda, the NRA created an extensive promotional campaign that 
soon became a well-known component of the Depression’s visual landscape.  The 
agency’s promotional strategy resulted largely from the efforts of its director, General 
Hugh S. Johnson, an outspoken, colorfully blunt figure with a “brazen personality.”35  
Johnson was a lawyer, West Point graduate, businessman, newspaper columnist, and an 
occasional presidential speech writer in FDR’s first administration.  During the First 
World War, Johnson oversaw the promotion of war bond sales, an effort that likely 
contributed to his appointment at the NRA.  However, while CPI campaigns had an 
identifiable German enemy dubbed “the Hun” during the 1910s, the NRA lacked an 
easily denoted villain.  Thus, as historians such as William Leuchtenburg have noted, 
Johnson often referred to the NRA’s “war” against the Depression.36  As a result, the 
agency often used patriotic, wartime rhetoric similar to that used during World War I.  
 In the summer of 1933, shortly after the agency’s establishment, Johnson initiated 
a campaign promoting the NRA that featured the work of professional advertising 
designers.37  The commercial artists Johnson hired included Charles Coiner, a young 
graphic designer from Philadelphia.  Coiner created the NRA logo, known popularly as 
the “Blue Eagle,” that first appeared in public in August 1933 (fig. 1.7).  While the U.S. 
government had long held a presence in American visual culture, this design represented 
a new type of federal symbol.  Coiner’s highly stylized eagle, easily reproducible at any 
size, used a simple, patriotic, red, white and blue color combination.  Rendered as one 
solid shape with few details, the eagle held its wings outstretched and beak to the left in a 
33
seemingly alert and powerful pose.  Its right claw held a gear while its left grasps three 
thunderbolts, symbolizing the industry and energy needed to improve the economy 
respectively.  Although Coiner may have intended his design to represent a bald eagle, 
Johnson later wrote that the logo referred to a Native American symbol he admired.38  
Regardless of its original source, Johnson did not hesitate to offer his criticism during the 
logo’s design.  When shown an early sketch that included an eagle holding a stalk of 
wheat, Johnson reportedly snarled “Get that wheat out of there.  This isn’t an agricultural 
program!”39 
 The Blue Eagle’s accompanying typography helped explain a primary agency 
goal.  Coiner placed three bold, red, sans-serif “NRA” letters above the eagle, and the 
words “we do our part” centered beneath.  In addition to serving as an agency icon, a key 
function of the Blue Eagle was to identify businesses that adhered to its industry codes.  
From 1933 to 1935, any business or individual that participated in the rules drawn up by 
the NRA could display a poster, flag, banner, or button featuring the Blue Eagle.  
President Roosevelt explained to Americans the purpose of the NRA emblem in a radio 
address thusly: “Those who cooperate in this program must know each other at a glance.  
That is why we have provided a badge of honor for this purpose, a simple design with a 
legend, ‘We do our part,’ and I ask that all those who join with me shall display that 
badge prominently.”40  By September 1933, more than two million business had complied 
(fig. 1.8).41 
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 To promote the NRA Johnson encouraged the widespread use of the Blue Eagle in 
a variety of spaces and media.  Historians such as T.H. Watkins have noted that due to 
Johnson’s efforts, Coiner’s Blue Eagle “fluttered and screamed its way into nearly every 
cranny of the American social landscape.”42  For nearly two years, between 1933 and 
1935, the NRA eagle appeared in window displays (fig. 1.9), newspapers (fig. 1.10), 
parades (fig. 1.11), buttons (fig. 1.12), and in federally produced art, as seen in Maxine 
Albro’s Coit Tower murals in San Francisco (1933-4; fig. 1.13).43  NRA posters featured 
a fiscally confident Uncle Sam encouraging consumers to spend their hard earned capital 
despite economic uncertainty (fig. 1.14).44  As during World War I, “four minute men” 
took to street corners to promote the NRA as well.45  Citizens took it upon themselves to 
create NRA-themed jewelry, snowmen, and hand-painted signs.  Folk singers referenced 
the Blue Eagle favorably, and the owner of Philadelphia’s professional football team 
named his squad the “eagles” after the NRA, a name that survives today.46  Coiner’s 
Eagle also appeared in the backgrounds of films and in advertisements shown prior to 
screenings (fig. 1.15).  The NRA logo became such a memorable symbol that, for many 
Americans, it was nearly synonymous with the New Deal.47  Thus, despite the NRA’s 
short, rocky existence and questionable success, Johnson’s promotional efforts were 
exhaustive, and Time named him the “Man of the Year” in 1933.  
 The visual style of Coiner’s Blue Eagle contrasted strongly with previous 
government efforts to influence citizen behavior.  In so doing, NRA promotions 
demonstrated the administration’s engagement with progressive forms of design.  While 
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CPI artists used a highly naturalistic, “realistic” style in World War I posters, Coiner’s 
design shows a clear awareness of modern design trends in its highly stylized form.  The 
Blue Eagle’s formal similarities with contemporary international design is evident when 
compared to Art Deco graphics such as a Vanity Fair magazine cover created in 1930 by 
the Italian Futurist Fortunato Depero (fig. 1.16).  Coiner, a noted proponent of European 
graphic design trends, was also an outspoken advocate for the inclusion of “fine art” 
graphics in advertising.  Before creating the Blue Eagle, Coiner worked at N.W. Ayer, a 
Philadelphia advertising group often regarded as the nation’s first advertising agency, 
where he established his reputation by using modern art aesthetics as “an attention 
device” in the 1920s.48  As a result of this mixing of “high” and commercial art, the 
boundaries between art, commerce, and industry became increasingly complex during the 
era.49  Although many artists operated as both “fine” and advertising artists, critics 
typically regarded these fields as separate spheres.  Thus, federally produced graphics 
entered into an ongoing conversation concerning promotional design.
 Coiner later used his notoriety in the art world to promote his opinion concerning 
the use of art in society.50  As an advocate for the advancement of commercial art 
standards, Coiner had little patience for painters who chose to avoid advertising work.  In 
1936, Coiner wrote an Art Digest article where he stated that “the art of any age should 
reflect that age,” and that too many artists were “wasting their time painting the industrial 
scene.”  Instead, he maintained artists “should be playing a part in the industrial scene” 
by pursuing “industrial commissions.”  Coiner argued that as a result of the increasing 
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industrialization of modern society, artists should reevaluate their roles and art schools 
should emphasize commercial art skills.  “How long will it be,” he wrote, “before our 
artists come down out of their north-lighted attics and start contributing to the life of the 
community?”51  Painters of the so-called “American Scene” thus served little purpose for 
Coiner, and his criticism extended to the work of artists on federal art projects.
 Despite the NRA’s aggressive promotional campaign, Johnson’s attempts to guide 
the agency and encourage American support for its agenda was short-lived.  Most 
scholars note that the agency’s inherent flaw was the manner in which industry leaders 
held significant authority over the creation of regulations.  Historians such as Robert 
McElvaine have argued that the NRA’s attempts to negotiate with business leaders “often 
amounted to government-sanctioned price fixing.”52  Despite its cozy relationship with 
business, many industrialists still regarded the NRA as an unwelcome intrusion of federal 
bureaucracy that would stifle economic recovery.  Critics included Henry Ford, who 
condemned Coiner’s eagle as “that Roosevelt buzzard,” as well as former President 
Herbert Hoover, populist politicians such as Senator Huey Long (D-LA), and the radio 
preacher Charles Coughlin.53  Criticism also appeared in political cartoons (fig. 1.17) and 
magazines including Vanity Fair, which depicted Coiner’s eagle in a less than flattering 
manner more than once (fig. 1.18).  The manner in which the NRA aligned government 
and business also riled political leftists.  Publications such as The Daily Worker likened 
the stylized, geometric design of the blue eagle to a fascist icon.54  Artists on the left also 
criticized Coiner’s Blue Eagle, as seen in a cartoon by William Gropper that depicted a 
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feminized President Roosevelt wearing a necklace bearing the NRA eagle sent from 
capitalist admirers (fig. 1.19).55 
 The variety of criticism levied against the NRA foreshadowed its eventual demise.  
Despite his vigorous enthusiasm, Johnson’s personal life eventually became a liability.  
Initially an asset to the Roosevelt administration, Johnson was prone to drinking binges 
that lasted several days.  He also had a scandalous affair with his secretary that 
contributed to his eventual political downfall, and he later became a fierce critic of 
Roosevelt.  More importantly, in May 1935, the Supreme Court deemed the NRA an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, thus ending a bold though flawed plan 
for recovery.  Shortly afterwards, the nonpartisan Brookings Institute concluded “the 
NRA on the whole retarded recovery.”56  Historians have since categorized the NRA an 
“unqualified failure” that “did little to improve economic conditions.”57  Though 
President Roosevelt publicly supported the agency, after the Supreme Court declared it 
unconstitutional he privately admitted the NRA contained serious flaws.58 
 Following the failure of the NRA, Roosevelt faced an increasingly vocal opposition, 
particularly from bombastic critics such as Long and Coughlin.  However, overwhelming 
Democratic victories in the November 1934 Congressional elections gave the White 
House an opportunity to propose new progressive legislation to reform American social 
and economic policy.59  The following year saw the establishment of federal agencies 
designed to stabilize the country that benefited the struggling working class in particular.  
On one week alone in June 1935, Congress passed the Social Security Act and the 
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Wagner Act, a key piece of labor reform.  The President’s intention to fight economic 
instability and related social ills by redistributing wealth was clear: in an address to 
Congress that summer, FDR argued that the hoarding of large amounts of capital meant 
“the perpetuation of great and undesirable concentration of control in a relatively few 
individuals over the employment and welfare of many, many others.”60  Subsequent 
legislative proposals included federal inheritance and gift taxes, increased personal 
income taxes for top earners, and a graduated corporate income tax.  This legislation 
signaled FDR’s support of the struggling working class before the 1936 elections and 
contributed to his reputation as a “traitor to his class.”61
 One of the most significant aspects of the wave of Second New Deal legislation in 
1935 was the enactment of the Works Progress Administration (WPA).  The WPA 
employed hundreds of thousands of Americans in a range of public works jobs.  Headed 
by Harry Hopkins, a former social worker who became an integral figure in Roosevelt’s 
staff, the WPA had a budget of $1.39 billion to provide federal work relief through a 
variety of programs.  In many cases, WPA workers contributed to public works projects 
that included the creation and maintenance of roads and buildings.  For example, the 
WPA built or improved 20,000 playgrounds, schools, and hospitals.  The agency also 
created bridges, built fire houses, and improved public utilities.  While the pay to 
individual workers was meager—sometimes as low as $55 a month, or about half a 
minimum subsistence budget at the time—the WPA provided millions of unemployed 
workers with jobs.62 
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 Along with improving infrastructure and public buildings, the WPA also provided 
vital support for the arts.  The WPA established four arts-related agencies known 
collectively as Federal One: the Federal Art Project (FAP), the Federal Music Project 
(FMP), the Federal Theatre Project (FTP), and the Federal Writer’s Project (FWP).  
Hopkins noted that artists had been “hit just as hard by unemployment as any other 
producing worker,” and thus needed government support.63  Moreover, WPA 
administrators hoped to use Federal One as a means to join “high culture” with American 
democracy.  Officials designed Federal One programs to grant artists much needed 
financial support while also providing art “for the people.”  The results not only provided 
artists with crucial income during tough economic times, but also exposed millions of 
Americans to art and culture that many communities had little access to previously.  As a 
result, small towns across the country saw classical music performances and plays.  
Traveling exhibitions of painting, sculpture, and design similarly exposed Americans to 
contemporary trends in the visual arts.  Despite the large cultural benefits, the actual 
percentage of capital invested in Federal One was small compared to the rest of the 
agency: in its first year alone, the WPA employed more than 3 million individuals, only 
5,300 of which were artists in the FAP.64  All told, in eight years the WPA employed more 
than 8.5 million people at a cost of approximately $11 billion.65  As discussed below, a 
handful of these programs extended into the 1940s, although as with other New Deal 
initiatives, such agencies would eventually come under fire from conservative politicians 
as wasteful harborers of communist sympathizers.66
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 The WPA relied primarily on two methods to promote its programs.  The first was 
the distribution of press releases through its own Division of Information.  As the 
historian Richard McKinzie notes, these efforts were “glib, traditional” and uninspired 
visually.67  Posters constituted the WPA’s second and more visual form of promotion.  
Created by FAP artists in studios across the country, WPA posters promoted each branch 
of Federal One, as well as other New Deal programs.68  While other FAP sections 
included easel painting and printmaking workshops, the poster studios served a slightly 
different function within the project.  Holger Cahill, national director of the FAP, 
requested that projects not defined as “fine arts” be “socially useful.”  This meant 
“practical” arts programs, such as posters and photography, were required to work with a 
variety of other offices within the WPA/FAP to promote the agency’s larger goals.69  
Ralph Graham, a Chicago-based WPA poster designer, noted his poster studio produced 
work that not only signified the “need of and demand for artists to be integrated into the 
community,” but also that posters functioned as a social lubricant similar to “the 
newspaper, the radio, and the movies.”70  Displayed in a variety of public locations, WPA 
posters became part of the visual environment of communities, and thus their message 
became subtle but powerful.
 The agency’s first poster workshop opened in New York City in 1935, where Mayor 
Fiorella La Guardia used posters to encourage support for an anti-slot machine campaign 
the previous year.  These early posters were hand-painted by a team of artists working in 
an assembly-line fashion that required each illustrator to paint a single color.  By 1935, 
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participating artists began using silkscreen presses to print posters.  Generally used for 
commercial art jobs requiring a quick turnaround and a small number of prints, silkscreen 
printing was a cheaper, more efficient process that also required fewer workers.71  Thus, 
poster designers could efficiently produce a large number of graphics without the use of 
more costly offset printing.  By 1938, three years after the FAP took over La Guardia’s 
New York City poster program, the agency had established poster studios in 38 states.72  
Most WPA posters measured 22 x 14,” and could easily be displayed on public bulletin 
boards, school and community centers, buses, and subways.  The programs they 
advertised varied widely and included civic activities, band concerts, lectures, FTP 
productions (fig. 1.20), as well as health care issues and treatment centers (fig. 1.21).73  
Poster workshops also promoted classes for children and adults (fig. 1.22), and produced 
book jackets for FWP publications and covers for WPA exhibition catalogs.  Similar to 
their fellow artists who produced murals, photographs and prints, WPA poster designers 
created an astonishing amount of art.  Between 1935 and 1943, the WPA printed 2 million 
posters from 35,000 designs across the country, an impressive display of the productive 
capabilities of the silkscreen medium.74 
 NRA promotions, which relied largely on Coiner’s Blue Eagle, exhibited some 
formal similarities with WPA posters through their highly stylized, modern designs.  
However, WPA graphics exhibited a diversity in content unique to most other government 
funded artists.  While artists and community leaders debated the content of murals, and 
government photographers such as Walker Evans quarreled with supervisor Roy Stryker 
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at the RA/FSA, WPA poster designers enjoyed creative freedom to experiment.  Their 
designs show a variety of influences, and the geometric abstraction seen in most 
examples suggest an affinity with Art Deco, Constructivist, and Futurist forms.  As seen 
in Herbert Pratt’s promotional design for The Dictator, a FTP production, workshop 
supervisors encouraged expressive typography (fig. 1.23).  In this and other cases, 
letterforms became more than informative text through a creative incorporation into the 
poster’s overall design.  The distinctively modern forms appearing in most WPA posters 
share formal similarities not only with Coiner’s Blue Eagle, but also with contemporary 
product design as well.  Many of these posters exhibit a “streamlined” appearance, 
reminiscent of the geometric forms seen in the work of American industrial designers 
such as Donald Deskey, Kem Weber, and Paul Frankl.75 
 The modern style seen in many WPA posters resulted from several factors.  First, 
WPA poster workshop supervisors encouraged artists to seek inspiration from 
contemporary European graphic designers, an influence that led to WPA graphics 
exhibiting abstracted forms of representation.  The New York City WPA poster studio had 
a strong connection to such ideas specifically, as Richard Floethe, a European-trained 
designer, directed the poster workshop from 1936 to 1943.  As a young man Floethe 
studied in Dortmund and Munich under Wassily Kandinsky and Paul Klee, and as a result 
he encouraged designers to experiment with abstraction.  After immigrating to the U.S. in 
1928 from Germany, Floethe sought to raise the level of American poster design to a high 
art, similar to the status the medium enjoyed in Europe.76  This sentiment was shared by 
43
Graham, the previously mentioned Chicago FAP poster designer, who noted that U.S. ad 
campaigns typically used enlargements from magazines for poster promotions, without 
concern for how such a transfer effected appearances.  As a result, Graham felt American 
advertising designers lacked creative opportunities and that clients typically insisted on 
featuring a “rosy-cheeked maiden with a paralyzed smile inviting the spectator to invest 
in his product, no matter whether it is trucks or toothpaste.”  Floethe’s goal to raise 
American design standards and influence commercial artits through dynamic WPA 
posters soon became a reality.  Speaking years after the WPA closed, he noted that 
commercial advertisers “which had looked skeptically at our new concept, took notice—
visited our shops and even asked technical advice...”  Floethe argued further that the 
WPA poster program not only raised the general standards for poster design and gave 
unemployed artists work, it also prepared artists to return to the commercial workforce 
with more developed skills.77
 The distinctive style exhibited by WPA posters also resulted from the nature of the 
silkscreen medium.  Historians have suggested that a technique similar to silkscreen 
printing was invented in China 2,000 years ago.  The process includes the chemical 
treatment of a framed screen that allows ink to pass through a stenciled shape.  Thus, 
solid forms of flat colors reproduce quickly and easily, encouraging a distinct aesthetic 
characterized by hard edges and fields of solid color.  The low cost of this process 
allowed silkscreen posters to be relatively affordable.  The list of institutions served by 
WPA poster workshops thus included numerous federal and state agencies, while also 
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extending to zoos, libraries, art centers, and civic groups.  As discussed previously, before 
its end in 1943, the WPA poster workshops also created graphics to support the war effort 
(fig. 1.2).  Finally, an additional reason for the visual diversity of WPA posters resulted 
from the fact that the graphics did not promote commercial products, thus, designers 
enjoyed more freedom to experiment.78
 As with other branches of the WPA, the FAP poster design studios received periodic 
criticism.  While WPA posters were generally less controversial than other FAP programs, 
the posters did come under fire in 1938 when Audrey McMahon, Director of the New 
York FAP, suggested designers create a calendar for distribution to U.S. Congressmen 
(fig. 1.24).  The strategy proved ill-advised when a Congressional recipient went on the 
floor of the House waving the calendar around while disparaging its creation, and the 
office that produced it, as a waste of money.79 
 Finally, in addition to promoting government programs and services in civic spaces, 
during the 1930s WPA posters were exhibited in “high art” locations such as the Museum 
of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York.  Designed to raise American graphic design 
standards and educate viewers on “good” design, MoMA held several poster competitions 
and exhibitions during the era.80  Beginning in 1936, the museum displayed graphics by 
well-known European poster artists such as the French designer A.M. Cassandre (fig. 
1.25), and E. McKnight Kauffer, an American expatriate living in England.81  Museum 
press releases aligned Cassandre with modern art specifically by noting that his work 
“employs stylistically any of the manners of modern painting,” including cubism and 
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surrealism.82  MoMA began displaying American posters before the 1937 Kauffer exhibit 
as well.  Government produced posters, including but not limited to WPA designs, were 
often included in these exhibitions.  The first such recorded instance came in 1936 with 
New Horizons in American Art, an exhibition that included a range of FAP artwork.  
While praising traditional fine arts such as easel paintings and sculpture, Cahill’s 
introductory exhibition essay emphasized the importance of the “integration between the 
fine arts and the practical arts.”  The exhibition thus included WPA posters supporting 
government programs in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and New York.  One of the most striking 
examples exhibited promoted the FTP’s Negro Unit production of Macbeth, directed by a 
young Orson Wells (fig. 1.26).83  According to Cahill, these designs assisted public 
institutions while also encouraging “higher levels in the creation of objects of common 
use.”84  Cahill thus emphasized not only the integration of “fine” art with “practical” art, 
he also sought to encourage and inspire designers, and the public, to develop a sense of 
“good” design.  
 New Deal posters therefore, from both the NRA and the WPA, attempted to 
promote the efforts of government agencies to provide assistance and stability across the 
country.  Although the NRA did not last long, its Blue Eagle campaign marked the most 
notable attempt by the federal government to appeal to a wide American audience since 
the First World War.  Unlike the NRA, WPA posters displayed a much larger range in 
content resulting from the agency’s more diverse agenda and artistic freedom.  Other 
Second New Deal agencies saw various levels of artistic experimentation akin to the 
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WPA.  For example, before turning to explicit promotions of the war, the next section 
examines two agencies created shortly after the demise of the NRA that both focused on 
improving the lives of Americans in rural areas.  
Promoting Government Aid in Rural America: REA & RA
 The creation of federal agencies designed to assist farmers and rural communities 
constituted a significant component of the Second New Deal.  Such programs provided 
crucial aid as farmers faced numerous problems resulting not only from economic 
concerns, but also from a series of massive droughts during the mid 1930s.  As a result of 
these issues, rural regions saw declining populations and vast poverty.  To combat this 
situation while strengthening agriculturally-based economies, the Roosevelt 
administration initiated programs designed to improve farmers’ standard of living.  Two 
of the key offices in this effort, the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) and the 
Resettlement Administration (RA), created promotional campaigns that explained agency  
goals in posters, exhibitions, and films.85  Despite sharing a similar audience, publicity 
created by the REA and the RA displayed distinctly different rhetoric.  While the REA 
produced posters featuring a positive, upbeat tone and visual similarities to modern 
European design, the RA distributed graphics that bluntly addressed the era’s economic 
hardships.  Furthermore, the RA used visual and audio methods to document aspects of 
rural culture in a manner the REA did not.86  This section examines how promotional 
campaigns reveal the different, though closely related agendas of the REA and RA.
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 Established in May 1935 with Executive Order 7037, the REA was created to 
increase access to electricity in rural areas.87  To achieve this goal, the agency established 
cooperative offices across the country.  REA members, mostly though not exclusively 
farmers, pooled funds against low interest federal loans to subsidize the cost of providing 
electricity to sparsely populated regions.88  Previously, privately owned electric 
companies argued that providing service to rural consumers would not yield adequate 
profits.89  The need for this service was thus critical: in the early 1930s, only ten percent 
of American farms had access to electricity.  Thanks to the efforts of the REA, by the 
early 1950s electricity had reached approximately ninety percent of farms.90
 To promote its services the REA distributed brochures, films, exhibitions, and 
posters.  As the design historian R. Roger Remington has noted, the REA faced a unique 
problem with its promotional efforts as the communities served often had high illiteracy 
rates.91  The agency’s posters therefore had to be graphically legible to viewers who 
might lack basic reading skills.  To handle this visual problem, the agency hired Lester 
Beall, a young advertising designer known for his interest in modern European art, 
expressive typography, and photomontage.  Born in Kansas City and educated at the 
University of Chicago, Beall was hired by W.B. “Bill” Phillips, an REA administrator, to 
create three sets of six lithographic posters for the REA over four years (1936-41).  As 
with other New Deal promotions, Beall’s posters were distributed to schools, county 
fairs, public buildings, and shown at traveling exhibitions.92
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 Beall’s first series of posters, created in 1936, featured an austere design with 
little textual information.  One example depicted a lone, likely rural home upon a horizon 
line separated by fields of red earth and blue sky (fig. 1.27).  A huge lightbulb labeled 
“LIGHT” emphasized a basic REA benefit.  Another example from Beall’s first series 
promoted electrical-powered water services (fig. 1.28).  Here, a series of black arrows 
suggested an open faucet filled with running water.  Both posters are clearly part of the 
same series based on their use of large areas of bright color, similar typography, and 
large, simple icons.  Additional posters in this series promoted the use of electricity for 
heating, washing, and labor.93
 Beall’s posters alluded to the numerous benefits of electricity for farmers, 
including modern methods of crop cultivation and animal care.  Electricity provided 
indoor plumbing, refrigeration, sewing machines, electric stoves, radios, and of course, 
lighting throughout the home and farm yard.  In many cases, RA/FSA photographers such 
as Arthur Rothstein documented these and other benefits (fig. 1.29).  Rural education also 
benefited from electricity, as school houses were outfitted with more modern equipment.  
While the REA could not stop the migration of rural populations to cities, the agency did 
improve the lives of many farm families.94 
 Beall’s subsequent REA posters exhibited more complicated designs, and 
included the addition of photographic imagery.  Beall’s second series, created in 1938, 
included an example in which a pair of young, rural Americans lean against a fence (fig. 
1.30).  The background color and design scheme, which clearly evokes the U.S. flag, 
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suggests these smiling children enjoy the support of the sponsoring government agency.95  
This series also featured a worker assisting with the installation of a new power line (fig. 
1.31).  Unlike previous posters, this example displayed an uneven geometric background 
suggesting a dynamic sense of movement and space unseen, a concept reinforced by the 
worker’s expression and the wire’s uninterrupted protrusion past the poster’s edges.  The 
yellow rectangle labeled “here it comes” refers to electricity and the resulting 
improvements to farm life brought by modern conveniences.  Another poster in this series 
promoted improved rural living standards without referencing electricity directly (fig. 
1.32).  As the text in this example states, electrical power likely made “things look better” 
for many farm animals as well as their owners.  Another example suggested how older 
members of farm families could benefit from new, electrically-powered technology (fig. 
1.33).
 Stylistically, Beall’s use of geometrically abstract forms, fields of flat color, and 
photomontage—all techniques he used in earlier advertisements—display strong 
similarities with modern European graphic design.  In this way Beall’s first series of 
REA posters shared affinities with NRA and WPA graphics.  However, his later designs 
exhibit a greater complexity.  The formal affinities are clear, for example, between Beall’s 
work and Russian Constructivist posters by artists such as Alexander Rodchenko (fig. 
1.34).  The political ramifications of this appropriation of Constructivist techniques are 
more subtle.  Beall’s interest in European design was hardly an endorsement of 
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Constructivist ideology and instead represents the commodification of the avant garde by 
a designer whose career goals lay in commercial advertising.96 
 Many of Beall’s contemporaries characterized his REA posters as significant 
achievements in both government promotions and modern design.  In July 1937 Public 
Opinion Quarterly noted that while most government graphics seemed “inadequate and 
unimaginative,” Beall’s posters stood out as “excellent.”97  A more culturally prestigious 
endorsement of Beall’s posters came with their exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art 
in November of 1937.98  The Museum displayed each of Beall’s six designs from the first 
REA series, including the previously mentioned “Light,” (fig. 1.27) as well as “Wash 
Day” (fig. 1.35), and “Heat/Cold” (fig. 1.36).  Though not included in the New Horizons 
exhibition of a year earlier, Beall’s posters reinforced Cahill’s argument concerning the 
“integration between the fine arts and practical arts” by demonstrating a functional, 
progressive design aesthetic.99 
 Poster exhibitions at the Museum of Modern Art represented part of an effort to 
raise American design standards in the 1930s, as mentioned in the previous section.  This 
program responded to critics who had long attacked American design as lacking, 
particularly in contrast to European works.  In 1936, the American critic Lewis Mumford 
characterized the work of the French graphic designer Cassandre (fig. 1.25), as “easy to 
read, easy to understand, handsome, brilliant, attention-arresting.” As for American poster 
art, Mumford mused:
there is simply no comparison between Cassandre’s dashing 
advertisements and the sticky, sentimental realism of most 
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American advertisers today...  American advertising is controlled 
by minds which have rationalized their own lack of aesthetic 
response by means of statistics and trumpery psychological tests.  
That sort of business and ‘science’ gets the kind of art it 
deserves.100
In Mumford’s view, the increasing reliance of American advertisers on statistics and 
polling data contributed to such “sentimental realism” (fig. 1.37) which, in turn, 
hampered aesthetic advances in American graphics.  Thus, many American curators and 
critics welcomed the REA’s willingness to break with traditional forms of representation.  
For example, Alfred Barr, Director of the Museum of Modern Art and an instrumental 
contributor to the Museum’s collection of posters (particularly Russian designs), 
approved of Beall’s REA graphics unequivocally.101  In July 1937 Barr wrote to John 
Carmody, the REA’s director, that it was: 
encouraging that a government bureau should issue posters of such 
interesting conception and creditable execution.  America has 
lagged far behind the European nations in this field of design 
which is so integral a part of our everyday experience, and I can 
think of no more fitting example to private industry than tasteful 
posters by an American designer used for government publicity...  
Let us hope that federal agencies and private business alike may 
profit by your splendid example.102 
Determining whether business and government agencies benefited from Beall’s designs, 
as alluded to by Barr, is difficult to ascertain.  However, REA posters undoubtedly 
granted Beall a large audience of potential clients, and he went on to a highly successful 
career in advertising.103   
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 Moreover, MoMA’s endorsement of REA posters also had important international 
political implications.  When the Museum exhibited Beall’s work in 1937, the posters 
hung alongside a series of antifascist Spanish Civil War posters created by artists such as 
Jesus Lozano (fig. 1.38).  In this design, Lozano included text that translates to “Peasants! 
Your Enemies Made You Work from Sunrise to Sunset to Feed Them.  Now That the 
Land Is Yours Work from Sunrise to Sunset to Annihilate Them.”  The accompanying 
imagery included a sickle alongside stalks of cut and uncut wheat alluding to the 
harvesting of death associated with war.  Another Spanish poster exhibited featured a 
highly stylized profile of a helmeted soldier decorated with the flags of supporting 
nations above text that translates to: “All the armed forces unite in the popular army” (fig. 
1.39).  This poster, designed by Melendreras, shows a soldier in a modern design that 
included the flags of nations united in their opposition to fascist aggression.  
Melendreras’ use of flags to suggest a unified front foreshadows later OWI posters that 
alluded similarly to unified antifascist forces.104
 Though Beall’s REA posters display a simpler, stripped down form of modernism, 
the formal similarities between his work and these Spanish images is clear.  Writing about 
this poster exhibition overall, Barr noted that: “Though they vary in quality and purpose 
these posters display three conspicuous virtues in common: a sense of vigorous design, a 
modernity of style, and a boldness of symbolism.”105  A Museum press release also 
praised how all of these posters— the Spanish examples as well as Beall’s REA designs
—rejected the conservative aesthetic tendency displayed in most government promotions. 
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Furthermore, by aligning Spanish antifascist posters with progressive New Deal 
aesthetics, the Museum revealed an underlying political agenda that did not support all 
forms of modern graphic design equally.  For example, while posters from Russian 
Constructivists and Spanish Republicans were championed, MoMA did not display 
graphics by the well-known German designer Ludwig Hohlwein at the time, despite his 
previously established modernist advertising credentials (fig. 1.40).106  This selective 
exhibition of European design foreshadowed the Museum’s ensuing and vigorous support 
of the Allies during World War II.  Such examples ranged from Edward Steichen’s Road 
to Victory exhibition in 1942, to war-themed poster competitions.107 
 Beall’s third and final series of REA posters employed an even more pronounced 
photomontage technique than previous examples while simultaneously promoting 
electrically powered appliances as commodities.  Created in 1941, this series featured a 
mix of photographic imagery, geometrically patterned backgrounds, and more prominent 
text.  One example, which referred to “Power on the Farm,” included a photograph of a 
laborer sharpening a blade with an electric motor (fig. 1.41).  Other designs from this 
series emphasized modern domestic conveniences (fig. 1.42).  Here, a woman used a 
modern stove below the phrase “A Better Home.”  It should also be noted that the REA 
soon began promoting rural Americans as a huge, untapped market for appliance 
manufacturers.  In a 1943 issue of the trade magazine Advertising & Selling, Harry 
Slattery, an REA administrator, noted that “rural electrification promises a billion-dollar 
market for... home appliances...”108  Clearly then, the REA not only benefited farmers, but 
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also manufacturers who provided new products demanding this new power source.  Even 
during the Depression and then the war (eras characterized first by low incomes and then 
by rationing and material shortages), advertisers encouraged consumers to look forward 
to new appliances.  For example, in a 1945 ad from Good Housekeeping, a crowd swarms 
outside a showroom to gawk at a washing machine that, as the accompanying text notes, 
was not yet available for purchase due to wartime rationing of raw materials (fig. 1.43).
 While the REA helped provide rural Americans with electricity, the RA, a 
contemporary agency focused on rural populations, had different goals.  A short-lived 
program established in late April 1935 rolled into the Farm Security Administration 
(FSA) in 1936, the RA assisted low income rural families and migratory workers through 
a variety of initiatives, including housing assistance for families who had lost or 
abandoned their homes.109  To promote this agenda, the RA used a drastically different 
aesthetic than most other federal agencies.  Unlike Beall’s REA posters, the RA portrayed 
a more sobering view of rural life through both audio and visual methods.  To achieve 
this, the RA established the Special Skills Division, an agency subsection composed of 
artists and documentarians who did more than produce publicity.  These RA staffers 
documented rural living conditions through photography (fig. 1.44), lithography, and oil 
and watercolor paintings.  Their work recorded the problems of different geographic 
areas, and were spread throughout the county to regional offices.  In some cases, RA 
paintings of rural scenes decorated Congressional offices.  The RA art staff also created 
visual material for small exhibitions seen in county and state fairs, and oversaw art 
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programs in rural communities that taught a host of artistic and “practical” art related 
skills.110
 To promote its diverse agenda, the RA’s Special Skills Division distributed 
posters.  Ben Shahn’s “Years of Dust,” created in 1936, is a memorable example (fig 
1.45).  In this image, Shahn depicted a forlorn farmer sitting on his front porch.  A soiled 
newspaper that rests across his right thigh references the dust storms which ravaged the 
midwest during the mid 1930s.  These storms, known collectively as the Dust Bowl, 
added misery to an already depressed agricultural economy from North Dakota to Texas.  
Shahn’s farmer, head in hands, peers miserably from beneath a straw hat that gives little 
consolation to his plight.  Behind the farmer, within the white clapboard house, a child 
presses his face and hands against a window in an unintelligible expression that might be 
read as painful or playful.  The text below the image announces the agency’s name and its 
goals: “RESETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION / Rescues Victims / Restores Land to 
Proper Use.”  The poster’s title, Years of Dust runs across the top of the image, and refers 
to the Dust Bowl conditions that forced hundreds of thousands off their farms and into 
the unknown.
 Shahn, an eastern European immigrant discussed in the following chapter, often 
addressed social issues in a blunt, documentary style reminiscent of his RA photographs 
(fig. 1.44).  He depicted a similar theme of hopelessness in a second RA poster titled 
Sheriff's Sale (1936; fig. 1.46).  In this image, created as a black and white lithograph, 
two forlorn male figures gaze wearily past the viewer.  The work’s title, which appears 
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both at the top of the graphic as well as on a sign in the background of the scene, refers to 
an auction typically held by county authorities to sell the possessions of farmers who 
could not pay their debts.111  The text below the image states that over a million American 
farmers faced the “sheriff’s sale,” an event that Shahn likely witnessed himself while 
photographing rural auctions for the RA in 1935.112 
 Shahn explained the misery seen in these graphics as part of the RA’s effort to 
“acquaint the public with the specific problems that exist.”  In an undated memo, Shahn 
elaborated on the RA poster program’s goals, which he felt should:
make known the fact of human distress, should awaken concern and 
feeling for the populations which are to be aided.  They should educate 
both the farmer and the public at large to look upon Resettlement as a 
necessary part of government, and in so doing prepare the ground for an 
ever broadening policy.  They should affectively dispel any notion that 
Resettlement is a light-handed gesture undertaken for showmanship or 
publicity.113
Furthermore, Shahn criticized many of the techniques used by commercial advertisers as 
ineffective for RA promotions.  Rather than sentimentalize or ignore the human suffering 
brought by economic instability, Shahn felt “a simple statement of the problem and what 
is being done to meet it would be more convincing than the better known advertising 
‘blurb.’”114  These sentiments appear throughout Shahn’s RA posters and photographs.  
Bernarda Bryson, another RA artist who later married Shahn, contributed similar work to 
the Special Skills division with a single poster (c. 1935, fig. 1.47), as well as a series of 
lithographs based on photographs taken by Shahn (c. 1936, fig. 1.48; cf. fig. 1.44).115 
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 Attacks on the RA, and later the FSA, came from expected quarters.  Business 
leaders and their Republican allies such as Congressman John Taber (R-NY) condemned 
New Deal programs for using “concentrated propaganda” to achieve the Administration’s 
goals.116  Criticism also came from New Deal supporters who simply disagreed with the 
content of Shahn’s posters.  For example, Fred Hildebrandt, a Democratic Congressman 
from South Dakota, wrote RA administrator Rexford Tugwell to complain about Shahn’s 
Years of Dust (fig. 1.45).  While supportive of the RA’s goals, in Hildebrandt’s opinion 
many viewers would consider the farmer Shahn pictured:
as grotesque and a distortion of the appearance of the typical tiller of the 
soil.  The face is unintelligent, and the picture of the child in the window 
is also the wrong kind to be shown in such a poster...  The reaction that 
many would get is that both the farmer and the child look ‘dumb.’ It seems 
to me that, while the sufferings of agriculturalists ought to be shown 
graphically, there should be every effort to represent farmers and their 
families as intelligent, clean-cut persons.  If this is not done, reactionaries 
will tell political audiences that the New Deal and the Brain Trust are 
insulting farmers by caricaturing them as virtual morans [sic] and by 
implying the administration is trying to save them from the results of their 
(the farmers’) [sic] ignorance.117
Clearly then, not all viewers agreed with Shahn’s methods for encouraging a sympathetic 
view of farmers’ plight, even if they did agree with the RA’s mission.  
 The RA’s Special Skills Division also created various other visual material to help 
support its agenda.  Related efforts included exhibitions featuring a variety of charts, 
graphs, posters, and photographs that traveled across the country (c. 1936, fig. 1.49).  
These displays also included maps such as one example likely designed by Ben Shahn 
and Charles Pollock that used illustrative icons to demonstrate the type of assistance each 
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region received from the RA (c1936, fig. 1.50).118  The map’s top and bottom borders 
include RA photographs that exhibit a range of emotion, including more positive scenes 
than those depicted in the previously mentioned posters.  A more famous example of the 
RA’s promotional efforts, the 1936 Pare Lorentz documentary The Plow that Broke the 
Plains, explained the causes and extent of the drought that ravaged the midwest in the 
middle of the decade (fig. 1.51).  Similarly, the REA also held traveling exhibitions and 
produced a film that explained its goals.  In 1940, the REA released Power and the Land, 
directed by Joris Ivens (fig. 1.52).119  As with the more well-known RA/FSA photography 
project, both films explained the goals of the sponsoring agency in a documentary style.
 Along with explaining the RA’s agenda through graphics and film, the Special 
Skills Division also recorded rural culture using non-photographic methods.  For 
example, the RA documented folk music through the creation of sheet music and audio 
recordings.  RA musical anthropologists such as Charles Seeger and Alan Lomax traveled 
throughout rural areas, particularly the Appalachians, recording a variety of mostly poor 
and rural musicians.120  Visual analogues to this effort include RA photographs of 
musicians taken by staffers including Shahn, as well a series of illustrated sheet music 
featuring traditional folk melodies.  While the interiors of these small brochure-like 
pamphlets included the tune’s lyrics and notation, the outside covers featured illustrations 
by Charles Pollock.121  The first example of the series, “When the Farmer Comes to 
Town,” included lyrics expressing the frustrations shared by many farmers at the time (c. 
1936, fig 1.53).  After praising the farmer as “the man who feeds us all,” the lyrics go on:
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the farmer is the man, the farmer is the man
lives on credit ‘til the fall
then they take him by the hand and they lead him from the land,
and the middle-man’s the man who gets it all122
Certainly many farmers from all eras of economic difficulty felt “the middle man,” often 
bankers or other lenders of credit, “gets it all,” while the farmer lost his land.  The 
popularity of alternative political solutions, including populism and socialism, 
particularly in the midwest between the late 19th century to the 1930s, attests to the 
resonance of such lyrics.123  Pollock’s illustration reinforces similar attitudes of 
frustration by displaying a farmer behind his mules and cart in front of a feed store that 
could have easily been set in the 19th century.  Reflecting the song’s title, Pollock’s 
graphic shows a farmer in town, but his wagon appears empty of goods.  Instead, a 
woman sits in the wagon facing the farmer, whose back is to the viewer.  In addition to a 
lack of visible goods, this couple’s despondency, conveyed by their forlorn exchange, 
suggests a compromise is being negotiated with few available resources.    
 The sobering tone and rural theme of Pollock’s RA illustration clearly resembles 
Shahn’s RA posters.  However, Pollock’s sheet music drawings refer not only to rural 
folk music and culture, but also to contemporary trends in modern art as well.  The 
similarities are particularly clear to Regionalism, which promoted agrarian scenes of rural 
America in a representational style.  Significantly, the influence of rural culture and folk 
music continued to resonate with Pollock into the war years as seen in a 1942 oil painting 
titled Look Down That Lonesome Road (fig. 1.54).124  This image of a melancholic 
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African American glancing down a desolate dirt road parallels the lyrics of “Look Up, 
Look Down That Lonesome Road,” a folk song with nearly the same title as Pollock’s 
painting recorded by the cultural anthropologist Alan Lomax in the preceding years.  The 
lyrics included: 
The best of friends must surely part
So why not you and I my love
So why not you and I
Look up look down that lonesome road
Hang down your head and cry my love
Hang down your head and cry125
In this case, the despondent lyrics connote the moody scene Pollock rendered.
 Pollock’s RA sheet music illustrations, as well as his paintings created during the 
early 1940s, show a clear similarity to the contemporary work of his younger brother 
Jackson.  As thousands of Americans migrated West in search of jobs during the Dust 
Bowl, Jackson Pollock addressed such travels in Going West (1934-5, fig. 1.55), a 
swirling, nearly dream-like scene featuring a lone figure moving a team of horses or 
mules from right to left across the canvas.  Although both Pollock brothers turned to 
abstraction by the mid 1940s, their initial interest in painting rural themes in a 
representational style exhibits a clear similarity to Thomas Hart Benton, their former 
instructor at the Art Student’s League in New York City during the early 1930s.126  
Benton, with whom Charles sometimes played folk music, was perhaps the most 
important promoter of Regionalism, which, as the art historian Leo Mazow and others 
have discussed, often depicted rural musical traditions.127  The elder Regionalist’s 
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influence on both Pollock brothers is particularly evident in earlier canvases such as 
Benton’s The Jealous Lover of Lone Green Valley, whose title refers to a folk song that 
told the tale of a tragic murder (1934, fig. 1.56).  Here Benton reinforced the musical 
quality of the scene not only with the evocative swirling landscape, but with the three 
musicians at the lower right.  A young Jackson Pollock, a student of Benton’s at the time, 
served as the model for the harmonica player at lower center.128
 Although the RA and REA created promotional campaigns that emphasized the 
government’s ability to provide aid to rural communities, they did not use a similar 
rhetoric.  While Shahn, Bryson, and Charles Pollock created imagery denoting the 
strained economic circumstances experienced by many farmers, Beall’s designs focused 
largely on the positive effects of modernization.  Furthermore, while both agencies 
displayed their posters in similar rural locations, the Museum of Modern Art also 
exhibited Beall’s REA posters as examples of excellent American design, a declaration 
not bestowed upon Shahn’s RA work.  Nevertheless, the REA and the RA had lasting 
effects on American culture, both in the services they provided and their promotional 
efforts.  
The Decline of the New Deal & the Rise of War Propaganda
 As the 1930s came to a close and the chances of American involvement in another 
multinational war seemed increasingly likely, the Roosevelt administration created new 
agencies that distributed information preparing Americans for the possibility of war.  
Many of these new agencies, including the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) and the 
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Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), both established in 1941, employed artists discussed 
previously to create posters and other graphics.  For example, Coiner created a series of 
icons for the OCD, and Shahn not only designed posters for the OWI, the agency that 
succeeded the OFF as the nation’s primary war propaganda agency, he also managed 
other graphics employees.  Similarly, agencies such as the WPA and the REA began 
featuring war related themes in their posters.  This section examines the transition from 
late New Deal promotions to images that referenced the war abroad.  As we will see, 
between the start of the war in 1939 and the establishment of the OWI in June 1942, 
multiple American agencies created war themed graphics.  In most cases, political 
considerations mandated that these bureaus proceed cautiously, and withhold outright 
promotions of American involvement in the war before the Pearl Harbor bombing.  
 Federal agencies had several reasons for the careful use of propaganda supporting 
American engagement with, much less preparation for, a second World War.  First, the 
Roosevelt administration could not whole-heartedly support the fighting abroad due to 
domestic political concerns.  Politicians such as Senators Burton Wheeler (D-MT) and 
Gerald Nye (R-ND) led an influential isolationist movement that criticized American 
support for the Allies before Pearl Harbor.129  These and other politicians were backed by 
isolationist organizations including the America First Committee.  Supported by Charles 
Lindbergh, the well-known pilot, America First argued government support for any 
nation involved in the war would contradict the Neutrality Acts passed by Congress 
during the 1930s that limited American response to Europe’s growing militarism.  Thus, 
63
the popularity of America First and similar isolationist groups in the interwar period 
limited U.S. involvement in the fighting abroad, even after the Germans invaded Poland 
in September 1939.130
 Additionally, the Roosevelt administration hesitated to create pro-war graphics 
due to the public’s largely negative recollection of World War I propaganda.  As noted 
previously, after President Wilson closed the CPI in 1919, the agency’s efforts were 
lauded initially before public opinion turned in the 1920s when influential media critics 
such as Harold Lasswell began lamenting the sensationalistic language and graphics used 
to shape public opinion.131  Furthermore, during the 1930s Nazi propaganda became 
increasingly well known.  Many Americans regarded the Nazi propaganda machine, 
directed by Joseph Goebbels, as manipulative and deceitful but also highly organized and 
effective.  The Roosevelt administration feared Americans would characterize any 
attempt to distribute war related information from a singular, central propaganda office as 
mimicking the methods used by the Nazis and other totalitarian regimes.  The President’s 
initial solution to avoid these concerns relied on war news being released from multiple 
agencies.  As the historian Richard Steele has outlined, this “decentralized” strategy led 
to conflicting messages that soon instigated criticism from editorialists, the public, and 
politicians as inefficient and confusing.132 
 Thus, American artists had few opportunities to create government propaganda 
that supported the Allies explicitly in the late 1930s and early 1940s.  However, American 
propagandists did begin to mobilize at this time as part of a general effort to encourage 
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the public to shift its support from the New Deal to the fight against international fascism. 
The first U.S. office created after the Nazis took Warsaw that operated as a war 
propaganda bureau was the Office of Government Reports (OGR), established in 1939.  
Dubbed “ogre” by its critics, OGR succeeded the National Emergency Council, the 
agency responsible for spreading New Deal information during the 1930s.  Similar to its 
predecessor, the OGR distributed news on federal programs to local communities.133  
However, the agency did not release posters or other graphic propaganda, and seemingly 
had little direct impact on American visual culture.
 American concerns over the war increased as the German blitzkrieg advanced 
across France in the late spring of 1940.  Although Roosevelt campaigned to stay out of 
the war during the 1940 presidential election, following the start of his unprecedented 
third term the U.S. began to take steps towards intervention.  With the fall of France in 
June, the Germans began an eight-month bombing campaign in England.  These attacks 
contributed to Roosevelt’s decision to eventually take decisive action away from his 
previous policies.  On March 11, 1941, the President signed legislation implementing the 
Lend Lease Act, which guaranteed American material support to England, France, China, 
and other Allied nations.  Not surprisingly, Roosevelt’s isolationist critics found much to 
criticize concerning Lend Lease.  Two months later the president gave his critics 
additional concern with the establishment of the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD), the 
first federal agency created during the war that generated a nationally recognized visual 
presence.    
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 Founded six months before Pearl Harbor on May 20, 1941, the OCD had two 
primary functions: to “facilitate constructive civilian participation in the defense 
program” and “encourage domestic morale.”134  The Roosevelt administration began 
discussing the possibility of an Axis attack on domestic shores in the early 1940s, and the 
OCD represented a reaction to these fears.  To promote the OCD, the President named 
Fiorello La Guardia, the mayor of New York City, as the agency’s first director.  
Roosevelt hoped that La Guardia’s recognized oratory skills, along with his passionate 
interventionist views, would aide in public support for the new agency.135  Although its 
agenda included “morale boosting,” the OCD’s primary goal was to train civilians to 
respond to emergencies resulting from potential Axis sabotage, bombing, or invasion.  
Thus, unlike the CPI during the First World War, the OCD created graphics to support its 
own civilian volunteer programs.  According to agency promotional material, all 
Americans were encouraged to participate, including “all able-bodied, responsible 
persons in the community—men and women, housewives, laborers, business and 
professional people—for the mutual protection of all.”  OCD participants performed a 
range of duties depending on their skills and background.  Among other services, local 
offices trained and maintained rescue squads, auxiliary police and firemen, bomb squads, 
demolition and clearance crews, road repair crews, decontamination squads, and medical 
corps.136
 As the first wartime government agency that maintained a nationally recognized 
visual campaign, the OCD employed artists to create visual material, including countless 
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brochures, pamphlets, and posters.  The OCD’s visual presence became particularly 
recognizable through a series of twenty-six logos designating individual branches of 
service.  Designed by Charles Coiner, the commercial artist who created the NRA “Blue 
Eagle” logo previously (fig. 1.7), these highly stylized symbols typically depicted an 
object related to the duties performed by a specific wing of the agency.  As seen in a 1942 
poster, Coiner’s OCD icons each featured the same red, white, and blue color scheme 
(fig. 1.57).137  The agency used a quasi-military structure that required organized training, 
and these logos, which strongly resembling military insignia, denoted leadership and 
membership status.  Coiner’s designs appeared on arm bands, helmets, and other clothing 
worn and equipment used by OCD volunteers.138  For many Americans, air raid wardens 
represented the most commonly seen OCD representatives.  Identifiable by their 
distinctive arm bands and World War I style helmets, air raid wardens worked with local 
police to enforce blackouts and direct civilians to shelters during emergencies (fig. 1.58).
 In addition to Coiner’s icons, the OCD employed artists to create a range of visual 
material designed to explain the agency’s goals while simultaneously encouraging 
national participation.  One of the OCD’s earliest attempts to educate and recruit 
Americans was “Civilian Defense Week,” held in November 1941.  Coordinated with the 
WPA, this week of national programming included speeches and exhibits featuring large, 
graphic displays that articulated the government’s national defense concerns.139  The 
OCD also distributed countless brochures, pamphlets, and posters throughout the war.  To 
assuage its critics, the agency often clarified that its agenda was not to “propagandize” 
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the war, but to prepare for national defense.  Similarly, the agency did not intended to 
ostensibly promote military recruitment or other issues such as rationing addressed later 
by other agencies.  
 The OCD did however recruit new participants through visual campaigns.  This 
effort included posters, a handful of which were created by well-known American artists.  
In 1943, two years after the U.S. declaration of war, Rockwell Kent created a drawing for 
the OCD’s Forest Firefighters Service recruiting efforts (fig. 1.59).  The poster’s upper 
half features Kent’s drawing of a powerful and heroic firefighter standing with an ax at 
his side, apparently calling out to fellow OCD volunteers.  The lower half of the poster 
includes four prominent lines of copy that state: “Forest Fires Aid the Enemy / Volunteer 
to Fight Them.” While the term “them” ostensibly refers to forest fires, the reader may 
also understand “them” to connote “the enemy.”  Thus, in Kent’s drawing, as with many 
OCD graphics, the enemy is referred to indirectly.  As with all OCD publications, this 
poster featured the corresponding icon designed by Coiner (in this example, the red tree 
logo at the lower center).  Such efforts to recruit OCD participants played on themes of 
patriotism and service that did not require enlistment in the armed services.140
 Despite good intentions and support from Eleanor Roosevelt, the popularity of the 
OCD fluctuated.  The agency received harsh criticism from the press and Republican 
lawmakers as wasteful and ineffective.  A combination of diverse and unclear goals, and 
an overloaded, preoccupied director resulted in critics such as the Washington Times-
Herald referring to the agency’s track record as “a story of Alice in Blunderland.”141  A 
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significant aspect of such criticism resulted from the OCD’s own indecisiveness as to its 
ultimate role before the attack on Pearl Harbor.  Though overtly a civilian preparedness 
agency, many politicians (and presumably, citizens), saw the need for a more traditional 
propaganda agency that would emphasize morale boosting.  Historians such as Richard 
Steele have argued that La Guardia, though supportive of the president, was more 
interested in seeing the OCD follow its designated purpose of civilian defense than 
producing patriotic propaganda.142  Repeated criticism led to La Guardia leaving his post 
in early 1942.  He was replaced by James Landis, a former dean of Harvard Law School.  
Under Landis, a loyal New Dealer, OCD downplayed its capabilities as a propaganda 
office and instead focused on its initial goal, that of civilian defense.
 With American public opinion still divided over the war in late spring 1941, the 
Roosevelt administration recognized the need for a more sophisticated system of mass 
persuasion.  However, officials wanted to generate graphics that exceeded simple 
messages of patriotism by employing recently developed methods of data collection, 
particularly public opinion polling, in the creation of morale boosting efforts.143  The 
influence of pollsters such as Elmo Roper had become increasingly prevalent in 
American culture.  Newspapers and magazines such as Fortune printed the results of 
Roper’s polls, and agency administrators sought to use this developing technology.144  
Therefore, by August 1941 La Guardia began campaigning for the creation of a new 
agency that would use such data to function as the overall government information 
agency responsible for “morale activities.”145 
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 Two months later, on October 24, 1941, these concerns resulted in the 
establishment of the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF).  President Roosevelt chose 
Archibald MacLeish, the Librarian of Congress, a well-known poet, and former editor of 
Fortune as the agency’s first and only Director.146  A respected public intellectual, 
MacLeish had expressed his firm interventionist position previously in a widely read 
essay titled “The Irresponsibles,” published in the May 18, 1940 issue of the Nation.  In 
this essay, MacLeish criticized American intellectuals for ignoring their responsibility to 
defend culture against the brewing storm of war in Europe.147  Critics regarded MacLeish 
as a suitable choice as he maintained relationships not only throughout the artistic 
community, but also with business executives.148
 Shortly after his appointment as OFF Director, MacLeish held a press conference 
to outline the agency’s ideological goals.  Here MacLeish contrasted the propaganda of 
totalitarian nations and the OFF’s work as the “difference between the strategy of terror 
and the strategy of truth.”149  As noted by the agency’s official history, the OFF’s primary 
goal was to boost civilian morale by developing “over-all information programs to inform 
the public concerning first the defense, and then the war effort.”  As the war progressed 
MacLeish’s emphasis on a “strategy of truth” became a mantra that extended to its 
succeeding agency, the OWI.150 
 The OFF branch responsible for printed propaganda, the Graphics Division, was 
the first American bureau of its kind during the war.  This Division was supervised by 
Vaughn Flannery, a former vice president at Young & Rubicam (a major advertising 
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agency), and Thomas Mabry, an executive on leave from the Museum of Modern Art.151  
To maintain a steady roster of artists the Graphics Division established contacts in the 
advertising industry, which, according to the agency’s official wartime historian, made 
“available to the government the best talents in the commercial graphics field.”152  
Museum of Modern Art records indicate that, according to Mabry, Flannery argued 
stringently that the OFF should rely primarily on commercial artists, and that “modern” 
artists would be ineffective propagandists due to their high-minded conceptual designs.153  
Thus, many OFF posters were created by commercial artists approved previously by 
agency administrators.  The results, in many cases, were graphics that exhibited little 
stylistic innovation.  
 For example, shortly after Pearl Harbor the OFF released a series of eight posters 
informing Americans of their comrades in the Allied Forces.  Each poster from this series 
featured the text: “This man is your FRIEND... He fights for FREEDOM.”  The center 
space of these posters featured a photograph of a soldier from an Allied nation.  For 
example, the “English” version depicted an English soldier carrying a machine gun over 
his shoulder (fig. 1.60).  Each poster in this series, while stylistically dull, reinforced the 
OFF’s stated goals of objectivity.154  In their straightforward design, these graphics 
exhibit what an OFF administrator referred to as the agency’s interest in displaying 
“affirmative aims and carry a positive rather than a negative tone.”155  As the following 
chapter will explain, not all OFF posters displayed such a static design.  However, the 
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short history of the OFF Graphics Bureau was characterized largely by indecisiveness 
and internal struggle over the most effective content.156  
 In the early years of U.S. involvement in the war, other federal agencies, many of 
them established during the New Deal, provided American artists with additional 
opportunities to create war propaganda.  Not all efforts to make the transition from the 
New Deal to the war were successful.  For example, in early 1942, the Treasury 
Department’s Section of Fine Arts proposed a plan that would allow artists to either 
record the war or design propaganda posters.  The Section was well-known for its mural 
program, headed by Edward Bruce, that sent American artists to decorate public buildings 
across the country in the preceding years.  Despite its previous success, both Section war 
proposals were turned down.  Bruce privately complained that unimaginative propaganda 
agency leaders must have viewed the mentality of the public as “something close to the 
seventh grade.”  As noted by the historian Richard McKinzie, Bruce bluntly felt that if 
the government wanted to use art to encourage support for the war, “it should be the best 
and not directed to morons.”  Bruce’s supporters attacked the recently created OFF for its 
blatant use of commercial (and by implication, uncreative) imagery.  The OFF responded 
that the Section’s system of distributing assignments by a competition process was too 
slow for the war.  After some back and forth, McKinzie noted the Section’s fate as a 
propaganda agency was sealed once the OFF “opened an office on Madison Avenue, 
published a guide for poster-makers advising against ‘symbolic’ content, acquired an 
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associate of George Gallup’s opinion survey organization as adviser, and that ended 
that.”157 
 Other previously established agencies saw more success as wartime 
propagandists.  In fact, many New Deal agencies began creating overtly propagandistic 
graphics supporting the war before the establishment of OFF.  For example, it is likely 
that WPA poster workshops began designing civilian defense (fig. 1.61) and anti-gossip 
(fig. 1.62) promotions even before Pearl Harbor.  Similar to the “Avenge Pearl Harbor!” 
silkscreen discussed earlier (fig. 1.2), these posters demonstrate the WPA’s turn from 
promoting federal programs during the Depression to supporting the war.  Other WPA 
poster workshops created even more functional graphics, including training materials for 
the military.158
 Similarly, in 1941 the REA began inserting militaristic themes into its posters.  A 
design in Lester Beall’s last series of REA posters featured the text “Power for Defense” 
across a photograph of a tower, likely located in a rural area, that may have been used for 
various safety functions such as radio, as lighting, or as a lookout (fig. 1.63).  Unlike 
Beall’s previous REA posters, which celebrated electricity’s ability to improve the lives 
of agrarian populations, this design promoted rural electricity as invaluable for national 
defense.  This concept was emphasized by the patriotic color scheme, as well as the 
presence of a military aircraft.  Significantly, at this time the REA also enlisted the 
designer Herbert Bayer, a recent Austrian immigrant who studied and later taught 
advertising and commercial design at the Bauhaus.159  In his REA poster, Bayer largely 
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ignored the importance of rural electricity and instead emphasized egg production by 
U.S. farmers in the war (fig. 1.64).160  Both posters by Bayer and Beall exhibit the REA’s 
turn from promoting the role of government in improving the lives of rural communities 
to supporting the increasing possibility of U.S. entry into the war.  Similarly, the FSA, 
which had discontinued the Special Skills Division with the end of the RA in 1935, began 
documenting the home front in photographs that demonstrated an increasing militarism as 
seen in depictions of the production of weapons.161 
Conclusion
 This chapter has examined how agencies established during the New Deal first 
encouraged public support for various programs during the Depression before the 
impending war required the modification of the government’s graphic presence.  As noted 
previously, this shift from the benevolence of government during the Depression to an 
increasingly militaristic rhetoric was part of a larger adjustment in American culture.  
With the creation of the OFF in late 1941, the commitment to a dedicated “morale” 
campaign that soon promoted American involvement in the war became a graphic reality.  
Within seven months however, the U.S. joined the Allies in the war, and the OWI 
absorbed the OFF.  As explained previously in the comparison of the two Pearl Harbor-
themed posters, the newly created OWI existed contemporaneously with the WPA poster 
workshops for a short time, and both agencies created graphics supporting the war.  Yet 
before the OWI’s first anniversary, the WPA experienced a complete loss of funding, 
leading to the agency’s demise.  WPA artists who had received critical federal financial 
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support during the previous seven years felt an increasingly dwindling portion of 
government support for the arts funneled to the war effort.  As the next chapter explains, 
the resulting propaganda campaigns were fraught with political controversy, particularly 
in the depiction of the violence resulting from modern war.
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Chapter 2: “Facts vs. Ballyhoo”: 
Depicting Violence in American War Propaganda
 In the fall of 1942 the Office of War Information (OWI) released an unsettling 
poster designed by Ben Shahn known as This is Nazi Brutality (fig. 2.1).  Shahn’s poster 
depicts a hooded, handcuffed victim of Nazi war crimes in the moments before his 
murder.  Standing before unseen assassins, this unidentifiable figure nearly fills the 
poster’s vertical frame, thus denying the viewer’s gaze any recourse.  Foreboding 
background details, including a claustrophobic red brick corner and a dark, cloudy sky, 
amplify the traumatic tension of the image.  Handcuffs constraining the victim’s wrists 
allude to fellow prisoners, reinforcing the scale and ghastliness of the crime.  The words 
“This is Nazi Brutality” run diagonally across the victim’s torso in bold, red letters, 
clearly denoting those responsible for the atrocity being committed.  The text below, 
designed to mimic a telegraphic message, summarizes German news reports of a mass 
murder committed by the SS in a Czechoslovakian village.  Stretched across the victim’s 
midsection, these yellow strips suggest a rope-like constraint adding to the scene’s terror.1
 Shahn’s harrowing design recreated a savage act of Nazi barbarism covered 
widely in the international press.  As the telegraphic-like text within the poster explains, 
on June 10, 1942, German soldiers raided Lidice (pronounced LEE-dah-say), a 
Czechoslovakian village near Prague whose citizens were accused of aiding the assassins 
of Reinhard Heydrich, a high ranking SS officer and principle architect of the death 
camps.  In response to Heydrich’s death at the hands of the Czechoslovakian resistance, 
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the Nazis sent all female villagers to concentration camps and shot all 192 men.  The 
Germans then bulldozed and burned Lidice in an attempt to “extinguish” the city.  
Depending on their Aryan features, the children of the village were divided between 
foster homes and concentration camps.2 
 The disturbing, fact-based content of Nazi Brutality combined with Shahn’s 
modern art credentials to form a unique work of war propaganda.  Shahn began receiving 
positive critical reception during the 1930s by exhibiting in New York venues and 
contributing to New Deal art programs as a photographer, muralist, and graphic artist.  
His work at the time, rendered often in a sobering, blunt style, addressed issues such as 
poverty and social justice.3  Although Shahn continued to depict these themes in his OWI 
war graphics, agency posters also displayed the work of commercial artists such as 
Norman Rockwell, whose illustrations set the standard for much magazine imagery 
during much of the twentieth century.  As seen in Rockwell’s well-known Four Freedoms 
series, such propaganda depicted peaceful, patriotic visions that avoided the war’s 
horrific realities (fig. 2.2).4  In comparison, Shahn’s Nazi Brutality displayed an arresting 
scene whose resonance derived from a combination of specific facts and the suppression 
of melodramatic sentimentality.5  
 From Pearl Harbor to early 1943, posters such as Shahn’s Nazi Brutality and 
Rockwell’s Four Freedoms contributed to an ideologically diverse propaganda campaign 
generated by the OFF/OWI.  During these months, scenes of violence represented one of 
numerous themes propaganda agency officials used to explain the war’s seriousness.  
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Like his OWI supervisor, Francis Brennan, Shahn felt that by depicting war’s harsh 
realities Americans would realize more fully the seriousness of the international crisis.  
Yet as the war progressed agency leadership softened their preference for graphics in 
favor of commercially friendly content.  These ideological differences came to a head in 
April 1943 when a group of OWI artists and writers resigned in protest of what they saw 
as the agency’s policy of relying on slick, advertising-friendly imagery over more 
sobering content.6  Though Shahn shared this sentiment he remained at the OWI until 
July 1943, when agency cuts eliminated his position.7
 The debate at the OWI over aggressive, and at times violent, content resulted in 
agency officials labeling numerous propaganda designs as “too strong” and unfit for 
distribution.  Along with submissions from Shahn, propaganda officials suppressed 
proposals from several well-known artists, including William Gropper, Yasuo Kuniyoshi, 
Philip Guston, and Peter Blume.  Many of these artists had successfully navigated federal 
bureaucracies during the previous decade by contributing work to government art 
programs during the Depression.  However, creating war propaganda proved an even 
more ideologically-driven and complicated affair.  Unlike New Deal art, World War II 
propaganda often developed from government committees composed of art directors, 
commercial and fine artists, and public opinion researchers.  This bureaucratic labyrinth 
proved difficult for many modern artists to navigate and became particularly unpleasant 
for those bent on rendering unsentimental, unsettling visions of war.  
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 This chapter charts the evolving use of violence in American war propaganda to 
analyze how traumatic imagery such as Shahn’s Nazi Brutality operated within its 
historical context.  The first section briefly considers depictions of violence in 
government graphics and popular culture before Pearl Harbor.  The following section 
analyzes violent imagery produced by the OFF in early 1942 following the U.S. entry 
into the war.  As we will see, such imagery sometimes displayed intense content while 
avoiding the depiction of suffering American servicemen or civilians explicitly.  The third 
section compares the use of violent imagery in two propagandistic brochures released in 
early 1942.  The first, created by the OFF and featuring artwork by Daniel Fitzpatrick, a 
St. Louis cartoonist, contrasted significantly with a larger and flashier publication 
distributed by Abbott Laboratories, a pharmaceutical corporation, that included images by 
the famous Regionalist painter Thomas Hart Benton.  The fourth section emphasizes the 
OWI work of Ben Shahn, whose year-long contribution to the agency included a range of 
graphic projects.  The fifth and final section examines the rejection of propaganda 
proposals submitted by Shahn and other well known artists such as Blume, Kuniyoshi, 
and Guston.  This analysis explains why bureaucrats suppressed such imagery in favor of 
patriotic graphics such as those created by Rockwell.  As a result of the associated 
debates over content, the use of violent imagery in American war propaganda went from 
an occasional occurrence in the war’s early years to nearly nonexistent by 1944.  This 
turn led many artists and critics to argue that propaganda which ignored war’s brutal side 
promoted little more than advertising rhetoric, or “ballyhoo” over facts.8 
92
Allusions to Violence in American Propaganda Before Pearl Harbor
 Though U.S. government agencies began creating graphics featuring war themes 
before the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, these images rarely 
included scenes of violence.  This scarcity resulted from several factors.  As discussed in 
the previous chapter, isolationist politicians and their supporters argued that any overt 
support of the Allies would contradict the Neutrality Acts passed by Congress during the 
1930s.9  Additionally, the White House acknowledged fears held by many Americans of a 
reborn CPI, the nation’s propaganda agency during World War I that created imagery 
later considered sensationalistic exaggerations (fig. 1.5).  Finally, American’s increasing 
awareness of the Nazi propaganda machine caused general unease over the power of 
public relations to manipulate popular opinion.  As a result of these concerns, government 
agencies released few visual references to the violence of war before late 1941.
 At the same time, violent imagery permeated American art and visual culture 
during the era.  Scenes of discord served several purposes in the 1930s.  Many painters 
depicted various types of disorder related to social injustice and the economic instability 
of the Great Depression.  These “socially conscious” artists, later termed Social Realists, 
often created work featuring conflict, poverty, and suffering to draw attention to political 
and social causes, including the flaws of capitalism and the evils of racism.10  Well-
known examples include Philip Evergood’s American Tragedy (1937), which recalled a 
riot between police and picnicking auto workers (fig. 2.3).11  Additionally, numerous 
artists, black and white, created anti-lynching imagery that depicted white mobs attacking 
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African Americans.  These acts of aggression appear in Evergood’s shocking Lynching 
Party (1935), as well as Jacob Lawrence’s Migration Series (1941), a group of 60 small 
panels featuring two scenes of African Americans in physical confrontation with white 
racists.12  American artists also depicted scenes of violence stemming from international 
conflicts.  As the proceedings of the 1936 American Artists’s Congress demonstrated, 
many artists opposed the rise of European fascism through their work.13  Examples of 
imagery by Congress attendees included paintings by William Gropper, who in canvases 
such as Hostages (1937) created scenes of atrocities committed during the Spanish Civil 
War (fig. 2.4).  Thus, while government agencies showed little interest in distributing 
such imagery, many American artists addressed the era’s unstable realities.
 Violent content also appeared in American visual culture beyond painting as well.  
Artists such as Gropper often contributed to left-wing magazines including The New 
Masses and The Daily Worker which criticized the rise of fascism and capitalist abuses of 
the working class (fig. 2.5).  Other forms of violence originated in more mainstream 
media.  Numerous scholars, including the historian Richard Slotkin, have noted the use of 
violence in popular gangster and western films during the 1930s and 1940s.14  Though 
tame by twenty-first century standards, characters in Hollywood movies were regularly 
beaten, shot, and executed.  Similar “low” forms of mass culture that depicted acts of 
aggression included comic books which, like popular movies, often addressed the war 
(fig. 2.6).  As with their “high art” counterparts, such depictions of violence in popular 
culture often carried moralizing messages.  To generate a wide audience these narratives 
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typically avoided potentially controversial issues, and rarely criticized specific American 
political leaders or parties.15 
 Despite the frequency of violent imagery in American culture, the government’s 
trepidation to enter the war left artists with few federally-sponsored opportunities to 
create war-themed work.  However, after the fall of Paris to the Germans in June of 1940, 
American concern over the war increased, and with it, government-produced images 
related to the crisis abroad.  As discussed in the previous chapter, many of these early 
efforts encouraged civilian participation in domestic defense programs.  The Office of 
Civilian Defense (OCD) developed numerous examples.  Although OCD publications did 
not emphasize violence specifically, the prevalence of Charles Coiner’s agency icons (fig. 
1.57) served as a constant reminder of the possibility of upheaval on the home front.  
Additionally, OCD brochures provided readers with diagrams on the use of safety 
equipment such as gas masks (fig. 2.7).  Other publications explained how to extinguish 
fires and disable explosive devices.  Similarly, air raid wardens and other OCD 
volunteers who wore agency icons served as obvious references to the war (fig. 1.58).  At 
the same time, reference to the OCD appeared in a broader range of spaces, including 
comics and corporate advertising.  For example, the November 1942 issue of Good 
Housekeeping featured a female air raid warden in her OCD uniform reaching for a 
Chesterfield cigarette (fig. 2.8).  Ironically, the casual appearance of OCD insignia may 
have desensitized viewers to the potential reality of the war reaching domestic shores.
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 In a few cases, OCD posters made the possibility of violence a visual reality.  In a 
1941 recruitment poster, two volunteer OCD firefighters attempt to stop a fire 
presumably started by an enemy attack (fig. 2.9).  While the unknown artist did not depict 
the fire’s specific cause, the window at the top left shows three military aircraft, an 
uncertain allusion to either the attack on, or the defense of an American city.  The two 
men in the foreground, identifiable as OCD volunteers by the insignia on their arms, 
ignore these aircraft and attempt to quench the fire that rages at left.  Although OCD 
firefighters never had to respond to an Axis attack, agency graphics nevertheless 
increased the government’s presence in American visual culture.  Following the Japanese 
bombing of Pearl Harbor, this presence expanded substantially.
The OFF and Early Signs of Brutality in World War II Propaganda 
 After the U.S. entered the war in December 1941, the OFF began the mass 
distribution of visual propaganda.  This material included posters and brochures, some of 
which featured violent graphics.  Unlike the OCD, which sought primarily to recruit 
civilian defense volunteers, the OFF intended to boost civilian morale through the 
distribution of information and imagery.  The agency’s name suggested an untainted 
objectivity, and indeed Director Archibald MacLeish maintained the OFF was not “a 
ballyhoo agency,” and would “disseminate only factual information to the public.”16  This 
“strategy of truth” as MacLeish called it, developed from a staff with experience in 
business, broadcasting, museums, and the literary and visual arts.17  Though few modern 
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artists found opportunities to contribute to the OFF, commercial artists and editorial 
cartoonists created posters, brochures, and other graphics.  
 Despite MacLeish’s claims of objectivity, the OFF’s reliance on commercial 
artists led to many graphics displaying a sensationalism similar to the work of the CPI 
during World War I.  A poster released in the spring of 1942 titled Sacrifice for Freedom 
(fig. 2.10) demonstrates one such example.  This poster featured an illustration by the 
commercial artist John Falter depicting a priest and a young family against a brick wall.18  
The priest and a young man stand in hunched positions on either side of the group.  Both 
men exhibit expressions mixing disgust, fear, and apprehension.  A terrified young 
woman and two children crouch between them, presumably the family of the man on the 
right.  Though the viewer cannot see what troubles these five individuals, a large dark 
shadow falls across the scene and provides a startling revelation.  The shadow’s shape 
reveals that these figures are witnessing the brutal torture of an unidentifiable victim at 
the hands of an unknown assailant.  The large shadow at left, which nearly covers the 
priest, belongs to a large figure wearing a military officer’s cap.  This imposing torturer 
wields a cat-o-nine tails against his victim, whose shadow at the lower right shows a 
defenseless figure with an outstretched hand.  
 The poster’s typographic content combines two different themes that appeared in 
government propaganda throughout the war.  The bottom copy, which states “Sacrifice 
for Freedom!” expresses language used in rationing and conservation programs 
encouraging the reuse or recycling of raw materials and consumer goods.  The top copy, 
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“This world cannot exist half slave and half free,” is a slightly modified quote from 
Abraham Lincoln.  During a well-known speech delivered to the Illinois Republican 
Convention in 1858, the future President referred to the simmering divisions between the 
North and South by stating “I believe this government cannot endure, permanently, half 
slave and half free.”19  Used in Falter’s poster, the division between free and enslaved 
individuals referred to democratic and totalitarian regimes respectively.  
 Clearly a shocking image, Falter’s Sacrifice for Freedom stretches the “strategy of 
truth” promoted by MacLeish.  First, unlike Shahn’s later Nazi Brutality, Falter’s sparse 
scene makes no reference to a specific, documented act of violence.  Similarly, Falter 
provided few clues to align the figures shown with a specific nationality.  Depictions of 
Nazis in popular culture ranging from Charlie Chaplin’s film The Great Dictator (1940) 
to editorial cartoons often emphasized basic attributes of enemy uniforms, particularly the 
high, rounded cap seen here.  However, the headgear seen in the menacing shadow on the 
left represents the best (and only) indication the torturer is an Axis officer.  The victim, 
whose shadow appears as an unidentifiable mass, does not show any attributable 
characteristics and seems human due only to a single hand raised in defense.  The 
onlooking figures pressed against the brick wall lack any sign designating them as 
members of a specific nationality or region.  Only the priest possess a clear identifying 
characteristic, as his clerical collar symbolizes Christianity, and to a lesser extent, 
organized religion.  Ironically, the priest’s inclusion is troubling, as his presence suggests 
that religion, though present, remains helpless to aide the abused.20
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 Despite its eye-catching content, Falter’s Sacrifice for Freedom combines text and 
image to create a confusing series of mixed messages.  No details direct viewers as to 
what they should sacrifice specifically, or how any sacrifice will stop additional violence.  
Further confusion results from the connection between the image and the misquoted 
Lincoln declaration.  How exactly did concepts such as “sacrifice” and “freedom” relate 
to one another?  In short, the poster’s complicated combination of text and image renders 
an unclear message.  To rephrase this problem in terms used by the scholar W.J.T. 
Mitchell, the poster’s “want” is “lacking.” Mitchell notes that while the question of “what 
pictures want” is often deceivingly complex, images such as James Montgomery Flagg’s 
“I Want You” recruitment poster from World War I (fig. 1.3) represents “an image whose 
demands, if not desires seem absolutely clear.”21  Flagg’s work requests young male 
viewers join the service.  As Mitchell argues, the image benefits from the direct jab of 
Uncle Sam’s foreshortened, pointing finger, an element that “transfixes” the viewer in a 
manner Mitchell refers to as the “Medusa” effect.  
 Falter’s Sacrifice for Freedom lacks a similarly direct simplicity due to its 
confusing cast of characters and violent shadows.  Still, analyzing the “want” of Falter’s 
poster as Mitchell might say, provides a valuable opportunity to understand the issues that 
concerned OFF bureaucrats only months after Pearl Harbor.  Government surveys 
conducted in early 1942 suggested that while support for the war remained strong, many 
Americans felt unclear about the war’s ideological details and the government’s postwar 
goals.22  As a result, OFF officials sought to explain the war by reinforcing easily 
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understood concepts such as “freedom” and “slavery” in dramatized terms.  In his poster, 
Falter frames these issues in a highly creative manner that ultimately challenges the 
stability of the observer’s own freedom.  If viewers of this poster witnessed a scene such 
as this in reality, the combination of vantage point and placement of shadows would 
require those contemplating the image to either be the victim, or perhaps even more 
troubling, the torturer.  Thus, while viewers of Sacrifice for Freedom might relate initially 
to the family pressed against the wall, Falter has constructed a scene where the figures 
who cast the shadows stand approximately at the same spot as the poster’s actual 
audience.  The shadows therefore, “activate” the viewer’s role from a passive observer to 
one that is much more problematic.  To return to Mitchell’s analogy of what a picture 
“wants,” one might argue that while Sacrifice for Freedom desires the sacrifice of time or 
consumer goods, Falter’s design arguably demands that viewers momentarily consider 
themselves in the highly uncomfortable situation of not just witnessing, but enduring (or 
worse yet, indirectly administrating) a torturous beating.  Thus, though not as effective 
initially as Flagg’s pointing Uncle Sam, Falter’s shadow suggests a “transfixing” 
component, cast from its domestic audience, that seeks to force a recognition of the 
violent reality of modern war.
 The dramatic, sensational quality of Falter’s Sacrifice for Freedom likely resulted 
from several sources.  Most obviously, this shocking content shares affinities with the 
artist’s commercial illustration.  Well-known for family-friendly fare, including 
advertisements and mainstream magazine graphics, during the 1930s Falter also painted 
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pulp fiction novel covers, which often featured this type of exaggerated violence (fig. 
2.11).23  Moreover, the artist’s use of shadows in this OFF poster may represent an 
attempt to avoid the type of criticism levied at CPI graphics following World War I that 
depicted similarly unsettling scenes.  By merely connoting violence through a shadow, 
Falter arguably attempted to evade similar condemnation.  
 More importantly, in its combined use of aggression and lack of details, Sacrifice 
for Freedom fails to achieve MacLeish’s “strategy of truth.”  Similar to many CPI 
posters, the poster makes no reference to a specific event, and instead reveals a 
nightmarish image with only a tenuous association to reality in its “realistic” style.  The 
fact that Falter used this approach years after confirmations of Nazi atrocities began 
appearing in the U.S. complicates the image further.24  Finally, Falter’s violent imagery 
may have simply represented an attempt to shock Americans into realizing the 
seriousness of the war, as OFF public opinion polls and editorial surveys led agency 
leaders to suspect a rise in isolationism only months after Pearl Harbor.25 
 While Sacrifice for Freedom avoided fact-based details, other OFF graphics 
exhibited a more subdued threat of violence through imagery that, while less 
sensationalistic, remained unsettling.  Two such examples promoted “Don’t Talk” 
campaigns featuring artwork by the illustrator Albert Dorne.26  Intended to discourage 
civilians from spreading unnecessary gossip relating to the war effort, each poster 
depicted a disembodied hand reaching out to an object iconic to a branch of the U.S. 
military.  In the “naval” version, the hand of a drowning sailor reaches from below the 
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ocean’s surface towards a white cap (fig. 2.12).  In the “army” version, the outstretched 
and lifeless hand of a soldier rests near the butt of a rifle intwined in barbed wire (fig. 
2.13).  Though featuring different imagery, both posters include the same text.  The top 
portion of each poster states “Somebody Blabbed,” while the bottom reads “Button Your 
Lip!” The only other copy, set within a white space overlapping Dorne’s image, were two 
smaller reminders reading “...don’t talk about ship movements! ... don’t talk about war 
production!”27 
 Dorne’s OFF posters promoted vigilance against Axis spies who used rumors and 
idle gossip spread by American civilians to endanger the lives of American military 
personnel.  In each example, the viewer assumes the expressive hand belongs to a 
drowning, dead, or dying American serviceman whose demise resulted not only from an 
unseen (and unidentified) enemy, but from fellow citizens who failed to “button” their 
lips.  At the time, government imposed standards restrained agency graphics from 
displaying images depicting the tragic death of American soldiers, and thus Dorne shows 
the dead as anonymous victims.28  While contextual clues only implied the nationalities 
of the deceased, both posters clearly aligned the tragedies shown as resulting from 
civilians’s inability to constrain their “loose lips.”
 The “loose lips” theme, a common wartime subject in American visual culture, 
extended beyond propaganda into popular fiction and film.  The threat of Axis spies in 
the U.S. had existed at least since the late 1930s, and resulted in popular narratives of 
foreign espionage such as Confessions of a Nazi Spy, a 1939 film released by Warner 
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Brothers (fig. 2.14).  Starring Edward G. Robinson as a hard-boiled FBI agent, the picture 
was one of Hollywood’s earliest World War II films.29  Less than two years later, a far 
more frightening story unfolded when the FBI captured a gang of actual Nazi spies in 
New York.  Apprehended only weeks before the bombing of Pearl Harbor, this network of 
spies was headed by Frederick “Fritz” Duquesne, a Boer national whose hatred for the 
British led him to volunteer for the Germans during both World Wars.  The FBI arrested 
thirty-three members of the so-called “Duquesne Spy Ring” in the fall of 1941 after a 
months-long investigation that included undercover Gestapo agents, a German-born 
double agent working for the U.S., and an elaborate Nazi scheme to photograph 
American military weaponry.30  Such events validated government concerns regarding 
the “loose lips” of civilians while simultaneously providing fodder for producers of pop 
culture.
 The difference in propagandistic imagery from OCD graphics to OFF posters 
shows a drastic change in government policy over a relatively short period.  Whereas the 
OCD encouraged a defensive ideology that referred to violence as a possibility, the 
bombing of Pearl Harbor resulted in government agencies, and artists, responding with 
violent content and dramatic text and image intended to persuade Americans to support 
the war.  Still, both the OCD and the OFF distributed exaggerated graphics that shared 
visual affinities with commercial art.  Finally, while the violence in early OFF posters 
marked a distinct shift in government propaganda, the agency would soon find itself 
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competing with sensationalistic corporate imagery that was more explicitly brutal than 
government agencies were willing to produce.  
Competing Scenes of Disorder: Government and Corporate War Propaganda 
 American artists responded to the Japanese attack and subsequent Congressional 
declaration of war on the Axis with a barrage of work that appeared in a variety of spaces 
and media.  Many artists, including George Biddle and Joseph Hirsch, sought to support 
the war by participating in government-sanctioned art programs.  These and other 
painters contributed to art programs sponsored by the U.S. Armed Forces that 
documented the war both at home and abroad.  Although such services saw funding cuts 
early in the war, Life magazine later hired several of these artists to continue their work 
(see chapter four).31  Similarly, exhibitions organized by the Artists For Victory, a loosely 
grouped association of New York-based artists, addressed the war regularly, including 
violent content.32
 Other artists found opportunities to support the war through various forms of 
corporate sponsorship.  By distributing patriotic graphics, typically through print 
advertising, corporations engaged in effective public relations due to the war’s popular 
support.  Along with advertising, war-themed graphics from corporate sources often took 
material forms, such as posters and brochures, that demonstrated similarities with 
government propaganda.  Corporate-sponsored war graphics often displayed themes of 
patriotism and national unity similar to their government produced counterparts.  Thus, 
distinguishing the institutional sources of war-themed posters, brochures, and 
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advertisements became increasingly difficult as the war progressed.  Yet in many cases 
corporate advertising had fewer restrictions regarding content and style than did federal 
propaganda.  Therefore, war-themed advertising commonly featured sensationalistic, 
violent, and at times explicitly racist themes avoided by government agencies such as the 
OFF, and later, the OWI.   
 The contrast between government and corporate sponsored depictions of violence 
became particularly evident in two widely popular brochures released in the spring of 
1942.  At this time, the OFF distributed Divide and Conquer, a 16 page, black-and-white 
brochure including six cartoons drawn by Daniel R. Fitzpatrick, a Pulitzer Prize winning 
cartoonist at the St. Louis Dispatch.33  Shortly thereafter, Abbott Laboratories, the 
Chicago-based pharmaceutical giant, released The Year of Peril, a larger, full color 
brochure featuring intense, and in some cases gory paintings by the well-known 
Regionalist painter Thomas Hart Benton.34  Unlike posters, brochures used a sequential 
layout that combined text and image to explain complex issues related to the war.  As the 
following comparison articulates, since corporate sponsors had few obligations other than 
the promotion of the underwriting agency’s interests, groups such as Abbot enjoyed a 
creative freedom unlike federal agencies such as the OFF.  Corporate sponsored imagery, 
including brochures and posters, often depicted sensationalistic scenes of violence that 
did little to articulate the war’s causes or resolutions.  Under these circumstances, 
publications such as The Year of Peril operated similarly to advertisements for the 
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corporate sponsor. Who benefited most significantly from such publications—the war 
effort, corporate sponsors, or participating artists—often remained unclear.  
 Released in March 1942, the OFF’s Divide and Conquer explained the dangerous 
nature of Nazi propaganda by emphasizing two related messages.  First, the brochure 
articulated how the Nazi propaganda machine infiltrated enemy nations and turned 
citizens against one another before the later Wehrmacht invasion.  The second, more 
important component of Divide and Conquer revealed how the Germans had already 
begun spreading propaganda in the United States.35  Written by Philip Hamburger, a 
junior OFF staff writer, the pamphlet’s effectiveness and popularity resulted undoubtedly 
in part from the inclusion of six didactic illustrations by Fitzpatrick, a well-known 
newspaper cartoonist.36  Fitzpatrick’s cover graphic featured a lightly drawn, ghost-like 
Hitler holding a noose while whispering to a man in a three piece suit (fig. 2.15).  To 
reinforce the metaphorical nature of his illustration, Fitzpatrick rendered Hitler in soft 
lines similar to the smoke-like background in which his torso floats.  The mustachioed 
figure in the foreground expresses surprise upon hearing Hitler’s words from above.  To 
complete the drawing’s effectiveness Fitzpatrick placed Hitler’s elbow behind the man’s 
head, thus creating a series of angles pointing to the figure’s brain and leaving no doubt 
as to the target for these lies.  
 Although Fitzpatrick’s cover art only alluded to violence with the inclusion of the 
noose, the interior imagery exhibited more foreboding content.  The brochure’s first half 
emphasized the Nazi invasion method used in Europe.  As noted by Hamburger, “Before 
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Hitler attacks any country, his agents carefully sow seeds of hate and disunity, turning 
people against their own governments, governments against their allies, class against 
class” (p. 4).  These introductory remarks, which explained the meaning of the brochure’s 
title succinctly, appeared below one of Fitzpatrick’s more sobering illustrations of Nazi 
aggression (fig 2.16).  Printed above the headline “The Story of Nazi Terror....,” 
Fitzpatrick depicted a Nazi soldier, identifiable by the swastika on his arm, marching 
away from two victims who hang from a tree at left.  While the drawing shows only the 
victims’ dangling shins and feet, Fitzpatrick makes the previous, undoubtedly unjust 
events clear by aligning three key elements into a triangular formation.  The soldier’s 
bayonet points to the hung victims who, though bound and deceased, play an active role 
in the scene.  The feet of the hung individual on the left point to a poster below that states 
“Verboten,” a reference to the “forbidden” activities the Nazis imposed on occupied 
nations.  This poster appears directly above a faint line on the wall below, which in turn 
leads directly back to the soldier.  Thus, while the center of the image displays an 
unmarked wall, Fitzpatrick links three iconographic elements into a continuous triangular 
configuration: Nazi laws, militarism, and victims.  
 The second half of Divide and Conquer explained how Nazi propaganda had 
already spread throughout the United States.  According to the brochure’s text, the 
Reich’s strategy in the U.S. before the Pearl Harbor bombing involved an approach 
similar to that used in Europe.  This plan included efforts to divide Americans by 
clandestinely spreading rumors and confusing citizens concerning the war before 
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invading.  Examples in Hamburger’s text included an international news service funded 
secretly by the Nazis, and the dissemination of “attractively printed ‘white books’ and 
‘news letters’ of German propaganda to businessmen, clergymen, editors, and others.” 
According to Hamburger, “Using mailing lists, they flooded the country with pamphlets 
discussing the ‘German side.’”  Furthermore, Divide and Conquer explained that 
unknowing citizens spread much of this material, which often “presented Hitler’s views 
in sugar-coated form to many loyal, unsuspecting Americans,” without realizing its actual 
source (p. 12).  
 If these surreptitious efforts resulted as intended, Americans would become 
suspicious of one another along racial, religious, and class demographics, thus easing a 
future Nazi invasion.  As explained by Hamburger in his text, the Nazis also intended to 
instill suspicion between the U.S. and one of its primary allies, the British.  To illustrate 
this notion, Fitzpatrick depicted Hitler dividing representatives of the two nations (fig. 
2.17).  This drawing featured two very similar looking men in jackets and neckties 
separated by a two-headed Hitler, who whispers rumors to each man simultaneously.  As 
both men eye each other suspiciously, this Janus-faced Hitler whispers “the British bz-z-
z-z-z-z-z” to the left, while to the right he murmurs “The Americans bz-z-z-z-z-z-z-.”  
Though hardly a terrifying image on its own, Fitzpatrick’s illustration effectively 
supplemented the text’s explanation of how covert propaganda instilled suspicion 
between Allied nations.
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 In short, Divide and Conquer outlined how Nazi propaganda sabotaged a nation’s 
unity before the actual shooting started.  As Hamburger’s text explained, this process 
grew worse through the assistance of the “fifth column,” a term used often during the war 
to designate an individual or group, foreign or domestic, that aided the enemy directly or 
indirectly through any action detrimental to the war effort.  Fifth columnists included 
Nazi spies who collected information or sabotaged manufacturing or military plans.  OFF 
Director MacLeish expanded on this point at a roundtable radio discussion broadcast 
from the University of Chicago in May, 1942.  The aim of Nazi propaganda, he argued, is 
“to divide us within this country—Christians from Jews, Protestants from Catholics, 
Negros from white people—and to break down everything that would tend to unify us.  
After all, the principle is divide and conquer, isn’t it?”37 [emphasis in text]  Government 
campaigns also noted that fifth columnists included those who took unnecessary sick 
days from work, broke tools, patronized the black market, or spread jokes and rumors 
that seemed innocuous, but in fact reinforced racist stereotypes and other cultural 
divisions.38
 The OFF initially printed one million copies of Divide and Conquer at a cost of 
$14,000.  Major press outlets ran stories announcing its publication, and according to the 
OFF, “editorial writers and radio commentators praised its effectiveness and emphasized 
its points.”39  Archival records indicate the agency eventually printed 2,600,000 total 
copies, a number exceeding any other domestically distributed OFF publication.40  As 
with many other federal propaganda brochures, the text of Divide and Conquer 
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reappeared in newspapers and popular magazines.  For example, the May 9th, 1942 issue 
of the Saturday Evening Post ran a reformatted version of the brochure featuring different  
artwork by Kemp Starrett, a commercial illustrator, that demonstrated a strong similarity 
to Fitzpatrick’s drawings.41  Additionally, the brochure’s text was reprinted in 
approximately 450 South American newspapers.42 
 The themes promoted in Divide and Conquer also appeared in contemporary 
literature and popular culture.  In March 1942, shortly after Divide and Conquer first 
appeared, John Steinbeck published The Moon is Down, a short, fictional account of the 
invasion of a small, anonymous European nation by an unidentified army.  Steinbeck’s 
story, a thinly veiled allusion to countless Nazi occupations, emphasized how the 
invading army used local townspeople against one another in order to break the 
underground resistance.  Generally well-received by critics and soon published overseas, 
Steinbeck’s novel reappeared subsequently as a full-length film, and later, a play.43  
Similarly, the second installment of Frank Capra’s Why We Fight film series, released in 
1943, was titled Divide and Conquer.  Though not explicitly a companion piece to the 
OFF’s brochure, Capra’s documentary shared many of the same themes, and appeared in 
theaters across the country.44
 According to OFF records, Divide and Conquer received overwhelmingly positive 
reviews and was one of the Graphics Bureau’s “highlights.”45  Reader response was 
“immediate and enthusiastic,” and the agency estimated a circulation of twenty-million 
readers.  The OFF received requests for more than one million copies from private 
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citizens across the country.  Newspaper editors, union officials, women’s clubs, fraternal 
organizations, and students asked for copies in the single and quadruple digits.  
Democratic Congressman Joseph Bryson of South Carolina requested 1,000 copies and 
noted that if he had his way, he would put a copy into the hands of “everyone of my 
constituents.”  A student in Baltimore wrote requesting copies for his history class, 
adding: “We feel that it is a fine piece of propaganda based on truth.”  A store manager in 
Fort Wayne, Indiana asked for 100 copies for the farmers that frequented his 
establishment.  “All you send,” he promised, “will be distributed.”  Americans praised 
not only the information provided but the illustrations as well.  Supreme Court Justice 
Felix Frankfurter wrote to MacLeish that “Daumier never did anything better than Fitz’s 
illustration of your pamphlet...”46  An unsigned OFF memo argued that the brochure’s 
huge and overwhelmingly positive reception proved that citizens did not receive enough 
war-related information from their government and that they were eager for more.47   
 Popular and read widely, Divide and Conquer featured imagery that while 
unsettling, was not particularly violent.  Fitzpatrick’s illustrations appeared similar in 
style and content to his editorial cartoons, and did not depict material that would shock 
readers of most national newspapers.  The real power of Divide and Conquer came from 
the sobering combination of Fitzpatrick’s graphics with Hamburger’s text, which together 
explained the threat of Nazism in urgent, though measured terms.  
 Not all American propaganda exhibited a similar restraint.  Within weeks after the 
OFF released Divide and Conquer, a corporate-sponsored brochure exploded onto the 
111
national scene that received a more mixed reception.  Titled The Year of Peril, this 
brochure featured the artwork of Thomas Hart Benton, a popular Regionalist painter.  A 
curmudgeonly figure known for his drunken slurs against homosexuals and the art 
museum establishment, Benton held a significant influence on American art as both a 
painter and a teacher before the rise of Abstract Expressionism following the war.  After 
studying in Europe from 1908 to 1911, his career rose in New York in the early 1920s, 
where his dynamic, colorful murals received particular notice.  In 1935 Benton returned 
to his native Missouri, where he taught at the Kansas City Art Institute and painted scenes 
celebrating midwestern life that critics frequently blasted as cliche.48  Benton’s work 
nevertheless became popular with many viewers drawn to his expressive, narrative 
compositions that displayed “traditional” American scenes.  During the 1930s in 
particular, Benton and his fellow Regionalists John Steuart Curry and Grant Wood 
created work that the conservative art critic Thomas Craven championed as uniquely 
American in their content and style.49
 A full-color, ten page assault on the senses, Benton’s The Year of Peril showcased 
the artist’s emotionally-charged reaction to the war.  According to press reports, Benton 
was lecturing in California on December 7, 1941, when notified about the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor.  Unable to continue speaking, Benton canceled the rest of his lecture 
tour and spent the next nine weeks in his Kansas City studio, where he created the 
paintings used later in The Year of Peril.  The brochure’s introduction featured a short 
statement from Benton, where he stated that in these pictures, “There is no hiding of the 
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fact that War is killing and the grim will to kill.  In these designs there is none of the 
polly-anna fat that the American people are in the habit of being fed.”  These words, 
apparently attacking what Benton saw as an inadequate government propaganda effort, 
proved an accurate description of the grim imagery that followed.  
 Benton’s The Year of Peril paintings ranged from depictions of dead or dying 
American soldiers to allegorical scenes showing the lethal threat of Axis aggressors.50  
Blunt, unabashed violence characterized each image, and Benton’s use of bright, garish 
colors amplified the shocking effect.  Though each painting has a nightmarish quality, the 
series can be split into two groups based on their relationship to either realism or allegory. 
Four of Benton’s paintings, Starry Night (fig. 2.18), Casualty (fig. 2.19), Indifference 
(fig. 2.20), and The Harvest (fig. 2.21) featured exaggerated violence and gore.  These 
works depicted sinking ships, wrecked planes, homes engulfed in flames, and soldiers 
and civilians either dead or dying, and in some cases decapitated or dismembered.  
Though violent and unsettling, these paintings exhibited scenes that, in the artist’s 
handling of perspective, form, or color, were less “realistic” than simply shocking.   
 These first four paintings emphasize the violent suffering and death of U.S. 
servicemen.  The brochure’s cover image, Starry Night (fig. 2.18) featured a drowning 
sailor raising his hands in anguish as a ship sinks in the background.  The work’s title, a 
reference to Van Gogh’s 1889 painting, suggests a tragic irony as the sky above shows a 
peaceful, star-filled night.  The only swirling forms reminiscent of Van Gogh’s evocative 
brushstrokes in Benton’s scene are the pools of blood, oil, and seawater blended on the 
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ocean’s surface.  The bright orange and red flames raising from the ocean directly in front 
of the drowning man intensify the sense of terror.  Like Starry Night, Benton’s Casualty 
also depicted a sinking, burning ship in the background (fig. 2.19).  The unsettling aspect 
of this image however, resulted from the dead, and in one case decapitated, U.S. troops 
lying in the foreground.  Similarly, Benton’s Indifference depicted the fiery wreckage of 
military aircraft, as well as suffering or perhaps already dead servicemen (fig. 2.20).  
Finally, The Harvest shows chaos, fire, and death in a war torn landscape (fig. 2.21).  
Unlike the previously mentioned works however, The Harvest exhibits violent acts of war 
committed against civilians.  Here a dead man dressed in civilian clothing lies in the right  
foreground, while a young woman stands aghast above a bleeding child on the left.  The 
aircraft flying into the distance above at left suggests a likely source of this tragedy, as 
the fiery remains of some structure, possibly a domestic dwelling, smolder in the middle 
ground.51
 The remaining three paintings in The Year of Peril, arguably even more violent 
than the previous works, exhibit surrealistic scenes that demonstrate little connection to 
“realism.”  As the art historian Erika Doss has noted, these images, titled The Sowers (fig. 
2.22), Again (fig. 2.23), and Exterminate (fig. 2.24), wandered from Regionalism into 
magic realism in their allegorical and nightmarish content.52  In The Sowers, Benton 
depicted a large, shirtless figure wearing military boots and a cap similar to a Nazi officer 
(fig. 2.22).  This muscular figure, who displays simian-like features, spreads skulls from a 
satchel in a manner reminiscent of the eponymous Millet painting.  The low horizon line 
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gives this menace an imposing dominance of the landscape as billowing, red-orange 
flames unfurl in the background.  Similar enemy figures appeared in Again (fig. 2.23), 
which showed a nightmarish crucifixion of Christ set on an angled precipice.  Instead of 
surrounded by traditional Christian iconography, here Christ is impaled from below by a 
group of attackers that include a mix of uniformed Nazis and shirtless ogres displaying 
racist features drawn from Japanese stereotypes.  These aggressors carry Axis flags while 
a fighter plane swoops down and attacks Christ from above.  By inserting Axis soldiers in 
place of the traditional Romans, here Benton appropriated Christian imagery to suggest 
that Americans, as well as Christianity itself was under attack by the Axis powers.  
 Benton’s Exterminate!, the final Year of Peril painting, was the only work in the 
brochure that depicted American soldiers engaging in an offensive attack (fig. 2.24).  The 
artist seemed to have Exterminate! in mind when he wrote in Time that: “Evil and 
predatory forces are always with us... Humanity must... rise up and tear their evil out of 
them and kill them.  For this task, sensual hate, ferocity and brute will are necessary...”53  
Here Benton depicted two bayonet-wielding GIs assaulting a pair of ogre-like humanoids 
representing the Axis Powers.  The larger of these enemy figures resembles Hitler and 
carries a staff with a swastika in one hand and a torch in the other.  The other enemy 
figure exhibits facial characteristics unmistakably similar to any number of wartime 
images that characterized the Japanese as rat-like subhumans.  As noted by several 
scholars, racist depictions of the Japanese enemy, also seen in Benton’s Again, appeared 
throughout popular culture and advertising during the war (fig. 2.25).54 
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 Compared to the more straightforward scenes of violence and suffering in the 
former works, the symbols Benton depicted in The Sowers, Again, and Exterminate! add 
a decidedly surreal and nightmarish quality to the series.  The artist seemed to reference 
these latter works in the brochure’s introduction by writing that he did not intend to create 
“technically realistic” paintings.  Rather, Benton argued his works “do not represent 
accurately anything that I have seen with my eyes or that another may see with his.  They 
are realistic just the same.  I believe that they are true representations of the moment even 
though the symbols used are imaginative.”  These works therefore display a more 
personal, emotive “representation” of Benton’s understanding of the fighting abroad.  
 Benton’s The Year of Peril paintings reached a huge, incalculable audience.  The 
artist later wrote that Abbott Laboratories, the brochure’s corporate underwriter, 
distributed 160,000 copies.  However, Benton also claimed The Year of Peril appeared in 
more than twenty-six million newspapers, two million magazines, and that seventy-five 
thousand viewers gazed upon the original paintings in New York when exhibited at the 
Associated American Artists gallery on April 6, 1942.55  Additionally, the series appeared 
in Paramount Pictures newsreels in movie theaters across the nation.56  The distribution 
of the series was so widespread that Manny Farber, writing in the New Republic, 
suggested that “More people have seen these Benton’s than anything since Van Gogh or 
GWTW [Gone with the Wind].”57
 Benton’s widely viewed series quickly generated passionate and diverse 
responses.  John Steuart Curry, a fellow Regionalist painter, wrote in Time that Benton’s 
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“propaganda paintings have been the most successful of all our pictorial propaganda so 
far.”58  Similarly, Benton received a congratulatory note from the critic Lewis Mumford, 
a friend from his days in New York who characterized The Year of Peril as “the best 
paintings on the theme that have been done since Goya.”59  Not all viewers were as 
supportive.  Though he admitted their reception was widespread, Farber also called the 
series “Benton’s bad paintings.”  Benton’s friend Bill McKim thought these works to be 
the artist at his worst.60  Similarly, Henry Pringle, an OFF official who later joined the 
OWI, referred to The Year of Peril as Benton’s “horror” pictures.61 
 Regardless of these divergent opinions, the development of Benton’s The Year of 
Peril into a brochure represents a complicated story resulting from a combination of 
government indecision and corporate initiative.  Benton apparently had no intention 
initially of distributing these paintings as a brochure, and had hoped originally to exhibit 
the series at Union Station in downtown Kansas City, located less than three miles from 
his home studio.  This exhibition apparently never occurred, however, and Benton’s 
paintings were given to the Library of Congress in early 1942 to be distributed by the 
OFF, where staff members expressed split opinions of the series.  Although Time noted 
that Director MacLeish wanted to distribute Benton’s work, other OFF officials, 
including William Lewis, a former CBS radio executive, feared the paintings would 
“horrify rather than inspire.”62  The distribution of Benton’s series seems to have stalled 
until Reeves Lewenthal, founder of the Association of American Artists, saw the potential 
for a much larger (and more profitable) distribution.  In early 1942, Lewenthal negotiated 
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a deal between Benton and Abbott Laboratories, a Chicago-based pharmaceutical firm, 
that paid the artist $20,000 while also covering production costs to distribute the 
paintings as a brochure.63 
 The development of Benton’s The Year of Peril into a corporate-sponsored 
brochure raises significant questions concerning the relationship between the government 
and big business in the distribution of war themed imagery.  The brochure featured an 
introduction by MacLeish in which the OFF Director characterized Benton’s work “as 
true as it is moving.”  However, The Year of Peril did not mention MacLeish’s connection 
to the OFF.  Apparently the decision to separate the government’s association with the 
brochure came rather late, as when The Year of Peril came off the presses, MacLeish’s 
title, “Director of the Office of Facts and Figures,” appeared beneath his name in a 
gesture suggesting a government endorsement of its contents.  However, as noted by the 
art historian Henry Adams, MacLeish’s title was covered with a small slip of paper on 
each copy of the brochure before their distribution, an attempt to apparently disconnect 
any official tie between The Year of Peril and the OFF.64  Shortly after its release, the 
OFF/OWI official Henry Pringle noted in a private letter that the government had 
“nothing to do with the publication except to the degree that the foreword is written by 
Archie MacLeish.”65  MacLeish’s involvement suggests a personal endorsement that may  
have upset other government officials given the contrast between his previous emphasis 
on a “strategy of truth” and the intense nature of Benton’s paintings.   
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 Moreover, the development of Benton’s The Year of Peril into a brochure raises 
significant questions concerning the motivations for corporate sponsorship of war-themed 
graphics.  Not only did Abbott emerge as the brochure’s sole sponsor, the group also 
reprinted Benton’s paintings in What’s New, the company’s in-house magazine distributed 
to doctors and pharmacists.66  In fact, The Year of Peril marked Abbott’s first venture into 
“high art” patronage that extended through the war.  Shortly after Benton’s brochure was 
released, Abbott commissioned numerous war-themed paintings by modern artists, 
including Benton, Curry, Peter Blume, Joseph Hirsch, and Reginald Marsh that later 
appeared in Abbott publications.  These works were also sent on Abbott sponsored, 
nationwide tours.  The art historian Michele Bogart has noted that Abbott commissioned 
artists to illustrate numerous publications during the war in a strategy to improve their 
standing among doctors and other influential professionals.67  While this is undoubtedly 
true, Abbott arguably exploited the war by commissioning modern artists to create 
advertising fodder, a method of self-promotion that became increasingly accepted by 
other corporations as the war progressed.
 Finally then, contrasting Abbott’s The Year of Peril with the OFF’s Divide and 
Conquer reveals starkly different approaches to the depiction of violence.  Divide and 
Conquer was clearly produced and promoted by a federal agency and had the staid layout  
of a textbook.  Primarily text-based and printed in black and white, it included 41 
endnotes from a variety of sources and used effective but restrained illustrations to 
supplement the text.  Sober in its content and design, Divide and Conquer explained the 
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Nazi threat largely without using sensational language or imagery.  In its directness and 
fact-based content, it foreshadowed the approach used by Shahn in Nazi Brutality.  
Contrastingly, The Year of Peril brochure featured far more violent, nightmarish imagery.  
It deemphasized the role of factual evidence and instead promoted overblown, 
emotionally charged scenes.  Additionally, whereas Divide and Conquer explained details 
of the enemy’s plan, Benton did not suggest strategies that would lead to the defeat of 
fascist aggressors.68  Indeed, Doss notes that Benton’s choice to use a “proto-surrealist” 
style suggests an “ambivalence...  as to what [The Year of Peril paintings] were really all 
about.”69  Thus, against Benton’s intensely violent imagery, the didactic nature of Divide 
and Conquer provided a straightforward, clear analysis.
 Ultimately, the significance between publications such as The Year of Peril and 
government propaganda, including Divide and Conquer and Falter’s Sacrifice for 
Freedom poster is not the use of violence or the amount of didactic information.  The 
larger, more complex issue is the increasing role of corporate-sponsored influence in 
American culture.  With the dismantling of the New Deal during the early 1940s, federal 
agencies (particularly in, but not limited to the arts) that once thrived saw their funding 
slashed as the war intensified.  As numerous scholars have noted, advertisers soon 
realized the advantages of employing well-known artists, including Benton, to produce 
original imagery for marketing purposes during the era.  Thus, it should come as no 
surprise that corporations began to recruit modern artists to create flashy imagery such as 
that seen in The Year of Peril to improve public relations.70  The following section further 
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complicates the relationship between government and corporate imagery by examining 
the results of the closing of the OFF and the establishment of the OWI in the summer of 
1942.   
Revealing the “Nature of the Enemy”
 As the summer of 1942 approached, government officials realized their 
propaganda efforts required a reorganized strategy.  While the OFF achieved some 
success with publications such as Divide and Conquer, critics cited government 
propaganda campaigns as disorganized and inefficient.  Editorialists, artists, and citizens 
blasted the OFF and related agencies, including the OCD and the Office of Emergency 
Management (OEM), for spreading a flood of information that led to significant 
confusion.  These complaints had validity as numerous individual federal offices, 
including each wing of the armed services and the Treasury Department, also produced 
their own graphics and press releases.  As noted in the midst of the war by A.H. Feller, a 
former professor of law turned propaganda official, the public’s criticism could be 
summed up thusly: “It all seemed to boil down to three bitter complaints: first, that there 
was too much information; second, that there wasn’t enough of it; and third, that in any 
event it was confusing and inconsistent.”71  In short, citizens expressed uncertainty as to 
which agency was spreading the “right” or “most important” messages.72
 In an attempt to alleviate these concerns, the Roosevelt administration sought to 
streamline the distribution of government information through the creation of the Office 
of War Information (OWI).  Established in June 1942, the OWI replaced or absorbed 
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existing agencies such as the OFF and the OGR and remained the primary American 
propaganda agency until the war’s end.  President Roosevelt named Elmer Davis, a well-
known and widely respected CBS radio commentator, as the OWI’s first and only 
Director.  The appointment of Davis, a midwesterner known for his plainspoken and 
unbiased editorials, received widespread support from critics.73  The OWI took on many 
former OFF staffers, including MacLeish, who returned to the Library of Congress but 
also served as an OWI advisor.  Similar to older agencies, the OWI continued to produce 
a variety of propaganda, including posters, but also extended its influence into newspaper 
comics, radio, and motion pictures.  The agency additionally established an Overseas 
Bureau, headed by the playwright Robert Sherwood, that distributed magazines, posters, 
books, photographs, and other ideologically driven content throughout the world.74 
 OWI Director Davis stressed a series of goals similar to those expressed by 
MacLeish at the defunct OFF.  Both agencies emphasized that their primary purpose 
involved the distribution of facts through news reports, posters, and other printed 
material.  By doing so they argued, the American people could make up their own minds 
concerning war related issues.  To help reinforce this notion, Davis and other 
administrators regularly avoided referring to the OWI as a “propaganda” office and 
instead declared the bureau’s work as the distribution of “information.” 
 Though the two agencies had some similarities, the OWI initially employed well-
known modern artists to assist with the production of its propaganda campaigns.  This 
effort began soon after the establishment of the agency when Davis introduced Francis 
122
Brennan as the OWI’s Chief of Graphics in August 1942.75  Formerly the art director at 
Fortune magazine, Brennan established his reputation previously by using graphics and 
photography that showed a distinctively modern, European influence.  Brennan’s taste for 
war posters, seen in the August 1941 issue of Fortune, revealed these visual interests.  
The issue featured work by modern American designers such as Joseph Binder and 
European immigrants such as Herbert Matter and Jean Carlu.76  Unlike the highly 
illustrative, ultra-patriotic imagery created by the CPI during World War I, these posters 
featured modern design elements, including conceptual, stylized forms, seen in Binder’s 
“Labor” poster (fig. 2.26).  Allusions to possible violence also resonated in more 
foreboding graphics, such as Carlu’s “America: Open your eyes!” (fig. 2.27).  The 
accompanying text in Fortune argued that American visual preferences had matured since 
the First World War and that the public’s “knowledge is greater, his background broader, 
his taste stricter.  With rare exceptions the posters that moved him to lick the Kaiser 
would today do little more than arouse a strong nostalgia for the days when war was 
simple and unsubtle.”77  Though no posters in this edition of Fortune referenced a 
specific event, Brennan later became a key advocate for the type of documentary-driven, 
at times unsettling propaganda designed by Shahn and others.78
 Following his appointment at the OWI, Brennan published a short letter in the 
August 1942 issue of Art News introducing himself to the artistic community.  Here 
Brennan wrote that as for federal propaganda, “It must be admitted that, thus far, the 
government has fumbled the ball—first, because it had no central organization for the 
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purpose; and second, because there was a split point of view on how the war graphics job 
was to be done.”  Brennan explained that the OWI Graphics Bureau would create posters 
and other printed material like brochures.  Such material, he noted, was sorely needed: 
“The American people need their artists now—to charge them with the grave 
responsibility of spelling out their anger, their grief, their greatness and their justice.  The 
artist will respond, as he has countless times before in the history of the world, to fight it 
out on the field where no others can.”79  Brennan’s rallying cry to artists went on to 
suggest an inclusive agenda regarding the work he anticipated the agency producing.  By 
not relying on commercial artists alone, Brennan’s approach marked a distinct shift not 
only from the CPI during the First War, but the OFF as well.  
 Yet Brennan provided few details regarding how artists might submit work to the 
OWI.  In fact the agency never established an efficient system for generating graphic 
content from diverse sources, and numerous artists that contributed work to the OWI did 
so only after being contacted directly by agency officials.80  This recruiting campaign 
began shortly after the agency’s establishment in the summer of 1942, when OWI 
bureaucrats, including MacLeish and Thomas Mabry, an OFF/OWI administrator 
mentioned in the previous chapter, contacted several well-known modern artists, inviting 
them to submit propaganda designs.  This effort paid off, as OWI records show numerous 
respected artists contributed sketches and in some cases finished paintings they hoped to 
see reproduced as propaganda.  In addition to Shahn, the list of modern artists who 
participated included Moses and Raphael Soyer, Yasuo Kuniyoshi, William Gropper, 
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Charles Alston, Peter Blume, Philip Guston, Robert Gwathmey, Charles Sheeler, 
Boardman Robinson, Ad Reinhardt, Jacob Lawrence, and Aaron Douglas.81  Despite 
Brennan’s allusion to a new artistic inclusiveness, the number of well-known modern 
artists who saw their work distributed as OWI posters remained very small.  The agency 
printed few graphics designed by these artists at least in part because some of these 
individuals wished to create imagery depicting the factual, and at times, discordant 
aspects of war.  
 The Nazi atrocity at Lidice, committed less than two weeks before the 
establishment of the OWI, illustrates how the war’s brutally violent nature challenged 
American propagandists.  News of the murders spread quickly due to the Nazis’ own 
flagrant dissemination of their actions.  Coverage appeared in the New York Times on 
June 11, 1942, the day after the killings, under the headline: “Nazis Blot Out Czech 
Village; Kill All Men, Disperse Others.” The coverage continued:
All men in the Czechoslovak town of Lidice have been shot, the women 
sent to concentration camps, the children placed in ‘educational 
institutions’ and the town itself ‘leveled to the ground’ on the charge that 
the population gave shelter and assistance to the slayers of the Nazi leader 
Reinhard Heydrich, the Berlin radio announced tonight.  The 
announcement, quoting an official statement issued in Prague, gave the 
population of Lidice as 483...  The town was utterly wiped off the map, the 
statement made clear, by noting that the ‘name of the community was 
extinguished.’82 
As the Germans reported the killings themselves, news coverage of the atrocity spread 
quickly.83  Thus, if American propaganda agencies avoided addressing Lidice they would 
ignore a truly heinous act known to be true.  Conversely, to acknowledge this massacre 
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with visual propaganda would almost certainly remind viewers of the sensationalistic 
posters used during World War I and thus seem a fabricated exaggeration.  Federal 
agencies ran the risk, therefore, of either ignoring a terrible event or of being accused of 
embellishing the facts to sway public opinion.  
 The complications of addressing Lidice became apparent in June 1942, when 
MacLeish, by this time an OWI advisor, contacted William Gropper concerning the 
creation of a series of drawings based on the killings.84  Gropper responded 
enthusiastically by submitting a portfolio of sequential lithographs within weeks.  His 
works began with a scenic view of Lidice as a quaint mining town, before transitioning to 
renderings of the murder of its men, forced migration of its women and children, and the 
village’s subsequent destruction.  The series’ most brutal image depicted the murder of 
several Czech men by a row of large, automaton-like Nazi soldiers (fig. 2.28).  This cruel 
scene of a firing squad seems akin to Francisco Goya’s well known The Third of May, 
1808 (1812; fig. 2.29).  Gropper’s treatment of the Germans as nearly inhuman monsters 
appeared in his original cover art, which showed a helmeted Nazi staring straight towards 
the viewer, dull-eyed and animal-like.  Other works in Gropper’s series depicted children 
being herded from their parents, and a landscape displaying the village’s charred, 
smoldering remains.   
 Though expressive images based on documented facts, Gropper’s Lidice drawings 
did not receive a positive reception at the OWI.  About four months after the artist 
submitted his work, the progressive New York daily PM covered the series’ rejection by 
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the agency under the headline “Gropper’s ‘Lidice:’ Too Rough for the OWI” (fig. 2.30).  
The article, which included Gropper’s original cover art, stated that MacLeish found 
Gropper’s images “too grotesque and that people would not believe it.”  MacLeish also 
mentioned that other government officials noted “it was like being in the hands of 
Gargantua...  too anthropoidal [sic].”85  Initially the OWI intended to print Gropper’s 
work as a brochure for domestic distribution.  However, after being labeled as “too 
rough,” Gropper’s series was given Spanish captions and distributed in South America by 
the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA).86  Before the brochure’s printing by 
the CIAA, Gropper redesigned the cover art (fig. 2.31).87  Instead of the animal-like Nazi, 
the printed cover featured a dignified Czechoslovakian miner along with text that 
translated to: “Lidice: history of a small population.”  Not surprisingly, Gropper’s 
reaction to the OWI’s rejection of his work was characteristically gruff.  As reported by 
PM, Gropper responded to the agency’s criticism he was “too rough” on the Axis by 
asking: “What do they want us to do? Handle the enemy with silk gloves?”88 
 Though Gropper’s efforts to address the atrocities at Lidice received a critical 
reception, Ben Shahn’s work later proved more effective.  Shahn’s involvement with the 
OWI began in June 1942, when Mabry invited Shahn to join the agency’s new Graphics 
Bureau, later chaired by Brennan.89  Agency records indicate that shortly after he joined 
the OWI, Shahn was appointed a Senior Liaison Officer.  This position included some 
managerial responsibilities, such as overseeing projects that featured paintings by other 
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artists, as well as posters, brochures, and maps characterized by straightforward, text-
based designs.90 
 Mabry’s letter to Shahn requesting his involvement provided an indication of the 
OWI’s methods regarding the development of posters.  According to Mabry, the agency 
intended to produce approximately three posters every six weeks.  Each poster would be 
directed “to the citizen public and fall roughly into three main categories.”  Mabry noted 
the first category, “The Issues,” addressed “why we fight, whom we fight, how we fight.”  
The second, “Our Allies,” explained “Who they are, what their characteristics are,” while 
the third, “How we can win,” illuminated “the means with which we fight,” including 
“how the civilian can help through work and sacrifice.”91  The agency’s identification of 
three distinct goals originated from President Roosevelt’s 1942 State of the Union 
address.92  Delivered on January 6, 1942, less than a month after Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt 
here outlined the war’s key issues, including the nation’s allies, enemies, and ultimate 
goals.  The President’s speech emphasized the opposing forces of good and evil involved 
in the conflict thusly: “The militarists of Berlin and Tokyo started this war,” he stated, but 
“the massed, angered forces of common humanity will finish it.”  OWI artists such as 
Shahn sought to reinforce this rhetoric by addressing violent acts of aggression 
committed by the Axis Nations.
 Shahn’s artistic success, interest in social justice, and previous work at New Deal 
agencies made him a strong candidate for graphic work at the OWI.  His early success in 
New York during the 1930s came at approximately the same time Mabry began working 
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at MoMA, and it seems likely the two men shared acquaintances.93  Additionally, the 
reportorial style and sobering content of Shahn’s paintings and graphic work during the 
1930s demonstrated strong potential for addressing the war’s seriousness.  For example, 
Shahn received praise from many art critics in the mid 1930s for his series The Passion of 
Sacco and Vanzetti (1931-2).  This group of twenty-three tempera paintings represented a 
critical but subdued response to the controversial murder trail of two Italian immigrants.94 
While many critics argued the court proceedings demonstrated prejudice against the 
defendants as a result of their anarchist beliefs and immigrant status, Shahn’s imagery 
appears in an accessible style critics noted for its straightforward, unbiased approach.  
For example, one panel from the series depicted Sacco and Vanzetti laying in coffins 
before the judges and educational authorities who oversaw the case (fig. 2.32; 1931-2).95  
Besides Shahn’s interest in social justice, his ability to operate within government 
bureaucracies had been strengthened the previous years while working as a photographer, 
poster designer, and muralist for various New Deal-era art programs (see previous 
chapter).  As with his Sacco and Vanzetti paintings, Shahn’s work for the government 
before the war displayed his interest in social issues through a modern, objective style.96 
 Shahn’s decision to address the killings at Lidice likely resulted from several 
factors, including his personal background and disdain for injustice (which he once called 
“the only thing I really do hate”).97  A Jewish artist born in Lithuania, Shahn immigrated 
with his family to Brooklyn as an eight year old in 1906.  After serving as a 
lithographer’s apprentice, he traveled throughout Europe and North Africa, and thus 
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gained an additionally personal connection to sites ruined during the war.  Other 
inspiration for commemorating Lidice may have come from Mabry, whose letter, dated 
thirteen days after the massacre, suggested Shahn consider creating posters based on the 
theme of “the common man in the United Nations as our ally.”  Mabry noted that he 
could not specify further, as “the development of your ideas will be more valuable than 
any elaboration we might make.”  Mabry also included a copy of Vice President Henry 
Wallace’s well-known speech, “The Century of the Common Man,” delivered less than 
two months earlier.98  Much like Shahn’s propaganda, Wallace’s speech expressed a 
humanist attitude towards war that downplayed dogmatic patriotism.  
 Additional visual influences for Shahn’s designs came from confidential 
photographs distributed by the OWI to its artists.  Shahn noted later that the agency 
provided a “constant stream of material, photographic and other kinds of documentation 
of the decimation within enemy territory.  There were the secret confidential horrible 
facts of the cartloads of dead...  There were the blurred pictures of bombed-out places, so 
many of which I knew well and cherished...”99  Several horrific photographs marked “top 
secret” survive in Shahn’s papers, and while none of these match the content of Nazi 
Brutality exactly, they are unquestionably grisly (fig. 2.33).  Shahn’s collection of source 
material also includes newspaper clippings documenting atrocities from the Spanish Civil 
War, including a photograph depicting a hooded victim of fascist aggression about to be 
shot (fig 2.34).
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 While the unsettling content of Nazi Brutality indicated Shahn’s concern with 
fascist aggression, this poster also demonstrated an attempt by OWI officials to address 
troubling opinion surveys.  Though often downplayed in popular histories, public polling 
data suggested American opinion regarding the war remained unstable even after 
Congress declared war in December 1941.  Surveys suggested many Americans 
expressed confusion regarding the government’s short term goals and the future of the 
postwar world.  Uncertainty concerning the enemy, particularly the relationship between 
the German people, Hitler, and the Nazi party, remained especially strong well after 
American entry into the war.  For example, immediately after Pearl Harbor, 30 percent of 
Americans polled hoped for a negotiated peace with the Nazis, and four months later, in 
May 1942, 82 percent of those surveyed stated they did not hate the Germans.100  A 
similar poll conducted more than a year later revealed that a significant portion of 
Americans felt that the German Army did not really support Hitler, and that a military 
coup was possible.  Similar results stated that 40 percent of Americans thought the 
German people did not support Hitler.101  This confusion led to government officials 
expressing concern with American vigilance and willingness to fight.
 In response to such data, government pollsters argued for propaganda that would 
reveal the “Nature of the Enemy” by emphasizing acts of violence such as the massacre 
at Lidice.102  Whether Shahn was aware of surveys documenting American confusion 
concerning the Nazi threat or not, his Nazi Brutality represented a powerful attempt to 
use known acts of aggression as a weapon against the enemy.  The lower text within 
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Shahn’s poster emphasized this relationship in particular by repeating details used in Nazi 
press releases later printed throughout American media.103  As noted by an unnamed OWI 
official, “there was no need to manufacture [atrocity] stories since the Nazis themselves 
boast of their misdeeds.”104  By employing this approach, the OWI reinforced a “strategy 
of truth” while avoiding criticism that it manufactured exaggerations of the enemy’s evil 
actions.
 Besides Nazi Brutality, Shahn’s use of traumatic content also appeared in the only 
other OWI poster he designed that the agency printed.  His second, and last OWI poster, 
We French Workers Warn You, featured a horizontal scene of French laborers raising their 
hands in a gesture emphasizing their helpless submission (fig. 2.35).105  Likely threatened 
by the drawn weapons of unseen assailants, these men stand crowded together in a scene 
suggesting a tense moment of uncertainty.  Except for the figure closest to the viewer, 
each man faces a brick wall that nearly fills the background and connotes an anxious, 
restricted setting.  The partially obstructed poster in the background, titled an “Official 
Vichy Decree,” likely refers to any number of Nazi imposed laws in occupied France.106  
Nazi abuse in Vichy began shortly after the German invasion in June 1940, and included 
antisemitism and the forced labor of groups identified as foreigners.  Shahn’s poster 
provides a clear warning to American workers of the fate suffered by laborers in defeated 
nations with bold lettering at the poster’s top: “We French workers warn you... defeat 
means slavery, starvation, death.”107  Clearly Shahn intended the Nazi abuse of French 
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laborers as a foreboding message to American workers unsure regarding their stake in the 
international conflict.108 
 Opinions on Shahn’s OWI work ranged from praise to condemnation.  Soon after 
the distribution of French Workers, the OWI received a letter from C.M. Burgess, the 
president of a midwestern factory, deriding Shahn’s design.  Expressing dismay for the 
OWI’s warning to American labor, Burgess felt that “Whoever designed [French 
Workers] surely had a pessimistic and defeatist complex.”  The poster, he wrote, 
“questions the possibility of a victory for this country,” while also making “martyrs out of 
French workers who are largely responsible for the defeat of France.”109  Burgess 
finished by noting that if he were the head of the department responsible for this poster, 
he would have it recalled.  Similar criticism for Shahn’s posters came later from 
government officials.  Although the OWI originally intended to distribute 40,000 copies 
of Nazi Brutality to a Czech-American organization, an unnamed agency official saw 
Shahn’s image as too gruesome, and they were never delivered.110 
Not all viewers of Shahn’s posters reacted negatively.  The same month Shahn 
received the criticism above, William Warne, an Assistant to the Director of the 
Department of Interior, wrote Brennan and noted that Shahn’s French Workers and Nazi 
Brutality posters were “absolutely swell jobs.”  Warne felt that those involved “should be 
proud to distribute such telling stuff.”111  Additionally, Edward Rowan, Assistant Chief at 
the Section of Fine Arts, wrote Shahn that he was “profoundly moved” by Nazi Brutality 
specifically.  Rowan wrote: “I sincerely feel that you have created a real work of art and it 
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is extremely gratifying to me to see that an artist can do this even in a poster.”112  Praise 
such as this may have inspired Shahn to amplify his efforts with later projects that 
addressed similar themes.
Though his OWI work varied, agency records document that one of the larger, 
long term projects that Shahn oversaw featured artwork by other modern artists depicting 
victims of Axis aggression.  Referred to in agency documents as the “Nature of the 
Enemy,” this campaign featured brutal and sometimes graphically violent imagery.113  In 
his own words, Shahn intended these posters to be a “resume” on the enemy that would 
remind Americans of the serious threat posed by the Axis.114  According to agency 
records, Shahn proposed that the series begin with a text-based poster stating the 
campaign’s name, “The Nature of the Enemy” followed by the words “Suppression, 
starvation, torture, slavery, death.”115  The series was then to include an individual poster 
for each of these painful themes featuring a design by a different modern artist.  A map 
denoting specific sites of Axis atrocities would complete the series.116 
The campaign’s most accurate record is not a poster but a tempera painting 
created by Shahn featuring the designs of four other, participating artists (fig. 2.36).  
Titled The Enemy Method, Shahn here recreated posters featuring artwork by (from left to 
right) Charles White (suppression), Kathe Kollwitz (starvation), Shahn (slavery), Yasou 
Kuniyoshi (torture), and Bernard Perlin (murder).117  The complete painting depicts each 
poster affixed to a brick wall, mimicking the urban environment in which Shahn likely 
envisioned them appearing.  Shahn additionally added the text “We FIGHT for a FREE 
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world!” beneath the posters, reinforcing the larger, long term goals of the war that would 
end the violence shown.  Shahn’s intentions in creating this painting are unclear, but as 
there is little evidence that most of the posters he included were distributed by the OWI, 
he may have simply desired to commemorate an unrealized series that attacked the 
injustice of war.118
As demonstrated by The Enemy Method, the posters included in Shahn’s 
campaign featured sobering content that eschewed traditional patriotic war imagery.  
Similar to Shahn’s own OWI posters, the series depicted the suffering victims of the Axis 
Powers, and not the enemy himself.  By doing so, the artists forced viewers to identify 
with those who had been beaten, tortured, or killed as a result of the war.  By avoiding a 
literal depiction of the enemy, these artists avoided stereotyping the enemy as a 
caricature.  This strategy had two major benefits: first, many Americans were not far 
removed ancestrally from Axis nations.  Thus, depictions of the enemy in OWI graphics 
avoided offending viewers based on regional or ethnic stereotypes.119  Second, by not 
depicting the enemy as an easily defeated, clownish, or inhuman figure, as advertising 
often did (fig. 2.25), the OWI discouraged the public from becoming overconfident.  
Additionally, posters such as these which depicted human suffering were strikingly 
different from examples created during the First World War, which often characterized 
the enemy as a deranged, animal-like beast.  In contrast, Shahn’s “Nature of the Enemy” 
campaign focused on those who suffered as a result of the enemy’s actions.
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The designs for Shahn’s “Nature of the Enemy” campaign each used a similar 
rhetoric, including Kollwitz’s “sacrifice,” which, though printed, did not see wide 
distribution (fig. 2.37).120  This poster featured an image drawn some twenty years earlier 
by the well-known German artist that depicted wide-eyed children holding empty bowls 
up desperately above the text: “Ask the women and children whom Hitler is starving 
whether rationing is too great a “sacrifice.’”  Each child gazes upward longingly, with a 
hungry, expectant expression.  The effectiveness of the image is increased through its 
perspective, which looks down onto the children, emphasizing their small, needy state.  
Posters such as this not only reminded viewers of the suffering of civilians abroad, but 
also that domestic rationing programs represented an inconsequential sacrifice by 
comparison.121  No known OWI records indicate the circumstances by which an image 
created nearly twenty years earlier by Kollwitz, who lived to war’s final year, appeared 
on an OWI poster.  By 1942 however, Kollwitz was a recognized figure who would have 
been known to Shahn and like minded artists in the U.S.
 Despite Shahn’s effective designs, the willingness of OWI leadership to tolerate 
fact-based propaganda that exhibited trauma and suffering was short lived.  In early 1943, 
the agency came under fire from Congressional critics, primarily on the political right, 
who claimed that the OWI’s Domestic Graphics program represented an inefficient use of 
resources, harbored leftist sympathizers, and created pro-Roosevelt propaganda.122  By 
late April, Director Davis was called before a Congressional subcommittee to discuss the 
Domestic Bureau’s activities in what became an event covered widely in the press.123  
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Despite Davis’ best efforts to defend the agency, Congress subsequently slashed the 
OWI’s budget for domestic operations.  
 Along with decreased resources, OWI bureaucrats implemented drastic 
ideological changes concerning graphic and semantic communication efforts.  This 
process began in February 1943, when Gardner Cowles, OWI’s Domestic Branch Chief 
of Operations, made several significant staff changes that gave considerable power to 
William Lewis and James Allen, two OWI officials with professional backgrounds in the 
commercial broadcasting and film industries respectively.  Soon after, OWI officials 
emphasized the use of language and imagery that many staff writers and poster designers 
associated with commercial advertising.  Writers at the OWI soon felt that the 
“businessmen managing the government’s promotional campaigns conceived of their job 
as ‘selling’ the administration’s war program to the greatest number of people.”124  As for 
the agency’s graphic efforts, historians have argued that new OWI policies forced posters 
“to reflect only the more benign side of the war,” while avoiding aggressive content.125 
At this time, Shahn’s Nazi Brutality came under specific criticism in OWI staff 
meetings from Price Gilbert, Brennan’s eventual replacement as Graphics Bureau Chief.  
Gilbert, a former vice-president at Coca-Cola who had a background in advertising, 
admired Norman Rockwell’s “visually appealing scenes of America,” and felt that 
Shahn’s work was too unattractive for display.126  In staff meetings in early March 1943, 
Gilbert specifically questioned the purpose of Shahn’s Nazi Brutality, and criticized such 
posters for spoiling “the pleasant effect” of advertising.  Although Shahn was not present 
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at these meetings, Brennan defended Shahn’s design by articulating the value of 
explaining the enemy (and his actions) in order for the viewer to develop a genuine, 
instead of a forced, antagonistic feeling.  According to OWI stenographic records, during 
these conversations Brennan argued that “If you do the job of explaining correctly,” 
hatred for the enemy “is then a conclusion in the onlooker’s brain, and as a conclusion, is 
a much more powerful thing.”127  By defending propaganda featuring serious content that 
challenged viewers to contemplate atrocities, Brennan argued for the ability of graphics 
to advance beyond basic patriotic ideology to a more critical form of war imagery.  Yet 
Gilbert remained unconvinced, and responded by referencing his own experience in 
advertising: “You have to be simple and direct.  It is an inexcusable error not to be 
understood in the commercial field.  And I would say, that would be true in any kind of 
poster.”128  Unfortunately, Shahn’s work was one of the relatively few examples of such 
content produced by the OWI.  As 1943 progressed, few OWI graphics displayed the 
chaos of war in favor of an increasingly commercial aesthetic.
Censoring Trauma and “Selling” the War
Shahn’s controversial propaganda graphics shared thematic similarities with a 
handful of designs submitted to the OWI by other well-known modern painters, including 
Peter Blume, Philip Guston, and Yasou Kuniyoshi.  While these and other artists shared 
Shahn’s interest in displaying the war’s violent reality, OWI officials refused to distribute 
such content after the agency experienced the personnel shifts described previously.129 
Initially, OFF/OWI posters exhibited diverse themes ranging from unsettling imagery to 
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pleasant scenes such as those created by illustrators including Norman Rockwell.  
However, by 1944 officials regarded traumatic graphics created by Shahn and others as 
unnecessary and excessive.  This transition represented a significant ideological shift in 
the manner the OWI encouraged Americans to support the war that led to government 
propaganda resembling corporate marketing campaigns.  This final section compares the 
themes and content of rejected propaganda designs to the more peaceful, friendly 
graphics preferred by agency officials such as Price Gilbert.   
Not all rejected propaganda proposals included specific details as seen in Shahn’s 
previously discussed posters.  However, many did address violent or otherwise traumatic 
issues seen often in popular culture and news media.  For example, Peter Blume’s untitled 
OWI proposal displayed three emaciated male figures stranded in a raft within an endless 
seascape (fig. 2.38).130  While the setting seems almost surrealistically calm, each figure 
contorts his body in agonizing pain as their burnt skin stretches against protruding bone.  
Although Blume never added a typographic element, the handwritten notes housed with 
this object in the National Archives strongly suggest that the artist intended to promote 
wartime rationing.  These included phrases state: “And YOU talk about sacrifice—Share 
your share,” and, “Don’t shut your eyes; Tighten your BELT.”131  The underlying 
message, made clear only with the knowledge of the unseen text, aligns wartime 
domestic issues such as rationing with the suffering of servicemen.
The OWI often printed posters promoting rationing campaigns during the war.  
However, few examples aligned human suffering to domestic practices in such an 
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aggressive manner.  Typical attempts to encourage rationing sought to influence choices 
made by women in the domestic sphere—canning homegrown fruits and vegetables 
represented a primary example.  In a poster designed by Alfred Parker, a smiling mother 
and daughter can their presumably home grown produce (fig 2.39).  Here the daughter 
asks, “We’ll have lots to eat this winter, won’t we Mother?”  In this image, Parker, who 
often contributed illustrations to women’s magazines such as Good Housekeeping, 
created an effective message of self-reliance.  Yet the poster’s visual rhetoric hinges 
largely on the sentimental relationship between mother and daughter, and makes no direct 
reference to the war effort.  Other OWI graphics that promoted rationing addressed the 
war more directly.  As seen in an example designed by an unknown artist, a soldier raises 
his tin cup to the viewer in gratitude for doing “with less” (fig. 2.40).  While this poster 
addressed the war directly, it too seems naïve and far from modern war’s hellish realities 
in its inclusion of a cleanly-shaven soldier flashing a toothy grin.
By contrast, Blume’s untitled propaganda proposal not only demonstrated 
significant differences from these sanitized versions of war, but also from other OWI 
graphics featuring nautical themes.   However, while Blume suggests a conceptual link 
between the wartime sacrifices of civilians to the pain of sailors lost at sea, most war 
posters featuring nautical tragedies promoted “Don’t Talk” messages similar to that seen 
in the previously discussed OFF graphic by Albert Dorne (fig. 2.12).  Other OWI posters 
demonstrating watery deaths offered a slightly different version of the tragic and 
accusatory tone of Dorne’s work.  These examples, also by commercial artists, clearly 
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address the realities of war (fig. 2.41, fig 2.42).  Yet human suffering in these scenes has 
either passed, or will end soon, while the painful isolation shown in Blume’s work, 
created in a nearly surrealistic style, suggests a suffering that transcends temporal limits.
Blume’s placement of these unidentified men in a nautical setting also holds 
additionally significant historical meaning.  By creating three similar figures not labeled 
as servicemen, or even as Americans, Blume suggests wartime suffering extends to all 
mankind, not just individuals.  Yet the powerful message of this humanist approach—
evoked previously in paintings such as Géricault’s The Raft of the Medusa (1818-1819)—
was not just symbolic: due to the highly successful efforts of German U-boats, the 
chances of being torpedoed and stranded in the Atlantic during the war represented a very  
real threat faced by Allied military personnel and American civilians.  In October and 
November of 1942 alone, (approximately when Blume created this painting), German 
submarines sank 235 Allied military and merchant ships, more than any other period of 
the war.  Furthermore, German kills would have likely been higher if not for the fact that 
the Nazis deployed resources from the Atlantic to their North African campaign.   
Thus, while Blume’s painting seems to promote rationing through symbolic 
imagery, being stranded in the Atlantic represented an established threat.  As a result, 
such themes appeared in American culture throughout the early 1940s.  Tales of 
adventure at sea were popular during the war, and archival evidence suggests Blume may 
have used the widely publicized, near death experience of three Navy servicemen as 
inspiration for this painting.132  Americans took note of the U-Boat threat in various 
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forms, including articles in publications such as Life magazine that told readers what 
actions they should take if stranded in a lifeboat, including how to prepare safe drinking 
water and other precautions (fig. 2.43).  American films also addressed themes of helpless 
nautical isolation, including Alfred Hitchock’s Lifeboat, released in 1944 (fig. 2.44).  
Starring Tallulah Bankhead, the entire film took place in a lifeboat following a German 
attack on an American merchant ship in the Atlantic.   
While Blume’s design addressed nautical tragedies, Philip Guston’s rejected OWI 
contribution included a theme of anguish resulting from urban bombings (fig. 2.45).133  
Similar to Blume, Guston did not identify the enemy through explicit signs or military 
insignia.  Instead, he implored the viewer to “Know the Enemy” through his evil actions.  
Guston’s collaged proposal featured two profiled heads layered one on top of the another, 
both facing left, and looking upwards with open mouths, seemingly screaming or 
possibly aghast at the sight before them.  Though the features of the background face 
only include a silhouetted, wide-open eye, the foregrounded head is filled with a halftone 
photograph of a bombed urban environment.134  Guston, who also contributed to the war 
effort by painting aeronautic diagrams for the Air Force, addressed the war previously 
with canvases such as Bombardment (1937-8), a work that criticized the Nazi bombing of 
Spanish cities such as Guernica (fig. 2.46).  His OWI design represents a similarly 
intense, yet symbolic image suggesting an out of body, or psychotic experience instigated 
by the horrors of war.  Finally, the anonymity of Guston’s unidentifiable figures makes 
the image applicable to viewers regardless of age, race, or location.  
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While there is little evidence that the rejected designs by Blume and Guston were 
intended to complement Shahn’s “Nature of the Enemy” campaign specifically, these 
works share clear thematic similarities with the series.  Both proposals also demonstrate a 
conceptual likeness with a poster featuring an arresting drawing by Yasou Kuniyoshi.  
This image, referred to as Torture, depicts the back of a standing, shirtless, handcuffed 
man who has obviously been tortured as indicated by the long, cruel abrasions across his 
skin (fig. 2.47).  The accompanying text states: “This is the method of the enemy,” a clear 
indication that this poster constituted a contribution to Shahn’s series discussed 
previously.  As noted by the art historian Shi Pu Wang, OWI officials encouraged 
Kuniyoshi to depict the cruelty of Japanese militarists.  Despite the naturalistic realism of 
his work, Kuniyoshi’s early designs received harsh criticism from Mabry, who felt the 
artist’s early submissions specifically lacked enough documentary characteristics.135 
While such designs became less common as the war progressed, other OWI 
posters displayed imagery featuring a much more benign, commercially friendly manner.  
For example, Norman Rockwell’s well-known contribution to the war effort, his Four 
Freedoms series, offered a stark difference in style and content to the works discussed 
previously.  Though initially rejected by the OWI (most likely by Brennan), Rockwell’s 
series saw widespread distribution as posters that promoted the sale of Treasury 
Department War Bonds.136  Rockwell’s Freedom from Want, one of the posters from this 
series, depicts a happy family gathered around a table overflowing with food and 
decorative table settings (fig 2.2).  The viewer enters the proceedings opposite the elderly 
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couple at the head of the table, a perspective that provides a generous angle of the scene.  
Diners include men, women, and children of various ages, and the man at the lower right 
seems to acknowledge the viewer warmly.  The clothing worn by attendees along with the 
decorative wallpaper and table settings suggest a middle class interior.  Rockwell’s 
figures glance about with enthusiastic smiles, and the bounty of turkey and trimmings 
provides a stark contrast to previously discussed rationing messages.  The text below the 
image, which states “Freedom from want,” came from President Roosevelt’s well known 
1941 State of the Union speech.  In addition to “want,” the “four freedoms” included 
freedom of “religion,” “speech,” and “from fear.” The “four freedoms” were offered by 
both Roosevelt and Rockwell as a patriotic incentive intended to inspire viewers to 
support the war.137 
 Yet Rockwell’s Freedom from Want reinforces a highly problematic mythology 
concerning the realities of war and American culture during the 1940s.  “The Four 
Freedoms,” as painted by Rockwell and articulated by President Roosevelt, projected a 
rhetoric of equality and democracy both at home and abroad.  However, legislated and de 
facto cultural racism, sexism, and religious persecution denied equal status to millions of 
U.S. citizens.  The alignment of Rockwell’s Freedom from Want with the poster’s text 
reveals this false reality.  For example, the copy above the image states “OURS... to fight 
for.”  The use of the plural pronoun “Ours” along with the racially and culturally 
homogenous scene below, suggests all white Americans enjoy such lavish meals 
equally.138  Other races, and the less fortunate, do not exist in Rockwell’s scene.  
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Additionally, this celebration of consumer abundance, where all are white, welcome, and 
well fed, seems closer to a magazine advertisement for turkey or table settings than a call 
for wartime service.  Rockwell’s Freedom from Want overflows with so much happiness 
and food that there is no room for an allusion to the atrocities committed against civilians 
in Europe, or to the slow Allied advance through the South Pacific.  Yet by late 1943, the 
rhetoric employed in this and Rockwell’s other Four Freedoms epitomized the placid, 
commercially friendly scenes that characterized later American war propaganda.  
Conclusion
 As the spring of 1943 progressed, the situation did not improve for Brennan, 
Shahn, and other like-minded OWI employees.  While struggling to justify content that 
addressed the realities of war critically, Brennan received a letter signed by his staff, 
including Shahn, stating that they “are aware that you are at present forced to defend the 
ideas which you brought us together to express.”  The attack of agency critics, they 
wrote, “strikes at the right of Americans to know the why’s and wherefore’s [sic] of the 
war.”  The letter urged Brennan to “fight all such undemocratic attempts to muzzle the 
people’s government in its relation to the people... we affirm our complete loyalty to 
you.”139  Despite this support, Brennan wrote his brother in early April that he would 
soon resign from the OWI as “all the things I stand for in a graphics way are being pretty 
thoroughly booted around.  The place is turning into a gigantic advertising agency.”140 
 The associated controversy led to an intellectual exodus of more than a dozen 
OWI staffers, primarily writers, as well as Brennan, in early April 1943.  In his 
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resignation letter to Davis, Brennan explained his departure thusly: “to our shame, while 
American soldiers rotted in the desert heat, the Graphics Division was designing posters 
about ordering coal early.”  He continued that, “…psychological approaches, content and 
ideas… have done more toward dimming perception, suspending critical values, and 
spreading the sticky syrup of complacency over the people than almost any other 
factor.”141  As a display of animosity towards the OWI’s increased commercialization, 
Shahn composed a poster featuring the Statue of Liberty holding four bottles of Coca-
Cola instead of her torch.  The accompanying text of this unlocated graphic read: “The 
War that Refreshes: The Four Delicious Freedoms!”142 
 Despite the stark differences between his own poster designs and the more 
commercially friendly imagery that later dominated OWI graphics, Shahn supported a 
bipartisan approach to propaganda.  During an interview in the late 1960s, Shahn 
commented on his time at OWI by arguing for both pleasant, benign content and more 
aggressive scenes in order to appeal to the widest possible audience:
I felt we must use the work of Picasso and the work of Norman Rockwell 
because there is no one common denominator of a symbol that is going to 
get everybody.  If there are only the classic twelve who appreciate 
Picasso’s Guernica we must appeal to them too, but through the Guernica, 
and they are never going to be touched by Norman Rockwell, and 
conversely you see.  So the effort generally in all such situations is to 
arrive at the common denominator symbol and there is no such animal.  
We are not a mass, we are groups of individuals, and we must talk to them 
as individuals.143
 Shahn’s comments reveal his understanding of the complexities of viewer 
reception that his superiors could not grasp.  While OWI officials who criticized Shahn’s 
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designs, including Price Gilbert, no doubt wanted a quick end to the fighting, their 
refutation of aggressive content simultaneously encouraged the obfuscation of war’s 
violent realities.  Such practices have contributed significantly to the continued 
sentimentalism and romanticization of World War II.  Following Brennan’s resignation, 
OWI graphics refrained from further depictions of violent content.  While the similarities 
between corporate advertising imagery and war propaganda are discussed further in the 
fourth chapter, the following analysis considers OWI graphics intended for African 
American audiences.
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Martin, Ogden Pleissner, Henry Varnum Poor, and Byron Thomas.  For personal recollections from the 
artists who were involved in these efforts, see Tom Lea, The Two Thousand Yard Stare: Tom Lea’s World 
War II (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008); Edward Reep, A Combat Artist in World War 
II (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1987).  For more information, see unsigned essay, “The Life 
Collection of War Art,” Francis Brennan Papers, Library of Congress, Box 18, folder 6. See also Melissa 
Renn, LIFE in the Art World, 1936-1972 (PhD dissertation, Boston University, 2011). By June 1944 
Congress reallocated funds and sent artist-soldiers with the U.S. Army to North Africa and Europe.  Pacific 
Units were active in the Philippines, China, Japan, and Korea until disbanded in 1946.  By the summer of 
1945 the U.S. Army held more than 2,000 works of art, much of which is still held in military warehouses. 
My thanks to Sarah G. Forgey, Curator, Army Art Collection, U.S. Army Center of Military History, for 
providing much of this information.  For a collection of related art, see James Jones, WW2 (New York: 
Grosset & Dunlap, 1975). 
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32 American artists responded to the crisis of World War II with a range of work far beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  While many artists created work with war themes on speculation, others made posters and 
paintings for federal, corporate, state, and municipal organizations.  For introductions to the art and artists 
of the era, see Barbara McCloskey, Artists of World War II (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 2005), 
171-195; Cecile Whiting, Antifascism in American Art (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).  Groups 
such as the Artists For Victory held exhibitions, poster competitions, and offered art instruction in military 
hospitals.  Artists For Victory officers included Paul Manship, John Taylor Arms, Arthur Crisp, Ralph T. 
Walker, Hobart Nichols, and Hugo Gellert.  For more information, see Ellen Landau, Artists For Victory: 
An Exhibition Catalog (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1983), 1-8; Bogart, Artists, Advertising, 
and the Borders of Art, 286-89.  The Artists For Victory Papers are held at the Archives of American Art, 
Washington, D.C.
Another major source of American art from the war is the Abbott Collection, commissioned by Abbott 
Laboratories, Chicago.  With the assistance of the Office of the Surgeon General, Abbott sponsored twelve 
artists who documented medical aspects of the war, including Joseph Hirsch, Peter Blume, Lawrence Beall 
Smith, Marion Greenwood, Francis Criss, and John Steuart Curry.  Much of this art appeared in Abbott’s 
own publicity material, and was also exhibited nationwide.  For a general outline, see Herman Kogan, The 
Long White Line: The Story of Abbott Laboratories (New York: Random House, 1963), 211-13.  Yank 
magazine also commissioned original artwork from illustrators such as Norman Rockwell, Jes Schlaikjer, 
and Dean Cornwell.  
33 Fitzpatrick won the Pulitzer Prize in 1926 and 1954 for his editorial cartoons.  His archival papers are 
held at the University of Missouri—St. Louis.  For more, see Fitzpatrick, As I Saw It: A Review of Our 
Times with 311 Cartoons and Notes (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953).  According to a memo written 
by Henry Pringle, Fitzpatrick did these cartoons for free.  See memo to George Hecht, Parents’ Magazine, 
dated April 8, 1942, Pringle Papers, Library of Congress, General Correspondence, folder: H, 1942-3.  See 
also Pringle Papers, Subject OEM; OFF, general memoranda.  
34 The scholarship on Benton is extensive.  For starters, see biographies including Henry Adams, Thomas 
Hart Benton: An American Original (New York: Knopf, 1989), and the more recent Justin Wolff, Thomas 
Hart Benton: A Life (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012).  Much has been made on the relationship 
between Benton and his estranged pupil, Jackson Pollock, including Adams, Tom and Jack: The 
Intertwined Lives of Thomas Hart Benton and Jackson Pollock (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009).  For 
analysis of Benton during the war years specifically, see Erika Doss, Benton, Pollock, and the Politics of 
Modernism: From Regionalism to Abstract Expressionism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).  
For an analysis of Benton’s activities that focuses primarily on his prewar activities and the importance of 
folk music for the artist, see Leo Mazow, Thomas Hart Benton and the American Sound (University Park: 
Penn State Press, 2012). The artist also wrote himself often.  See esp. Benton, An Artist in America 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1983).  A complete analysis of Benton’s wartime activities has yet 
to be written.  For example, in addition to the work discussed in this chapter Benton created numerous 
paintings later reproduced in brochures published by Abbott Laboratories developed while the artist 
traveled aboard U.S. submarines and ships.
35 As the official history of the OFF states, this brochure intended to expose: “the barrage of propaganda, 
outright and disguised, that the Nazis had been directing against this country.” Pringle Papers, “OFF 
history,” 35.
36 Hamburger later went on to write criticism for the New Yorker for six decades.  See his obituary in the 
New York Times, April 26, 2004.  See also Philip Hamburger Papers, 1924-1991, Humanities and Social 
Sciences Library, Manuscripts and Archives Division, Special Collections, New York Public Library.
37 MacLeish Papers, Library of Congress, folder: Speeches and Lectures File/ Radio and TV Broadcasts/ 
“Propaganda: Good and Bad,” NBC broadcast, March 1, 1942,14-15.
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38 The concept of “fifth columnists” existed long before the 1940s, and the term itself appeared often during 
the war.  For instance, in April 1941 President Roosevelt labeled contemporary critics of the war such as 
Charles Lindbergh “Copperheads,” a term used during the American Civil War to refer to anti-war Northern 
politicians.  Richard Hofstadter pointed this out in a book review of Abraham Lincoln and the Fifth 
Column, written by George Fort Milton, published in 1942.  See Hofstadter, “Lincoln Had Them Too,” The 
New Republic, October 18, 1942.  Additionally, the term “divide and conquer” appeared in American 
culture before the war.  See for example an article on Nazi persecution of Jews in Europe: “Divide and 
Conquer,” New York Times, July 31, 1938. Further, the phrase was used commonly by leftists to describe 
the manner in which racism and sexism were used to separate working class demographics. The concept 
itself has a much longer history dating to military strategy and classical antiquity.
39 The New York Times ran a preview of Divide and Conquer on March 29, 1942.  Also, the OFF began 
planning a sort of companion follow up brochure titled the Unconquered People that, according to the OFF 
history, “relied on a factual narrative of the heroic resistance to Hitler by our Allies temporary under his 
heel in the occupied countries.” The brochure was printed, but not until the summer of 1942, when the OFF 
was closed and the OWI had been established.  See Pringle Papers, OFF history, 35-7.
40 Pringle Papers, Library of Congress; subject file: OEM, OFF, board Meeting Minutes.
41 The Saturday Evening Post version was noted in an OFF Board Meeting, April 7, 1942. See staff meeting 
minutes, Pringle Papers, Library of Congress.
42 South American distribution was courtesy of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, 
chaired by Nelson Rockefeller.  Pringle papers, folder: OEM, OWI, “Divide and Conquer survey,” 2.  For 
more on Rockefeller’s role during the war, see: Gisela Cramer and Ursula Prutsch, “Nelson A. Rockefeller's 
Office of Inter-American Affairs (1940-1946) and Record Group 229,” Hispanic American Historical 
Review 86, no. 4 (November 2006): 785-806.  The brochure was also reprinted verbatim, without 
illustrations, as a small booklet by E. Haldeman-Julius of Girard, Kansas.  See also Hamburger’s papers at 
the New York Public Library for a full page newspaper ad for the brochure.
43 For analysis of The Moon is Down, and Steinbeck’s wartime activities in general, see Donald V. Coers, 
Steinbeck as Propagandist: The Moon is Down Goes to War (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 
1991).
44 For information on Capra’s Why We Fight series, see Cynthia J. Miller, “Why We Fight and Projections 
of America: Frank Capra, Robert Riskin, and the Making of World War II Propaganda,” in Peter C. Rollins, 
ed., Why We Fought: America's Wars in Film and History (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 
2008), 242-257.  For additional information on the controversy between Capra and the Hollywood studios 
over these films, see Koppes and Black, 122-125.  See also Michaela Hönicke Moore, Know Your Enemy: 
the American Debate on Nazism, 1933-1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 163.  
45 OFF history; Pringle Papers, Library of Congress.
46 The OFF kept extensive documentation of the requests for, and commentary on, Divide and Conquer.  
See Pringle Papers, folder OEM/OWI, folder “Divide and Conquer.”  Copy of letter to MacLeish from 
Frankfurter, dated April 3, 1942; Pringle Papers; subject file: OEM / OWI, “Divide and Conquer.” 
Frankfurter particularly admired illustrations on pages 8 and 9, not discussed here.  This two page spread 
displayed a Nazi official overseeing the evacuation of a European village.
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47 Not all readers were enthusiastic about Divide and Conquer, including members of the OFF staff.  After 
his initial review of the final brochure, Keith Kane, an assistant Director at OFF, wrote MacLeish that 
Fitzpatrick’s illustrations were “not the right type” and “most unfortunate from a propaganda strategy point 
of view.” Kane’s primary criticism was that while it was necessary to show the enemy as “strong and ugly,” 
it was also “essential to present our own people as strong too, or at least growing in strength.” Why not, 
Kane suggested, have the man on the front cover laughing, instead of seeming frightened? If MacLeish 
doubted his criticism, Kane wrote he had expert testimony to back up his comments.  Kane finished his 
memo by emphasizing that future publications, including posters and brochures, should be “pre-tested.” 
Pringle wrote MacLeish that they should take Kane up on his challenge of expert’s testimony, although no 
evidence exists that they did.  The next month, Kane sent MacLeish a copy of Footprints of the Trojan 
Horse, a brochure that addressed concerns similar to Divide and Conquer.  Kane felt this non-government 
publication was a better example of propaganda.  However, it did not really feature the characteristics he 
described earlier as being effective.  For this correspondence, and a copy of Trojan Horse, printed by the 
Citizens Educational Service, Inc., of New York City, see Pringle Papers, subject file: OEM / Office of 
Facts and Figures, “General Memoranda.”  
48 For contemporary criticism of Regionalism, see the debate as it played out in the pages of Art Front, the 
Art Union’s publication.  Art Front 1 (April 1935): 1-2; Art Digest (March 15, 1935), 20; and Art Digest 
(September 1, 1935): 29.  For these and more, see Shapiro, ed., Social Realism, 95-107.  For a scholarly 
rebuttal of the accusations against Regionalism as cliche, see James M. Dennis, Renegade Regionalists: the 
Modern Independence of Grant Wood, Thomas Hart Benton, and John Steuart Curry (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1998).
49 Craven was the foremost champion of Regionalism.  See Thomas Craven, Modern Art: The Men, The 
Movements, The Meaning (New York: Halcyon House, 1934, 1940, 1950), esp. 340-55 on Benton.
50 For more on Benton and the Year of Peril, see Doss, 283-97; Whiting, 111-126; Wolff, 308-10.  See also 
Todd McClain, “Year of Peril: Thomas Hart Benton’s Reaction to Pearl Harbor,” (MA thesis, SUNY-
Buffalo, 2001); Barbara J. Carr, “Thomas Hart Benton’s Year of Peril,” (MA thesis, University of Missouri, 
1981).  Carr notes that there were at least three additional works that Benton possibly proposed to be 
included in the series: Invasion; Negro Soldier; and Embarkation, all finished in 1942.  Carr, 7-9.
51 A similar theme is seen in Benton’s Invasion, painted at the same time and not included in the brochure 
for reasons that remain unclear.  See Doss, 283-6.
52 Ibid, 289-300.
53 "For All Americans Who Will Look," Time 39, no. 14, April 6, 1942, 63.
54 For more on such imagery, see John Dower, War Without Mercy (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 77-93, 
181-90; Shi Pu Wang, Becoming American? (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011), 85-89.
55 Benton, An Artist in America, 299.
56 Benton’s paintings were also reproduced as stamps, stickers and posters, many of which were distributed 
internationally and featured text in French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Norwegian. However, their reception 
abroad was negative enough (some feared that Christians would be offended by Again), that the 
government discontinued distribution.  Both the government and the Associated American Artists had a role 
in the production and distribution of this material, but the exact relationship, and who paid for what 
graphics, is still unclear at this writing. See Doss, 282-283; Carr, 10-14.
57 Manny Farber, “Thomas Benton’s War,” New Republic, April 20, 1942, 542-543.
154
58 Letters. Time 40, no. 12 (September 21, 1942).  Perhaps even more interesting than his support of 
Benton’s work was Curry’s praise of the Soviet Union for the manner in which the USSR had kept its 
artists, writers, and musicians busy “even in the stress of the present crisis.” Curry’s implication was that 
the U.S. government did too little to manage the visual representation of the war.
59 Quotation cited in Wolff, 312.
60 Quotation cited in Doss, 297.
61 Pringle Papers, Library of Congress; gen corr; ‘G’ folder, 1942-43; letter dated April 1942, from J.C. 
Gebhard at U.S. Naval Academy, to whom Pringle sent both The Year of Peril and Divide and Conquer.  
62 “For All American Who Will Look,” Time 39, no. 14, April 6, 1942, 63.
63 Wolff, 308-10.  For published descriptions of the process of Abbott’s involvement, see Doss, 282-3; 
Whiting, 124-5.  For more on the Association of American Artists, see Doss, “Catering to Consumerism: 
Associated American Artists and the Marketing of Modern Art, 1934-1958,” Winterthur Portfolio 26, no. 
2/3, (Summer - Autumn, 1991): 143-167.
64 Adams mentioned this during a panel discussion at a conference in Provo, Utah, spring 2011.  
65 Pringle Papers, Library of Congress; gen corr; ‘G’ folder, 1942-43; letter dated April 1942, to J.C. 
Gebhard at U.S. Naval Academy.
66 What’s New, 58, April 1942, 1-6.  The layout of Benton’s images in What’s New was an exact 
reproduction of the Year of Peril brochure, including color, copy, typography, and sequencing.  Though 
Benton’s essay was included in What’s New, MacLeish’s was not.  A large collection of What’s New is 
available to public researchers at the Crerar Library, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
67 Bogart, 275-6.
68 Doss, 285.
69 Doss, 289.  Doss later explains how Benton’s Year of Peril relates to Dali’s surrealism of the same era. 
See Doss, 293.
70 See related corporate art projects during the war, including Pepsi art competitions; the LIFE war art 
campaign; and Abbott Laboratory’s What’s New magazine and war-themed brochures. For more 
information on the relationship between high art and commercial imagery, see: Doss, 147-220; Bogart, 
205-255; Marchand, 117-155; Lears, esp. ch. 9 and 10; Neil Harris, “Designs on Demand: Art and the 
Modern Corporation,” in Cultural Excursions: Marketing Appetites and Cultural Tastes in Modern America 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 349-378.
71 A.H. Feller, “OWI on the Home Front,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 7, no. 1 (Spring, 1943): 55.
72 For more on the transition from the OFF to the OWI and related criticisms of propaganda agencies, see 
Clayton D. Laurie, The Propaganda Warriors: America’s Crusade Against Nazi Germany (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1996), esp. 88-115; Winkler, 19-37; Blum, 21-33.  
73 For more on Davis, including his appointment at OWI, see Winkler, 31-37; for his prewar activities, see 
Alfred Haworth Jones, “The Making of an Interventionist on the Air: Elmer Davis and CBS News, 
1939-1941,” Pacific Historical Review 42, no. 1 (February, 1973): 74-93; see also Roger Burlingame, Don't 
Let Them Scare You: the Life and Times of Elmer Davis (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1961).
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74 The OWI acknowledged the creation and distribution of all of its propaganda, including domestic and 
international efforts. Such campaigns are categorized as “white” propaganda.  This is in contrast to so-
called “black” propaganda, which the government refused to acknowledge, but produced covertly during 
the war.  The foremost agency responsible for “black” propaganda, which according to scholars was 
focused primarily on international activities, was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which eventually 
became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after the war.  For information on the OWI’s international 
campaigns see Winkler, 73-148; Laurie, 112-127. For information on the OSS, see Unnamed Author, War 
Report of the OSS (New York: Walker and U.S. War Department, 1976); Barry Katz, Foreign Intelligence: 
Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1989).
75 In between his work at Fortune and the OWI, Brennan was hired by “Wild” Bill Donovan, a World War I 
veteran and former Wall Street lawyer at the Office of the Coordinator of Information.  At that office, 
Brennan developed visual material for the Combined Chiefs of Staff.  See Brennan papers, Library of 
Congress, box 20, folder 3.  In 1942, Donovan was named head the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the 
agency that preceded the Central Intelligence Agency. For press coverage of Brennan’s OWI appointment, 
see New York Times, August 9, 1942.  For a detailed outline of the Bureau of Graphics, see Henry Pringle 
Papers, Library of Congress, subject file: OEM/OWI: Bureau Operations, Descriptions and Functions.  
These files include salary information on OWI staff members.
76 It is unknown if ether of these posters was ever produced.  Ben Shahn was aware of the modern graphics 
promoted at Fortune, as his supervisor at the FSA, Roy Stryker, sent Shahn pages from Fortune in June 
1939 as inspiration for a photographic project in Ohio.  See memo from Roy Stryker to Ben Shahn, June 
22, 1939, Ben Shahn papers, AAA, misc. letters and correspondence, Reel D-146.
77 “A Portfolio of Posters,” Fortune 24, August 1941, 79.  
78 Around this time (March 1942) Brennan also had some correspondence with Alfred Barr at the Museum 
of Modern Art regarding an exhibition proposed by Brennan that would focus on modern air warfare.  See 
letter from Brennan to Barr, dated March 5, 1942, Museum of Modern Art Archives, Barr Papers, Roll 
2167; frame 100.
79 Art News (August 1942), insert.
80 Artists often submitted unsolicited designs to the OWI.  As seen in the OWI records, it was not 
uncommon for artists, and even citizens with little artistic training, to send ideas for war propaganda in 
various states of conception.  Typically the agency responded politely that they had no need for assistance 
and that the writer should contact local civic groups concerning opportunities to contribute to the war 
effort.
81 For an example of the type of letter the OWI sent to modern artists inviting them to contribute work, see 
correspondence from MacLeish to Kuniyoshi, dated June 24, 1942, Kuniyoshi Papers, AAA, box 1, folder 
37; Mabry to Hugo Gellert, July 9, 1942, Hugo Gellert Papers, AAA, box 1, folder 33, Correspondence: 
1942; Shahn Papers, AAA, Mabry to Shahn, June 23, 1942, box 23, folder 54. The sketches and 
preliminary poster designs contributed by artists to the OWI far exceeds the number of graphics that were 
produced.  The most helpful archival source that documents these submissions is RG 208, E-251, box 1152,  
“Production Sheets for Graphics.” Unfortunately, these records provide few details of the visual content of 
artists’ submissions.  They do however, provide names, dates, and in many cases the general themes of 
propaganda proposals submitted.  
82 New York Times, June 11, 1942.
83 The OFF (still existent at the time) distributed details of the massacre to its staff immediately after the 
killings.  For a copy of the OFF press release dated June 11, 1942 that provided details of Lidice, see 
Kuniyoshi Papers, AAA, box 1, folder 37, Misc. Subject Files: OWI Poster Project.
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84 See Norma Steinberg, “William Gropper: Art & Censorship from the 1930s through the Cold War 
Era,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 1994), 56-61.
85 PM, October 25, 1942.  
86 A copy of the entire publication is located at RG 208, E-462, box 17.  
87 It is unknown if Gropper made this change voluntarily or not. 
88 PM, October 25, 1942. A copy is located in Brennan Papers, Library of Congress.
89 Mabry’s letter to Shahn was dated June 23, 1942.  See Shahn Papers, AAA, box 23, folder 54, “U.S. 
Office for Emergency Management.”  Mabry was executive director of the Museum of Modern Art in 1938, 
when MoMA exhibited the work of Shahn’s friend Walker Evans.
90 Shahn’s name appears repeatedly throughout the OWI archives in Graphics Bureau production notes in 
connection with numerous posters that show little stylistic evidence of his involvement.  See RG 208, 
E-251, box no. 1152, folder: “Production Sheets for Graphics.” Shahn received a salary of $4600 annually 
(although he was at the agency less than two years).  See government paperwork and pay stubs, Shahn 
Papers, AAA, box 24, folder 2. Shahn’s wartime propaganda also included poster and brochure designs for 
the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. See Shahn Papers, AAA, box 23, folder 54. 
91 Letter from Mabry to Shahn, dated June 23, 1942.  See Shahn Papers, AAA, box 23, folder 54, “U.S. 
Office for Emergency Management.” 
92 Ibid. Mabry repackaged the President’s speech into segments so that artists could address specific themes 
easily.  
93 Mabry was hired at the Museum of Modern Art in June 1935.  See Russell Lynes, Good Old Modern 
(New York: Atheneum, 1973), 153.
94 Shahn’s Sacco and Vanzetti series was exhibited at Edith Halpert’s Downtown Gallery in April 1932.  For 
more information, see Alejandro Anreus, Ben Shahn and the Passion of Sacco and Vanzetti (Jersey City: 
Jersey City Museum and Rutgers University Press, 2001); Frances Pohl, Ben Shahn (Rohnert Park, 
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Sacco and Vanzetti,” The Nation, April 20, 1932, 475; Matthew Josephson, “The Passion of Sacco and 
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289-92.
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Samuel Wesley Stratton, President of MIT.
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“Ben Shahn’s New Deal Murals: Jewish Identity in the American Scene,” in Alejandro Anreus, Diana 
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97 John D. Morse, Ben Shahn (New York: Praeger, 1972), 29.
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for Emergency Management.”  Wallace’s speech also inspired other artists.  For example, see Hugo 
Gellert’s silkscreen portfolio, The Century of the Common Man (1943), a series of 19 different designs 
inspired by Wallace’s speech. See also David Stone Martin’s Strong in the name of the Lord, discussed in 
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99 Ben Shahn, The Shape of Content (Cambridge: Harvard Press, 1957), 41-42.
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106 For more on Vichy France, including related postwar anxieties held by the French, see Henry Rousso, 
The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France Since 1944 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1991).
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Chapter 3: Divided Demographic: African Americans and War Propaganda 
 In 1942 the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) issued a poster featuring a 
photograph of Joe Louis grasping a rifle outfitted with a large bayonet (fig. 3.1).1  Here 
Louis, the world heavyweight boxing champion since 1937, lunges forward in his U.S. 
Army uniform against a background of royal blue.  The poster’s top text reads: “Pvt. Joe 
Louis says” while the bottom copy states: “We’re going to do our part... and we’ll win 
because we’re on God’s side.”  Louis’s wartime popularity crossed racial, geographic, 
and class demographics, and thus, his support for the war—expressed in this poster and 
other forums—symbolized a powerful endorsement.  His included quote, similar to a 
phrase spoken by the champ at a fundraiser in May 1942, added a crucial component to 
the poster’s meaning by alluding to the united war effort.  Louis’s reference to “God’s 
side” also made clear that the Allies had the support of divine forces.  Thus, this poster 
achieved a memorable effect by depicting a successful celebrity athlete as strong, God-
fearing, and optimistic regarding the war’s justification and outcome.2 
 Louis represented an ideal spokesman for the war effort despite the blatant and 
entrenched racism that characterized American society in the 1940s.  A highly successful 
boxer during the sport’s golden age, Louis’s cross-racial appeal resulted from the 
combination of his physical capabilities in the ring and his positive public persona.  His 
managers crafted an image that portrayed the champ as a gentleman and a devout 
Christian, and reporters mentioned Louis’s soft-spoken, humble demeanor regularly.3  
Thus, while many white viewers would likely recoil at a photograph of an anonymous 
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black man grasping a weapon threateningly, Louis’s positive reputation, established 
previously, neutralized such concerns.  As noted by the historian Lauren Sklaroff, Louis’s 
support for the war and avoidance of publicly discussing controversial racial topics 
resulted in a “record of deracialized patriotism” that transcended white fears of a threat to 
the racial status quo.4  Thus, this poster likely inspired many Americans, blacks and 
whites, to support the war.
 At the same time, the OFF’s Louis poster alluded to the instability of wartime race 
relations in the United States.  The image of Louis in uniform, though a clear 
endorsement of African American enlistment, also served as a reminder of the entrenched 
segregation practiced by each branch of the military.  While black leaders, including A. 
Philip Randolph and Walter White, argued stringently for the integration of the armed 
forces, the military’s entrenched system of racism remained a reality throughout the war.5  
Moreover, despite Louis’s popularity, the image of an armed black man likely reminded 
white viewers of contemporary acts of violence resulting from unstable race relations.  
Related concerns increased during the war as racial tensions exploded with numerous 
riots in urban areas and at U.S. military bases between American soldiers of different 
races.6  Acts of racial intolerance also resulted in part from the expansion of xenophobic, 
antisemitic, and racist organizations in the 1920s such as the Ku Klux Klan, whose 
influence, though weakened during the Depression, remained a violent threat in the early 
1940s.7
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 The OFF’s Louis poster is also significant as comparatively few other examples of 
World War II propaganda depicted African Americans.8  This scarcity resulted partially 
from the inability of bureaucrats at the OFF/OWI to develop an effective method to 
persuade African Americans to support the war.  Although many blacks contributed to the 
fight against the Axis voluntarily, others questioned the value of risking their lives for a 
nation whose laws regarded minorities as second-class citizens.9  Propaganda officials, 
including Theodore Berry, a black attorney, thus argued that graphics such as the Louis 
poster made a valuable contribution to the government’s morale-boosting efforts in black 
communities specifically.10  Determining the visual content of additional graphics 
featuring African Americans proved difficult however, due to the opinions held by the 
white majority.  White social conservatives often criticized government efforts to 
encourage blacks to support the war as “unnecessary” and “wasteful” attempts to 
underhandedly advance a progressive civil rights agenda.11  The era’s racial inequality 
and the volatility of race as a political issue thus led to few African Americans appearing 
in printed propaganda.  
 This chapter analyzes propaganda depicting African Americans in order to reveal 
the complexities of the visual representation of wartime racial difference.  Divided into 
four sections, the chapter begins by introducing key government officials and issues 
related to the production of propaganda portraying blacks.  The second section focuses on 
the recurring appearance of two well-known African American servicemen in government 
propaganda.  This analysis emphasizes depictions of Joe Louis and Doris “Dorie” Miller, 
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a soldier and sailor respectively, whose popularity government propagandists used 
carefully to persuade black audiences to support the war.  The third section examines 
artistic contributions to the war effort created by Charles Alston, who for almost fourteen 
months designed graphics for the OWI that appeared exclusively in black newspapers.12  
While his work featured heroes such as Louis and Miller, Alston also addressed issues 
such as housing, the contribution of black women to labor, and desegregation in the 
military.  The fourth and final section examines a 68 page OWI brochure titled Negroes 
and the War that encouraged African American readers to support the war by 
emphasizing the social gains made since reconstruction.  Featuring a slick design and 
over 100 photographs, this brochure demonstrated the difficulty of generating propaganda 
intended for minorities as it received sharp criticism from both blacks and reactionary 
whites.  
 The discrepancy between the positive, patriotic rhetoric seen in the OFF’s Joe 
Louis poster and the reality of racist legislation incensed black leaders and discouraged 
many from endorsing the war enthusiastically.13  At the same time, others saw the war as 
an opportunity for African Americans to contribute meaningfully to an international crisis 
in the hopes of encouraging a less racially restricted postwar society.  Blacks were 
therefore divided not only from whites through segregation, but also from each other 
regarding their support for the war.  This chapter examines visual representations of this 
dichotomy by emphasizing the evolving government strategy to appeal to African 
American audiences during a volatile time of racial tension.  
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Jim Crow and the “Fight For Freedom”
 OFF officials began developing a strategy to persuade African Americans to 
support the war in the spring of 1942.  This promotional plan fluctuated due to the era’s 
racism, which limited minority participation in the military and domestic defense.  Most 
white citizens agreed blacks should contribute to the war, yet determining changes to 
racial policies—particularly regarding military service—remained a hotly debated issue.  
Black leaders including Walter White, and white liberals, proposed giving minorities 
greater military leadership responsibilities and increasing opportunities to engage in 
combat.14  Conversely, military leaders and Southern politicians, including Senator 
Theodore Bilbo (D-MS), a known member of the Klan, favored maintaining the status 
quo whereby enlisted blacks typically performed service work such as janitorial or 
kitchen duties.15  The realities of the racially segregated military were harsh, as rendered 
by William H. Johnson in a painting titled K.P. (1943, fig. 3.2).  This scene, one of many 
works Johnson created during the war that depicted African American soldiers, displays 
the sequestered, demoralizing labor performed by enlisted blacks.16 
 While the military remained harshly segregated, the war’s socio-economic 
conditions allowed minorities and women to secure work and other opportunities 
unavailable to them in civilian life previously.  For example, pressure from black leaders 
such as Randolph, leader of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters Union, and the 
March on Washington organization led to President Roosevelt signing Executive Order 
8802 in June 1941.  This legislation, which banned racial discrimination in wartime 
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industry, allowed blacks to gain employment in factories that racist hiring practices 
blocked earlier.17  The desperate need for workers, which resulted largely from the loss of 
manpower to the armed services, resulted in many African Americans migrating from the 
rural south to urban areas.  While this relocation to centers of production offered 
opportunities, the resulting population shifts also increased racial tensions in public 
transportation and housing.  The combination of racism in the military and in civilian life 
subsequently led many blacks to question their own support of the war.  
 OFF officials initially did not recognize the frustrations of African Americans as 
the agency attempted to develop a rhetoric to appeal to black audiences.  For example, 
Archibald MacLeish, Director of the OFF, assumed blacks would identify with the 
characterization of the war as, in Vice President Henry Wallace’s words, a “fight between 
a slave world and a free world.”18  White leaders often used symbolically charged terms 
such as “freedom” and “democracy” in their portrayal of the war, yet MacLeish felt such 
words carried a particular resonance with blacks.  As pointed out by the historian Barbara 
Dianne Savage, by framing the war in this manner MacLeish “expected African 
Americans not only to embrace the war struggle as their own but also to do so with a 
special enthusiasm.”19  For example, on February 11, 1942, only weeks after Pearl 
Harbor, MacLeish addressed the National Urban League’s annual convention in New 
York.  In his speech, also broadcast via radio, MacLeish suggested that African 
Americans had a special appreciation of the war as it was, in his opinion, a battle against 
the “conspiracy” of slavery.20 
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 MacLeish’s attempt to portray the war as a fight against slavery was criticized 
shortly afterward by blacks and white liberal critics.  Writing in the left-leaning New 
York daily newspaper PM, Albert Deutsch and Tom O’Connor questioned the OFF 
Director’s inability to acknowledge the number of blacks hesitant to support the war.  
MacLeish’s speech was further proof, they argued, that “the dark skinned citizenry is 
made to feel that in many ways this is a white man’s war, not theirs.”21  Additionally, 
black critics argued that MacLeish downplayed America’s own racism while 
simultaneously failing to confirm the willingness of whites to abide by the 
characterization of the war as a true “fight for democracy.”  An editorial in The Crisis, the 
official publication of the NAACP the following month noted that: 
Someone should have told Mr. MacLeish in advance that in his dinner 
audience and in his radio audience would be Negroes who understand only  
too clearly what the war issues are declared to be.  What these colored 
Americans and their friends wanted to hear from Mr. MacLeish was some 
assertion indicating that white Americans understand the war issues and 
are prepared to fight, without equivocation, for freedom of all people.22
Such comments suggest black support for the war was more complicated, and possibly 
weaker than MacLeish and other bureaucrats assumed initially.
 Within weeks of his speech at the Urban League, MacLeish and other OFF 
officials grew increasingly concerned over what became referred to in internal agency 
documents as the “Negro Problem.”23  Archival evidence suggests that race riots in 
Detroit, instigated on February 28, 1942, two weeks after MacLeish’s speech, were a 
primary impetus for this anxiety.  The Detroit riots began when a white mob, at least 
partially goaded by the KKK, clashed with a group of African Americans over residences 
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at the Sojourner Truth public housing center.  The homes in question had been reserved 
for blacks, and the riots led to days of violence.24  Related media coverage, including 
photographs in Life magazine, depicted white policemen beating unarmed blacks and a 
sign featuring the words: “We Want White Tenants in Our White Community” (fig. 3.3).25 
OFF records reveal that at this time officials also became increasingly concerned with 
related matters involving race, including the “financing of seditious Negro newspapers,” 
and the possible effects of Axis propaganda on blacks.26  A later FBI investigation proved 
that black newspapers, though often critical of the government’s racist policies, were in 
fact not funded by the Axis or other subversives.27  Similarly, government concerns over 
the effects of Axis propaganda on American minorities dwindled as the war progressed.28  
Nevertheless, by early April 1942, OFF staff meeting minutes characterized the “Negro 
Problem” as “a subject of grave concern,” and MacLeish began asking “that any 
suggestions for government action in relation to the negro be sent to him” directly.29 
 Government officials gained a valuable and much needed advisor on racial 
matters in early March 1942.  At that time the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), 
an agency whose domestic war preparedness work often overlapped with the OFF, hired a 
consultant named Theodore Berry, a prominent black lawyer from Cincinnati.30  Berry, a 
former president of the Cincinnati NAACP, provided federal propagandists with 
suggestions for strengthening “negro morale.”  In a memo to his supervisors, Berry 
explained that low African American support for the war resulted from skeptism that the 
fight was being “prosecuted for practical democratic principles.”  He noted several 
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reasons for this apprehension, including the harsh treatment of black veterans after World 
War I, and the colonialism of American allies such as Great Britain.  Berry additionally 
pointed out that blacks expressed frustration with the segregated military, continued 
discrimination in the defense industry, and Jim Crow policies throughout the country.31  
Although he outlined a media campaign to improve black morale, Berry’s subsequent 
memos emphasized that without changes in legislation, propagandistic rhetoric would do 
little to bring racial progress.32  While little evidence suggests he proposed the use of 
black celebrities in war propaganda, during Berry’s tenure as an OFF advisor Joe Louis 
began promoting the war effort publicly.33  The following section considers the role of 
Louis and “Dorie” Miller in elevating black morale during the war.
Depicting Heroes: Black Servicemen and War Propaganda
 During World War II, U.S. propaganda agencies celebrated two African American 
servicemen as heroes.  These men, Joe Louis and Doris “Dorie” Miller, appeared in 
government war posters, were championed in radio and film spots, and spoke at rallies 
and fundraisers.  Louis’s wartime popularity resulted from his prewar athletic success and 
his reputation as a humble, clean-living individual.  Contrastingly, Miller was a 
previously unknown Navy messman stationed at Pearl Harbor who gained notoriety for 
acts of bravery during the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941.  Unlike Louis, Miller’s 
heroism developed largely through the advocacy of African American activists and 
newspaper editors.  The following analysis of promotions featuring these two men 
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reveals how government agencies carefully projected the notion of black heroes during 
the war.34
 Louis’s morale boosting activities began shortly after his enlistment in the Army 
in February 1942 and continued throughout the war.35  Born the son of a poor Southern 
sharecropper, Louis proved well-suited in this role for several reasons.  John 
Roxborough, one of Louis’s managers, outlined a list of morally driven commandments 
the champ lived by to succeed that the press distributed widely.36  Louis was also popular 
for his fighting style, characterized as not only powerful, but also as very fair.37  Finally, 
though known as a philanderer to those close to him, Louis’s soft-spoken, affable 
demeanor contributed to his popularity with white audiences who scorned successful 
black athletes previously.  For example, Louis’s personality contrasted sharply with that 
of Jack Johnson, the heavyweight champion in the 1910s whose cocksureness and 
interest in white women drew the ire of many whites.38
 Louis’s renown also resulted from boxing’s international popularity during the 
era.  Fights between boxers of different nationalities often took on politicized meanings, 
and Louis became a worldwide symbol of the U.S. in the 1930s.39  For example, the press 
emphasized the obvious political overtones when Louis faced the German Max 
Schmeling in a highly anticipated title rematch at Yankee Stadium on June 22, 1938.  
Hitler had celebrated Schmeling’s previous victory over Louis as evidence of the 
legitimacy of Nazi race theories that promoted white superiority.40  Contrastingly, 
President Roosevelt wished Louis good luck in a brief meeting before the fight by noting 
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that “people are depending on those muscles for America.”41  While the Nazis 
unabashedly framed the fight in both racial and nationalistic terms, the white press in the 
U.S. presented Louis’s subsequent victory as an American defeating a German, not a 
black fighter over a white.  Thus, as historians such as Sklaroff have argued, Louis 
symbolized “black patriotism and black citizenship” rather than controversial issues such 
as segregation.42 
 Imagery in contemporary art and popular culture also reinforced Louis’s 
popularity.  As seen in the work of painters such as Robert Riggs and William H. 
Johnson, artists addressed Louis’s success in the ring with vastly different styles.43  Both 
artists depicted Louis, or the “Brown Bomber” as he was known, besting a white 
opponent.  Riggs’s depiction of Louis featured a low perspective set amongst a crowd of 
spectators (1938, fig. 3.4).44  Given the painting’s date and the resemblance of the white 
boxer to Schmeling, Riggs likely based this scene on photographs of the second meeting 
of these two fighters.  In Louis’s dominance of his white opponent, Riggs portrayed the 
champ as, in the words of the art historian Richard Powell, a powerful “symbol of the 
apotheosis of the black proletariat,” and the Nazis’ worst nightmare.45  Conversely, 
Johnson’s painting avoids this mimetic realism and instead displays a flatter, modern 
aesthetic that conceals Louis’s face (1939-42, fig. 3.5).  Though the unidentified white 
fighter in Johnson’s scene seems to have thrown a punch eluded skillfully by Louis, his 
outstretched left arm suggests a Nazi salute, perhaps a subtle allusion to Schmeling’s 
alliance (albeit arguably against his will), with German National Socialism.46 
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 Other prewar portrayals of Louis exhibited racist stereotypes that reinforced his 
reputation as powerful though unintelligent and naive.  For example, the November 1935 
issue of Vanity Fair featured an illustration by Miguel Covarrubias that depicted a 
fictitious meeting between Louis and Haile Selassie, the King of Ethiopia (fig. 3.6).  
Released after Louis defeated the “Italian Giant” Primo Carnera on June 25, 1935, this 
image referenced threats made previously by Mussolini against Ethiopia.  As one of the 
few independent African nations, both Ethiopia and Selassie held a symbolic resonance 
for many African Americans.47  This meaningful connection was compromised however, 
by the “humorous” conversation that accompanied Covarrubias’ caricature.  When the 
regal and dignified Selassie eloquently asked Louis what strategy he employed to defeat 
Carnera, Louis replied: “Ah hit him wif mah right and bus’ his bridgework...  Find out dat 
man too tall foh to hit in de haid so Ah hit him in de pantry wif mah lef’.”48  Similar 
characterizations of Louis as inarticulate and feeble minded appeared in other magazines.  
In 1940 Life stated Louis “was bored by fighting.  He does it because he has been told to 
and does not know how to do anything else.”  Similarly, Time referred to Louis as 
“lugubrious” and a “mischievous child.”49  These representations of Louis as childlike 
but powerful strengthened existent racist stereotypes.  
 Despite such prewar characterizations, Louis’s popularity and success in the ring 
made him a powerful spokesman for the war.  For nearly three years he endured an 
exhaustive schedule to boost American morale: at the military’s request Louis traveled 
widely and made appearances throughout the U.S. and western Europe.50  Louis 
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promoted bonds, spoke on the radio, gave boxing demonstrations at military camps, and 
appeared in propaganda films, including a short reel for the Army titled The Real Joe 
Louis that emphasized his Christian faith, patriotism, and loyalty to his race.51  Similarly, 
the 1938 Louis/Schmeling fight framed the narrative of The Negro Soldier (1943), an 
OWI film created initially for black soldiers shown later to whites as well.52  Finally, 
Louis also appeared in commercial films during the war, including the 1943 Irving Berlin 
musical This is the Army.53
 Along with these efforts, the OFF released its “Joe Louis says” poster in the early 
summer of 1942, a few months after the champ’s enlistment (fig. 3.1).54  The poster’s 
photograph, taken from a low angle and rotated slightly to create a more dynamic image, 
depicts Louis in a training exercise.  The included text featured a slightly altered quote 
from Louis who, at a Navy Relief Society banquet on May 10, 1942, commented on his 
role in supporting the Allies thusly: “I’m only doing what any red blood American would 
do.  We gonna do our part, and we will win, because we are on God’s side.”  Louis’s 
statement was reported widely in the national media and furthered his positive reputation.  
Soon after, President Roosevelt wrote the champ and congratulated him for defining the 
war’s urgency succinctly.55 
 The OFF poster achieved two compelling effects by depicting Louis lunging 
forward in his Army uniform.  Due to his widely known athletic success, it was 
unnecessary to reference Louis’s boxing credentials.  Instead, this graphic gained greater 
propagandistic power by emphasizing how the champ’s athletic prowess translated into a 
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potent weapon against the Axis.  The combination of Louis’s determined facial 
expression, tight grasp of the rifle, and the manner in which his body appears at a 
dynamic forty-five degree angle combine to display an intense image of a powerful 
soldier.  This effect is particularly evident when compared to a painting from the same 
year by Thomas Hart Benton titled Negro Soldier (1942, fig. 3.7).56  Both images show 
soldiers bearing M1 rifles outfitted with long, menacing bayonets and wearing World War 
I “doughboy” style helmets.57  However, Benton’s soldier, though seemingly capable, is 
shown from the side and appears far more passive.  This figure’s pose suggests he is alert 
and advancing ably, yet his exaggerated facial features and slumped posture approach the 
manner of caricature Benton displayed in works such as his Year of Peril series painted 
the same year (see chapter two; figs. 2.23, 2.24).58  Thus, by using a dynamic photograph 
promoting Louis as a powerful member of the U.S. military, the OFF poster translated the 
champ’s success in the ring into an effective call for viewers to support the war 
themselves.
 Additionally, by depicting the champ in his military uniform the OFF reminded 
viewers of the well-known circumstances surrounding Louis’s voluntary enlistment.  
Historians have suggested that Louis’s handlers sought to leverage his celebrity into 
securing an officer’s commission.  Similarly, as the sole provider for his mother and wife, 
Louis may have been qualified to apply for a family exemption.59  However, Louis 
bristled at the possibility of his fame resulting in special treatment, and he entered the 
Army as a private.  Years after the war, Louis stated he would rather be “just a plain, 
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ordinary G.I. I’d feel closer to people like me.  If I had to spend time with all those men, 
give me somebody who I could talk with and laugh with.”60  Visual reinforcements of 
Louis’s amiable persona appeared during the war in photographs of the champ socializing 
casually with black soldiers, and being instructed by white officers (fig. 3.8).  The OFF 
poster thus reinforced Louis’s status as powerful while also reminding viewers of his 
humble and patriotic entry into the service. 
 The poster’s text suggests a more complicated meaning based on the era’s racial 
inequalities.  The inclusion of several pronouns, such as “we’re,” “our,” and “we’ll,” 
allude to a united American nation.  As the U.S. was racially divided however, an 
individual viewer’s interpretation of the text almost certainly depended on his or her race.  
White viewers likely understood the poster’s message to connote a symbolically united 
nation that set aside social differences such as race and class as part of the war effort.  
Similar government promotions that cited a “united” nation rung hollow for many blacks, 
who may have read Louis’s words as intended for their segregated communities 
specifically.  In that case, the OFF’s poster suggests a message of racial, not national, 
unity.  The poster’s effectiveness arguably results from this lack of specificity: both black 
and white audiences could view this graphic and realize a positive message encouraging 
them to support the war.61 
 Even with his widespread popularity, Louis’s role as a spokesman for the war 
came with potential hazards.  While his reputation as humble and reserved did not likely 
rile politically moderate whites, Louis’s favorability in black communities saw some 
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challenges.  The most egregious instance of this came in January 1942, when Louis 
donated the proceeds of a charity match against Buddy Baer to the notoriously segregated 
U.S. Navy.  While seen favorably by whites, some in the black press criticized Louis’s 
donation.62  This criticism took visual form in a Cleveland Call and Post editorial cartoon 
drawn by an artist known as “Beauford” (fig. 3.9).  Here Louis, standing at right and 
wearing a necktie, hands a club labeled “purse from the Louis-Baer fight” to an oversized 
white sailor about to strike a young black boxer labeled “American Negro youth.”  
Speaking to the white sailor, Louis calmly states “you may use this” while both the black 
youth at left and the white giant express confusion as connoted by the question marks 
above their heads.  Their bafflement at Louis’s gesture is amplified as the white sailor 
already holds a club labeled “racial prejudice” and wears a large boxing glove labeled 
“Naval Discrimination.”  Similar criticism in other black newspapers tied Louis to issues 
such as the segregated military that propagandists wished to avoid, thus potentially 
compromising Louis’s value to the OFF, and later the OWI.  
 While Louis’s popularity remained strong despite such criticism, U.S. propaganda 
officials recruited another well-known African American serviceman to assist with 
morale boosting efforts.  This young man, Doris “Dorie” Miller, rose to national fame in 
1942 for his heroic actions at Pearl Harbor.63  A young Navy messman from a poor, rural 
Texas community, Miller’s folkloric rise began the morning of December 7, 1941, while 
working laundry detail below decks on the USS West Virginia.  Upon hearing the 
Japanese bombing, Miller left his post and raced to the ship’s deck, where he helped carry  
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his recently wounded white captain to safety.  Without receiving orders to do so, Miller 
then manned an anti-aircraft gun which, as a black sailor he was forbidden to operate.  
Although he had no previous training with this weapon, Miller shot down at least one and 
possibly several Japanese aircraft.64 
 Although the Navy did not provide any details of Miller’s heroism initially, on 
December 22nd the New York Times printed a vague reference to the courageous acts of 
an unknown black sailor at Pearl Harbor.65  These comments drew significant interest 
from black readers in particular, and soon Walter White and other African American 
leaders began writing to the Navy and to President Roosevelt asking for the unnamed 
sailor’s identity.66  Three months later, in early March 1942, the Navy replied to White 
with details concerning Miller.  Then on March 14, the Pittsburgh Courier identified the 
“messman hero,” and Miller’s name began to be compared to African American historical 
figures ranging from Crispus Attucks to the “Harlem Hellfighters” of World War I.67  
Soon after, a campaign generated by black leaders, including White, as well as white 
politicians such as Congressman John Dingell (D-MI) and Senator James Mead (D-NY) 
called for Miller to receive official recognition.68  In response to these efforts, the 
Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, argued that Miller had already been “sufficiently 
recognized” with a letter of commendation.  Knox’s comments, written to Senator David 
Walsh (D-MA), chair of the Naval Affairs Committee, were made public in the Chicago 
Defender by Edgar Brown, President of the National Negro Council.69  Following 
increased criticism, on May 17, 1942, Miller received the Navy Cross on the deck of the 
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aircraft carrier Enterprise (figs. 3.10, 3.11).70  During the following month Miller was 
named mess attendant, first class, a promotion that included few actual benefits.  Despite 
his obvious bravery in a time of crisis, Miller returned to his messman duties and the 
Navy’s segregationist policies remained unchanged.71 
 Government officials enlisted Miller in morale boosting efforts soon after his 
actions became public.  Although an unknown messman previously, Miller’s heroism 
combined with his humble background to make him an ideal figure for such purposes.  
The government organized a speaking tour for Miller that included appearances at bond 
rallies and more casual meetings with audiences composed of black servicemen (fig. 
3.12).72  Additionally, in the spring of 1943 the OWI’s Radio Bureau organized a fifteen 
minute segment detailing Miller’s life and heroic acts at Pearl Harbor that received 
nationwide distribution.  OWI records indicate that the agency expected this segment, 
written by Venezuella Jones, a well-known black actress, drama instructor, and writer, to 
“do a good job in territories where negro morale problems exist.”73  Miller’s reputation 
also spread through non-government channels as well, including the weekly CBS radio 
series They Live Forever, which broadcast details of his heroics on March 29, 1942.74  His 
celebrity also led to entrepreneurial manufacturers creating mementos such as pins 
featuring portraits that barely resembled Miller’s likeness (figs. 3.13, 3.14).75  The poet 
and activist Amiri Baraka has commented that such objects contributed to the manner in 
which Miller was “almost canonized by Negros all over the country.”76  Thus, though 
relegated to his post below decks following acts of bravery, Miller became strongly 
178
associated with the willingness and capability of African Americans to contribute to the 
war.  
 Miller received even wider publicity in 1943 when the OWI produced a poster 
featuring his portrait prominently (fig. 3.15).  Created by David Stone Martin, Miller here 
gazes stoically beyond the viewer before a hazy, blue background resembling the ocean’s 
surface.77  A smoking, sinking battleship appears over Miller’s left shoulder, a clear 
reference to the U.S. ships he defended at Pearl Harbor.  The poster’s top text, which 
reads: “above and beyond the call of duty,” refers to his actions that led to the Navy Cross 
award.  The lower left corner features Miller’s name, followed by the words: “Received 
the Navy Cross at Pearl Harbor, May 17, 1942.”  Martin clearly used the widely 
circulated photograph taken during Miller’s Navy Cross award ceremony as a basis for 
the poster’s design (fig. 3.10).  By cropping that image tightly, Miller appears pushed to 
the foreground, a technique that emphasized his well-documented strength and size.  
 By celebrating Miller’s heroism while commemorating Pearl Harbor subtly, 
Martin’s OWI poster downplayed well-known controversial issues related to race.78  For 
example, any recognition of Miller’s bravery was inseparable from his role as a Navy 
messman, and thus from the military’s inherent racism and segregationist policies.  The 
Navy’s reputation as possibly the most racist branch of the service complicated Miller’s 
story considerably.79  The branch’s harsh treatment of black sailors became particularly 
apparent in October 1940, when a group of messmen wrote to the Pittsburgh Courier to 
explain their frustrations with the service bluntly.  These young men, who all served on 
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the USS Philadelphia, revealed that since enlisting, their “work is limited to waiting on 
table and making beds for the officers... in the last six months there have been nine mess 
attendants given solitary confinement on bread and water.”  These men, who became 
known as the “Philadelphia Fifteen,” specifically discouraged other blacks from enlisting 
in the Navy, as they would only become “sea-going bell hops, chambermaids and 
dishwashers.”80  Their letter caused an immediate uproar in the black press, and the Navy 
brought criminal charges against each man, who were soon “undesirably” discharged.81  
Contemporary critics thus speculated the Navy’s slow revelation of Miller’s heroics 
represented a deliberate attempt to avoid an obligatory recognition of his bravery for 
fears of increased pressure to desegregate.82 
 OWI attempts to celebrate Miller were complicated further by black newspapers, 
which often criticized the military’s segregationist policies while simultaneously noting 
Miller’s heroism.  In July 1942, the Pittsburgh Courier ran two photographs under the 
headline “THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THE JIM-CROW POLICY AND THE 
JIM-CROW ATTITUDE WORK” (fig. 3.16).83  On the left the Courier displayed a photo 
of Joseph Lockard, a white member of the Signal Corps who received an officer’s 
commission for warning of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor.  On the right appeared the 
photograph of Miller taken during his Navy Cross ceremony.  The text under Lockard’s 
photograph stated: “He Warned... Gets Commission,” while the words under Miller’s 
photograph read: “He Fought... Keeps Mop.” The accompanying caption described the 
racist hypocrisy of military discrimination thusly: “[White military leaders] say that 
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although the Negro is segregated, he has the same training, the same equipment, the same 
accommodations and the same OPPORTUNITY as the white soldier.  The pictures above 
disprove this contention.”  This juxtaposition encapsulated the frustration felt by many 
blacks: though awarded a high honor, Miller’s promotion lacked a subsequent 
advancement in rank commensurate with his actions.  That a sailor could perform so 
bravely and then return to menial work demonstrated the utter irrationality of the 
military’s racist policies.  The manner in which the Courier criticized the military’s 
segregationist policies by using the same photograph that served as the basis for the 
OWI’s poster reemphasized such hypocrisies.  
 Moreover, while Miller’s heroism hinged on his ability to operate technically 
sophisticated, deadly weaponry, the OWI poster featuring his portrait did not identify this 
detail explicitly.  Instead of showing Miller firing a weapon at Japanese aircraft (or 
assisting with the rescue of his white superior), Martin’s design depicts him at attention, 
unarmed, and nearly disconnected from his surroundings.  The visual distancing of black 
servicemen from weapons, and thus from positions of power, was a common strategy in 
government graphics.  While a poster of Joe Louis grasping a rifle was acceptable in 
1942 (thanks largely to the subject’s celebrity and popularity with whites), similar 
imagery featuring an unknown and armed black soldier presented more problematic 
issues.84  Thus, propagandists depicted minority members of the armed services in less 
threatening roles to placate white viewers’ fears of the possibility of an unstable racial 
status quo.  
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 In 1943 the OWI released a poster that exhibited a similar distancing of a former 
black serviceman from weapons.  Created for the War Production Board (WPB), an 
agency that regulated wartime manufacturing, this poster featured Obie Bartlett, a young 
soldier who lost his left arm at Pearl Harbor (fig. 3.17).  In this graphic, one of the few 
other U.S. posters to depict an African American, Bartlett is shown engaged in his post-
military work as a welder on a West Coast shipyard.85  The poster’s text notes that 
Bartlett is “TWICE A PATRIOT!” for his contributions first to the military and later to 
wartime industry.  The lower caption, set in quotes to suggest they are Bartlett’s own 
words, read: “Sometimes I feel my job here is as important as the one I had to leave.”86  
While his shipyard work was certainly valuable, Bartlett plays a far more passive role as 
a one-armed welder than did Louis in the OFF poster a year earlier.  Thus, the OWI’s 
depictions of Miller and Bartlett, while seeming to simply commemorate their service, 
also carefully avoided controversy by distancing the black figures shown from weapons 
or positions of empowerment.  
 Miller’s story continued to inspire African Americans after he was declared 
missing in action in the Pacific following the sinking of the USS Liscome Bay on 
November 12, 1943.87  In 1944 Gwendolyn Brooks composed a poem titled “Negro Hero 
(To Suggest Dorie Miller)” that bluntly addressed the racism that defined wartime 
America.88  Brooks, a 25-year-old poet at the time, noted how blacks faced not only 
racism, but the demoralizing situation of fighting alongside and aiding those who 
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supported the system that suppressed minorities.  Speaking in Miller’s voice, Brooks’ 
poem concluded: 
Naturally, the important thing is, I helped to save them, them and a part 
of their democracy,
Even if I had to kick their law into their teeth in order to do that for 
them.  
And I am feeling well and settled in myself because I believe it was a 
good job, 
Despite this possible horror: that they might prefer the 
Preservation of their law in all its sick dignity and their knives 
To the continuation of their creed 
And their lives.
Many blacks, both in and out of the service, undoubtedly shared similar sentiments of 
frustration.  
 Despite the differences in their wartime celebrity, “Dorie” Miller and Joe Louis 
were commonly mentioned together, particularly in the black press, and often with other 
black heroes.  In the fall of 1942, when a young African American named Lewis Jones 
went to prison rather than serve in the segregated U.S. Army, John Lewis, the editor of 
PM, criticized Jones for providing fodder for white racists.  Lewis was quickly refuted by 
forty Howard University students who signed a letter stating they supported Jones 
completely: “Thousands of Negro men and women will count [Jones] as much a hero as 
Dorie Miller and Joe Lewis [sic].  They will rank him with Frederick Douglass and A. 
Philip Randolph.”89  Miller and Louis remained aligned with similarly renowned heroes 
following the war as well.  In an editorial on racial pride written for the Defender a month 
after the surrender of Japan, Langston Hughes wrote: “There is pride in the history of the 
183
Negro people from Africa to America, from the Kings of Dahomey to Joe Louis, from 
Eboue in this war in Africa to Dorie Miller in this war at Pearl Harbor.”90  By aligning 
Louis and Miller with historical African kings and a black leader of the Free French 
respectively, Hughes revealed a lineage of racial pride that extended to these two 
contemporary servicemen.  Though Louis had his critics at times, similar words of 
admiration praising both men simultaneously appeared often in the pages of the wartime 
black press.  The following section examines how the OWI sought to capitalize on the 
popularity of the black press by addressing African American readers through visual 
methods directly.  
Charles Alston and African American Newspapers
 The OWI’s most sustained effort to address African Americans involved the 
distribution of content to black newspapers.  Although this campaign emphasized press 
releases primarily, the OWI also developed a more visual agenda as well.  In the summer 
of 1942 the agency hired Charles Alston, a well-known New York based artist and 
teacher, to create illustrations printed exclusively in the black press.  As an OWI 
employee, Alston could not criticize the government’s racist policies directly, a restriction 
that left the artist with some reservations regarding his service at the agency.91  Yet Alston 
regarded fascism abroad as a greater long-term threat than racism at home, thus he 
created graphics that did more than simply promote patriotism—they depicted blacks as 
crucial contributors to the war effort, both as independent participants and as valuable 
members of interracial collaborations.  Therefore, Alston’s OWI work negotiated a fine 
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line between criticism of entrenched federal policies on race and progressive calls for 
social change.  
 Alston’s prewar career, which included advertising and illustration, as well as 
employment on government art jobs, provided a strong background for his wartime 
graphic service.  After graduating from Columbia in 1931, Alston became a well-known 
and respected figure in Harlem’s artistic circles for his artwork and teaching.92  His 
contributions to the cultural scene in Harlem included an appointment as the first African 
American supervisor in the Works Progress Administration/Federal Art Project (WPA/
FAP).93  During the late 1930s, Alston designed and executed two paired murals at the 
Harlem Hospital Center that contrasted modern science and medicine with traditional 
forms of African healing.94  Both murals display complex designs combining dignified 
and thoughtful figures with objects related to historical and contemporary medical 
practices.  In Modern Medicine, Alston depicted doctors and nurses of various races 
surrounded by modern medical equipment (fig. 3.18, c. 1936-40).  His second mural, 
titled Magic in Medicine (c. 1936-40) aligned historical African healing techniques to 
those used in the American South and possibly the Caribbean.95    Furthermore, the 
manner in which Alston varies the scale and perspective of objects exhibits a clear 
influence from Diego Rivera, whom Alston visited while the Mexican muralist painted 
his controversial murals at Rockefeller Center in 1932.96  As with Rivera’s work, Alston’s 
murals also faced controversy before their installation when the Harlem hospital’s white 
administrator rejected the manner in which his preliminary designs emphasized black 
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figures.  The controversy eventually subsided however, and Alston’s murals were 
installed in 1940.97    
 When combined with his artistic skill, Alston’s success as a teacher and WPA 
artist made him an ideal contributor for the OWI.  Whether Alston volunteered or was 
recruited by the agency is unclear, but OWI records indicate that he submitted a poster 
design to Thomas Mabry, an agency graphics supervisor, in June 1942.  Alston’s poster, 
which featured an aeronautical theme, was apparently never produced.  However, his 
communication with Mabry, who recruited numerous artists to the OWI as discussed in 
the previous chapter, demonstrates that Alston began contributing work shortly after the 
agency’s establishment.98 
 Alston’s initial involvement with the OWI coincided with the agency’s promise to 
improve relations with African Americans through a strengthened connection to the black 
press.  According to OWI Director Elmer Davis, the black press would receive a “square 
deal” from the agency in the form of “straight news.”  As reported by the New York 
Amsterdam News, Davis’s plan not only included supplying black papers with objective 
data, but also recruiting African Americans to its staff as reporters, broadcasters, and 
photographers.99  As a result, in the summer of 1942 the OWI News Bureau hired a 
relatively small group of black newspapermen to serve as intermediaries between the 
black press and the government.  The September 26, 1942 edition of the Chicago 
Defender depicted several members of this team, including Alston, along with his 
supervisor, Ted Poston, a reporter well-known for his work in New York at the 
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Amsterdam News (fig. 3.19).  As a Senior Information Specialist, Poston’s responsibilities 
included drafting OWI press releases concerning race.100  For example, one of Poston’s 
first assignments was to write Davis’s response to false allegations that OWI only had 
two black employees.101  Though many African American newspaper writers kept up their 
criticism of the government’s policies on race, most seemed generally pleased with 
Poston’s appointment at OWI.  
! Alston’s appointment at the OWI News Bureau provided the agency with the 
opportunity to address millions of African American readers visually.  The popularity and 
importance of newspapers in black communities made Alston’s OWI contributions 
particularly valuable.102  Newspapers created by and for African Americans had existed 
since the nineteenth century, and readership had increased significantly by World War II.  
In 1940 approximately 210 black newspapers were published across the country, with 
total circulation of more than 1,200,000 copies a week.  The Pittsburgh Courier had the 
largest distribution, with 150,000 weekly sales.103  Most newspapers were weekly 
publications passed among multiple readers, and thus actual readership far exceeded sales 
numbers.  As with mainstream white publications, black newspapers spread information, 
encouraged debate, and fostered community development.  The Courier’s “Double V” 
campaign, which signified the hope of many blacks that by participating in the war, 
victory could be achieved over both fascism abroad and racism at home, represented a 
strong example of the ability of black newspapers to influence opinion.  Several other 
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black newspapers soon embraced this promotion, and it received support across the 
country.104
 Along with reaching a wide readership, Alston’s OWI graphics addressed issues 
with particular relevance for black readers while carefully avoiding direct criticism of 
federal policies on race.  An early example, printed in the Baltimore Afro-American on 
August 29, 1942, demonstrates Alston’s approach (fig. 3.20).105  At left, a farm couple, 
identified as such by their dress and the plow before them, gaze admiringly upward to 
passing aircraft.  Their relaxed poses identify the pilots above as friendly fighters—a 
point Alston’s work drives home with a sense of parental admiration through the male 
figure’s declaration that: “Those Are Our Boys Ma.”  The lower caption clearly states that 
this graphic came from Alston, a “NY artist,” and the OWI.  
 Although not identified specifically, the male figure’s admiration for the “boys” 
above likely refers to the Tuskegee Airmen, the well-known, decorated Army Air Corps 
pilots who achieved an elite status during the war in a field closed previously to 
minorities.106  The black press celebrated the achievements of the Tuskegee Airmen and 
their bravery abroad often, and these pilots also appeared in other forms of war 
propaganda.  For example, a war bonds poster distributed by the Treasury Department 
featured an identifiable member of the squad, a pilot named Robert Deiz, who completed 
93 successful missions over North Africa and Italy (fig. 3.21).107  Designed by an 
unknown artist, this poster depicts Deiz standing heroically in his flying gear while 
gazing into the distance, seemingly ready for action.  While the text fails to clarify that 
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the “us” in “Keep us flying” refers to the Tuskegee Airmen explicitly, informed black 
viewers would have likely understood the reference.  This approach, therefore, is similar 
to that used by Alston’s illustration in its subtle expression of racial pride that withholds a 
direct criticism of Jim Crow.   
Alston’s “Our Boys” graphic holds additional significance beyond admiration of 
airmen.  Through the austere rural setting, the dated farm implement, and the modest 
dress of these two figures, Alston’s support of the servicemen above alludes 
simultaneously to the plight of the black farmers below.  Prior to the war, the majority of 
African Americans still lived in the South, where many labored within a repressive 
system of tenant farming.  Though many American farmers endured terrible hardships 
during the Depression, Southern black farmers experienced a particularly difficult 
situation.  Despite attempts by the Roosevelt administration to provide aid, New Deal 
agricultural policies displaced thousands of blacks from tenant farms, while the WPA, the 
Farm Security Administration (FSA), and the Civilian Conservation Core (CCC) at least 
partially continued Jim Crow policies.108  Many of Alston’s readers, regardless of their 
location, were likely familiar with the harsh conditions faced by Southern farmers, either 
through personal or familial experience.  
 Alston’s OWI graphics addressed rural topics rarely, and he more often depicted 
issues resulting from the migration of blacks to urban areas.  Typically, such imagery 
promoted a positive message suggesting that black contributions to the war would lead to 
the loosening of racist restrictions and increased opportunities to improve economic and 
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social status.  For example, in a graphic from the Atlanta Daily World, captioned “A Real 
Home is Worth a Real Fight!,” Alston depicted two young men marching off to work (fig 
3.22).  The young man on the right is dressed as a soldier, the other, a laborer.  The 
soldier waves to a woman and child standing on the front porch of a suburban home at 
right.  Surrounding vegetation, including a large tree, a bush in the foreground at left, and 
a maintained lawn suggests a developed, well-cared for residence.  As with most of his 
OWI illustrations, Alston’s signature, along with the letters “OWI” appear in the lower 
right corner.
 The image shows these figures as contributors to the war, homeowners, and 
perhaps most importantly, independent agents shaping their own future.  Yet the text at 
the top right, which Alston set within the leaves of a tree and identified as a “news item,” 
alludes to the housing struggle faced by many: “Negro tenants will occupy 88,000 
housing units when current public housing program is completed in June.”109  Alston 
provided no details on the type or location of these units, but by referring to the desperate 
need for housing he addressed a significant issue.  The migration of black and white 
laborers from rural areas to urban centers of production caused housing shortages 
throughout the nation.  Combined with white supremacist attitudes, the situation led to 
rioting, and in some cases, murder.  As discussed previously, one of the worst cases of 
these circumstances exploded in Detroit at the Sojourner Truth Homes in February 1942, 
more than a year before Alston completed this image.
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 Alston addressed housing issues before joining the OWI in the June 1942 edition 
of Fortune for an article titled “The Negro’s War” along with his cousin, Romare 
Bearden.110  The article’s text emphasized how Jim Crow hamstrung wartime labor, a 
concern for the publication’s primarily white, business minded readers.  Yet Alston’s 
artwork also criticized the racist system that compounded difficulties blacks faced in 
housing, the military, and the private sector.  As seen in one illustration, white aggression 
against desegregated housing efforts included physical intimidation (fig. 3.23).  In this 
image, the young black couple at lower right stand near an unpacked moving truck as two 
white men gaze menacingly from either side of a sign reading “We want white tenants in 
our white community.”  Here Alston put white racists, as well as an American flag, 
between the couple in the foreground and the new homes in the distance.  As mentioned 
previously, the same sign appeared in Life magazine less than three months earlier in that 
publication’s coverage of the Sojourner Truth Housing riots (fig. 3.3).  Captured by 
Arthur Siegel, a FSA photographer, this photograph (fig. 3.24) was accompanied by 
additional images in Life featuring unarmed black civilians being beaten by white 
policemen dressed in caps similar to that worn by the figure to the left in Alston’s 
Fortune illustration.  Such a direct reference to race-based violence could never be 
rendered as explicitly in OWI imagery.  
 Unlike his OWI graphics, Alston’s blunt criticism of racism in the pages of 
Fortune shared a strong affinity with the work of fellow artists who contributed to black 
newspapers.  Illustrations and comics became an increasingly significant part of black 
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newspapers during the interwar period, and as noted by the art historian Amy Kirschke, 
artists often addressed social injustices such as lynching with aggressive imagery.111  
Such content continued to appear during the war as well.  For example, a November 1942 
cartoon from the Baltimore Afro-American featured an enraged white man labeled 
“SOUTH” tying a black man to a post (fig. 3.25).  The accompanying caption, spoken by 
the bound man, reads: “Don’t Look Now, but Somebody’s Behind You!,” a reference to 
the soldier labeled “JAPAN” who enters the scene at left.  In his racist fervor, the white 
man ignores both this threat and the sign pointing to “All Out Victory” at the top right.  
Not only an irrational impediment to victory, Southern racism was also aligned with 
Nazism as seen in another Afro-American cartoon from the same month (fig. 3.26).  In 
this example, Hitler walks with a cartoonish “hillbilly” labeled “Dixie” who carries a 
noose and a jug labeled “poll tax filibuster.”  The ideological similarities of these two 
figures is emphasized in their similar poses, friendly demeanor, and the caption above, 
which reads: “PALS (Die Guten Kameraden).”  Ironically, Axis propaganda that targeted 
African Americans, particularly that produced by the Japanese, often pointed out similar 
racial hypocrisies.112 
 Black newspaper artists did not limit their criticism to Southern racism however, 
and many chastised the U.S. government’s policies on race directly.  The multiple 
enemies of racial progress were made clear, for example, in a graphic printed in the Afro-
American in September 1943 that featured a young black soldier surrounded by 
international and domestic foes (fig. 3.27).  Titled “Small Wonder He’s Puzzled,” the 
192
unknown cartoonist here depicted an armed and willing but confused soldier facing not 
only a Nazi at lower left, but advancing domestic aggressors labeled “Discrimination,” 
“Southern Race Baiter,” and “Civilian Police.”  As his enemies close in, the soldier turns 
to Uncle Sam, standing at right passively, and asks “Which of these did you say was the 
enemy?”  The answer of course was all four, a situation many blacks readers could no 
doubt recognize.
 Alston’s OWI illustrations provided a valuable response to these and similar 
criticisms of U.S. policy by encouraging blacks to support the war.  At the same time, 
Alston wrestled with supporting a government that practiced racial discrimination, 
particularly after moving from New York to work for the OWI in segregated Washington, 
D.C.113  As a federal employee he could not create overt promotions of equality or 
desegregation.  Yet Alston felt blacks could make social progress by supporting the war, 
therefore, he developed a method whereby he encouraged a progressive message while 
remaining within federally imposed standards.  For example, Alston’s OWI graphics 
often addressed integrated cooperation in the workforce and the military without 
attacking Jim Crow explicitly.  The potential for a racially integrated united front appears 
in an image printed in the Atlanta Daily World (fig. 3.28).  In this graphic, a white sailor 
wrestles with an inhuman, beast-like enemy labeled “submarine menace” at the far right.  
As the white sailor struggles with this foe, a large black man dressed in a military 
uniform charges into the water to join the fight from the left.  The black sailor’s arrival is 
welcomed by his white comrade, who calls out “Come on Sailor, You’re Just in Time!”  
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Though his face is obscured, the black serviceman dominates the left side of the image in 
an active pose alluding to his capability to aid the white sailor in defeating a shared 
enemy.  Rather than emphasizing the racism faced by black servicemen, here Alston 
stressed the potential of a desegregated fighting force.
Significantly, Alston included text at the top right that denotes these men as Coast 
Guardsmen: “300 Negroes go on active duty in U.S. Coast Guard.”  Though the U.S. 
military did not desegregate until three years after the war when President Truman signed 
Executive Order 9981 in 1948, the Coast Guard offered blacks opportunities to serve in 
roles denied to minorities in other branches of the service.  As noted by the military 
historian Morris J. MacGregor, by August 1942 the Coast Guard had trained more than 
300 black men for general service duties such as radiomen, pharmacists, coxswains, and 
firemen.  Additionally, while Coast Guard housing and dining facilities remained 
segregated, training classes and duty activities were racially integrated.114  Thus, Alston’s 
depiction of racially integrated forces had symbolic power by referencing a branch in the 
military where blacks, while not receiving equal treatment, saw increased opportunities.  
This subject likely held a particular resonance for Alston, as his friend and former student 
Jacob Lawrence joined the Coast Guard a year after this image was printed.  As Lawrence 
later depicted in a painting titled Painting the Bilges (1944), white and black Coast 
Guardsmen served together, although not always in glamorous work (fig. 3.29).  In this 
canvas by Lawrence, two sailors, one white and one black, paint the plumbing system 
that emptied bilge water.115
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 Alston also depicted socially progressive issues concerning the influx of black 
women into the wartime work force.  As seen in the September 26, 1942 edition of the 
Philadelphia Tribune, Alston depicted three women marching before an American flag 
above the words “They Also Serve” (fig. 3.30).  Each figure represented a war related 
job, including, from left to right: nursing, factory work, and the armed services.  Alston 
characterized these women as strong, valuable members of the domestic front through 
their determined facial expressions and confident strides.  The image not only recognized 
those who were working, but also encouraged others to join the fight by appealing to the 
reader’s sense of patriotism and camaraderie.  
 The OWI encouraged African American women to support the war with 
photographs as well, as seen in an image on the same page of the Tribune directly below 
Alston’s graphic (fig. 3.31).  Taken by Howard Liberman, an OWI photographer, this 
image depicts a woman named Anna Marchand working in an aircraft factory.  Partially 
hidden by the large industrial equipment that surrounds her, Ms. Marchand is shown hard 
at work, too busy to notice the photographer.  The caption below her photograph reads: 
‘Women and Machines’—Negro women are playing an increasingly 
important part in war production.  Aircraft, munitions and ordnance 
plants are now tapping this source of labor supply.  The young 
woman shown under-sizing bushings in the picture above is one of 
several hundred Negro women employed in the aircraft factory of a 
large eastern Navy Yard.—OWI photo
Liberman’s photograph functions in a manner similar to Alston’s graphic as both honor 
those serving while encouraging others to join the fight.  However, these images differ 
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from most contemporary depictions of females engaged in the war effort, which nearly 
always featured attractive white women.116 
 Just as African American women appeared rarely in OWI graphics, the agency 
also avoided aligning the concept of “freedom” with racial minorities in visual 
propaganda.  White politicians and military leaders commonly cited the notion of 
“freedom” as one of the war’s primary justifications, and for many whites, Norman 
Rockwell’s Four Freedoms provided the justifications for their wartime sacrifices (fig. 
2.2).  Yet as minorities were legally denied the freedom mentioned often by the OWI, 
Rockwell’s poster (and similar graphics) meant little to black viewers.  As one woman 
from Harlem said, “Every time I look at them ‘Four Freedoms’ pictures, I get so mad
—‘cause we ain’t got no freedom.”117  Black cartoonists addressed this hypocrisy often, 
as seen in an image by Jay Jackson that appeared in the Chicago Defender shortly after 
the release of Rockwell’s posters (fig. 3.32).  In an image titled “The Four Freedoms: 
Dixie Style,” the iconic freedoms noted by FDR and depicted by Rockwell are replaced 
with icons representing (from left to right): Lynch, Peonage, Poll Tax, and Jim Crow—
four strategies used to deny blacks freedom and democracy in the South.  
Conversely, Alston addressed the notion of “freedom” by alluding to the hope for 
a brighter tomorrow through wartime sacrifice.  One of Alston’s graphics printed soon 
after Rockwell’s posters appeared featured a family embracing in what is likely the final 
moments before the uniformed young father ships off to war (fig. 3.33).118  As a large 
cloud of smoke at right labeled “The Battle for Freedom” rises in the distance, the soldier 
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addresses his son, held in his arms: “I’m going to see that you grow up in a better world 
young fellow!”  The smoldering chaos in the distance suggested battles abroad fought by 
Americans from various ethnicities, races, religions, and social classes.  Yet this overseas 
“battle for freedom” also extended to the figures in the foreground to suggest a potent 
second meaning.  For many African Americans, the “battle for freedom” was not limited 
to battles against the Axis, but extended to battles at home against racism as well.  
Clearly, Alston’s reference to “a better tomorrow” shared a strong conceptual allegiance 
to the Courier’s “Double V” campaign.  
 Yet not all of his artist colleagues shared this sentiment.  For example, a week 
before Alston’s “Our Boys, Ma!” illustration appeared (fig. 3.20), the cartoonist Ted 
Carroll offered a much different opinion in the Afro-American (fig. 3.34).119  Here Carroll 
depicted a soldier deep in thought beneath the words “Is It Worth It?” Sitting beneath a 
“colored only” sign, this soldier holds a newspaper with headlines featuring phrases such 
as “Lynched!” “Jim Crowed!” and “Soldier Slain!”  Behind him loom the horrors of war, 
represented in a chaotic scene of tanks, aircraft, and armed soldiers.  Posed in a manner 
similar to Rodin’s The Thinker (1902), Carroll’s soldier is trapped between racism at 
home, signified in the newspaper, and the violence of war abroad.  Lost in his thoughts, 
this muscular figure represents those who doubted their sacrifices would result in better 
conditions at home.  The title of Carroll’s graphic, “God’s War,” was likely a jab at Joe 
Louis, who as discussed previously, promoted the war in religious terms.
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While Carroll’s image makes a powerful argument by emphasizing racial 
injustice, Alston sought to acknowledge such crimes while simultaneously noting 
progressive change.  For example, in May 1943 Alston addressed desegregation in labor, 
a subject the black press raised repeatedly during the war (fig. 3.35).  Here a figure 
identified as “labor” posts a sign announcing “workers wanted regardless of color” before 
an industrial background.  To his right, a man in a business suit labeled “Management” 
assists.  Both figures stand on the previous sign, since discarded, which reads “workers 
wanted--white only.”  Labeled “A step in the right direction,” this graphic likely refers to 
Executive Order 8802, discussed previously, which outlawed segregated hiring practices 
in manufacturing related to the war.  Alston also included text at the lower left: “Between 
May 1942, and January 1943, Negro employment in Baltimore’s principal war plants 
increased 85%.”  Although many black workers continued undoubtedly to struggle in a 
hiring atmosphere characterized by “last to hire, first to fire,” Alston suggests the 
situation for minority laborers had improved.120 
Significantly, Alston’s graphic did more than note the erosion of racist hiring 
practices.  In this example, the term “step” in “a step in the right direction” connotes one 
of many—a progressive movement towards a larger goal.  A step “in the right direction” 
also acknowledges previously held policies of racism and inequality—antiquated 
practices new generations would not face.  This subtle reference thus situates Alston as an 
untraditional propagandist who rejected policies of the past, and even of the present.  
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Instead, in this and other graphics Alston exhibited hope for future public policy to meet 
the rhetoric of “democracy and freedom” expressed by politicians throughout the war.
 In a similar effort to raise black morale, Alston also celebrated well-known 
African American heroes from contemporary and historical eras, including both Dorie 
Miller and Joe Louis.  On the first anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Alston 
created a graphic that celebrated Miller’s actions (fig. 3.36).  Here Alston depicted Miller 
in the lower left corner, firing upon a Japanese Zero aircraft flying towards a sinking ship. 
The water between Miller and this wreckage, labeled “Pearl Harbor,” is accompanied by 
a caption stating: “December 7th ~ Remember!!”  Additionally, in what may have been 
an effort to counter the negative press surrounding Louis’s Navy Benefit fight (fig. 3.9), 
Alston created an illustration promoting Louis as “the Champion of Champions” (fig. 
3.37).  Alston not only provided a skillfully rendered portrait of Louis at the top right, he 
also included a brief biographical account of the champ’s “meteoric rise” from poverty in 
Alabama (seen at top left) to the “sports idol of the nation.”  Finally, Alston referred to 
Louis’s boxing clinics held at military camps at the lower right, as well as his donation to 
the Navy at the lower left.121
 Alston’s Joe Louis graphic was part of a series of similarly designed profiles 
featuring famous African Americans that Ted Poston referred to as the “color guard.”122  
This group of approximately 24 images included 19th century figures such as abolitionist 
icon Frederick Douglass (fig. 3.38) and the self-taught scientist and surveyor Benjamin 
Banneker.  The individuals Alston profiled also included contemporary contributors to the 
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arts, academia, publishing, engineering, and the military.  Examples included the actor 
and signer Paul Robeson (fig. 3.39), and William Hastie, who served as a civilian aide to 
Secretary of War Henry Stimson.  By emphasizing the success of a diverse range of 
individuals, these illustrations connected leaders from the past to those sacrificing in the 
present in a manner reminiscent of Alston’s Harlem Hospital murals.   
 Alston continued to design graphics for the OWI until September 1943, when the 
agency announced that budget cuts forced the elimination of his position.  Numerous 
black newspapers lamented the loss of Alston’s service, including the Atlanta Daily 
World, which stated that: “the discontinuance of his work will be felt by papers which 
have benefitted thereby in the past.”123  Shortly thereafter, Alston enlisted in the U.S. 
Army and served in the 372nd Infantry Regiment in New York City until he received an 
honorable discharge in December 1944.124  During approximately fourteen months at the 
OWI, Alston produced nearly one hundred graphics seen in black newspapers nationwide 
that represented a unique form of government-issued imagery.  However, by the fall of 
1943 the agency’s sweeping ideological changes discussed in the previous chapter began 
effecting efforts to address minorities.  At the same time that OWI posters began 
demonstrating an increasingly commercial aesthetic, campaigns to address African 
Americans became a liability the agency sought to suppress.  While Alston’s graphics 
seemed to generate little criticism, his work coincided with a controversial OWI brochure 
distributed to black audiences in 1943.  The following section addresses the ensuing 
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controversy, which soon led to the discontinuance of the OWI’s campaigns intended for 
African American viewers.
Photography, Race, and Negroes and the War
 In early 1943 the OWI released a 68 page brochure titled Negroes and the War 
that featured 141 black and white photographs and an introductory essay by Chandler 
Owen, an African American journalist.125  This brochure, distributed to black audiences 
specifically, combined patriotic text with photographs from numerous sources, including 
the FSA, in a distinctively modern design akin to Life magazine.  The primary message of 
Negroes and the War, emphasized by Owen’s opening text, argued that minorities would 
receive worse treatment from the Axis than from the current U.S. system, and thus blacks 
should support the war effort.126  To increase its appeal, Negroes and the War displayed 
an attractive design and artfully cropped images that resembled contemporary 
publications featuring a photographic emphasis.  By doing so, the OWI’s brochure shared 
strong visual similarities with 12 Million Black Voices (1941), a major photographic 
essay featuring text written by Richard Wright and imagery edited by Edwin Rosskam.  
Whereas 12 Million Black Voices addressed the inequalities and racism faced by African 
Americans, the OWI’s Negroes and the War carefully framed facts and photography to 
suggest that racial progress since reconstruction revealed a positive sign of social change.  
This rhetoric rang hollow to many readers for its whitewashing of Jim Crow, and viewer 
response was decidedly mixed.  Moreover, once whites became aware of its publication, 
the OWI drew the ire of conservative politicians and their constituents, many of whom 
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interpreted the brochure as “communist” and “an insult to the white people of the United 
States.”127
 The controversy surrounding Negroes and the War originated months before the 
establishment of the OWI at the agency’s predecessor, the OFF.  The production process 
began in the spring of 1942 when the OFF hired Milton Starr, a white Southerner who 
owned a chain of black movie theaters, as a “dollar a year” advisor on racial matters.128  
Beginning in late 1942, black newspapers began questioning Starr’s unclear 
qualifications and motivations for pursing the job.129  Throughout his appointment at the 
OFF/OWI, Starr exhibited a tendency of questionable behavior characterized by his 
repeated oversimplification of racial issues and the manipulation of facts.  For example, 
in October 1942, Starr wrote William Lewis, Chief of the OWI’s Radio Bureau, to 
encourage additional resources be directed at black radio listeners.  Contrary to actual 
agency data, Starr wrote: “Negroes, constituting one-tenth of the population, represent a 
large apathetic and seditious minded group according to all the intelligence we can get on 
the subject.”130  According to government surveys and black newspaper editors, African 
American morale was lower than desired, yet Starr’s use of the terms “apathetic and 
seditious” demonstrated a serious exaggeration.131  His critics, including Walter White, 
became increasingly vocal that Starr’s ownership of black theaters did not render him an 
authority on the motivations of African Americans.132  White and other leaders argued 
Starr had no qualifications to serve in such a capacity, and that his understanding of 
black’s concerns were wrong.  
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 In Starr’s view, articulated in a memo written in 1942, a handful of “professional” 
black leaders and the black press discouraged the majority of African Americans from 
supporting the war.133  To combat these supposedly seditious influences, Starr proposed 
that the OFF reprint a previously published brochure titled “What will happen to the 
Negro if Hitler wins!” (1941).  Written by Chandler Owen, this pamphlet took a 
decidedly conservative tone by downplaying issues such as segregation and instead 
emphasizing how African Americans would suffer if the Axis won the war.134  Owen, a 
journalist from Chicago, had previously co-edited the socialist journal The Messenger 
with A. Philip Randolph.  However, by the late 1930s Owen’s political views had shifted.  
Starr’s plan to reprint Owen’s brochure was immediately criticized by Theodore Berry, 
the advisor discussed previously, who argued the text would fail to encourage morale 
because of its explicit reliance on scare tactics.135  Agency records document that 
relations between Starr and Berry were unsurprisingly cold, with OWI Director Davis 
defending both men at various times.136 
 As production on the Owen project stalled, the OFF began preparing a publication 
with a very similar title featuring artwork by several well-known black artists.  
Preliminarily titled “The Negro’s Life Under Hitler,” this brochure, which by its title 
alone seems akin to Owen’s pamphlet, was to include artwork by Alston, Hale Woodruff, 
Jacob Lawrence, and Aaron Douglas, all of whom submitted preliminary sketches to the 
agency in 1942.  The vague, accompanying production records note these images 
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(unlocated and possibly lost) were never used, and that the brochure’s development and 
eventual termination was “a long, long story.”137 
 The project remained shelved during the establishment of the OWI in the summer 
of 1942.  Shortly thereafter, following months of Starr’s repeated efforts to avoid or usurp 
him, Berry resigned from government service.  In a letter written subsequently to Walter 
White, Berry explained his departure resulted from the “diversions in points of view of 
Starr and myself,” as well as “a reluctance in the Office to frontally attack white racial 
prejudice through propaganda instead of seeking to mesmerize Negroes with innocuous 
material.”  When White subsequently confronted Davis concerning Starr’s credentials 
and influence at the agency, the OWI director demurred politely.  Davis assured White 
that Starr served only a minor capacity, and ignored requests to provide his credentials to 
serve as an advisor.138 
 Following Berry’s departure, in the fall of 1942 Starr recruited Owen to adapt his 
previous text for a brochure that eventually became Negroes and the War.139  Formally, 
the publication’s design shared affinities with Life magazine in both its size and use of 
dramatic, artfully shot photographs, culled from sources such as the FSA archive, the 
U.S. military, and the Associated Press.  Most images included a short caption provided 
by an unidentified author.  The brochure’s layout, as well as the interior textual captions, 
were likely composed by a team of OWI staffers, including Ted Poston, Alfred Palmer, a 
white OWI photographer, and Milton MacKaye, a white reporter formerly with the New 
York Evening Post who served as an agency administrator.140  Distribution began in 
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January 1943, and by late February approximately 2,500,000 copies of the brochure were 
printed at a total cost of $85,000.  OWI records indicate these production numbers were 
far greater than almost all other brochures the agency produced.141
 The conflicting messages projected by Negroes and the War began with its 
somewhat misleading cover, which depicted rows of black soldiers standing rigidly at 
attention before two flags (fig. 3.40).  The larger American flag at left is partially 
obscured by a second banner bearing an unidentifiable military insignia.  When combined 
with the publication’s title, prominently displayed in large, bold letters, this powerful 
image suggests that the interior content will focus primarily on militaristic themes.  Yet 
this was not the case.  As explained on the inside front cover page, the brochure’s goals 
were far more diverse. This text explained: 
This book has been prepared to celebrate the achievements of Negro 
Americans in many fields and to recognize their important contributions, 
in all fields, to the fighting of the war.  By words and pictures it tells: 
What Negros are doing in agriculture, industry, and the armed services.  
What negroes have to lose if the Axis wins.  What Negroes have to gain by  
an American victory.
Thus, despite the brochure’s title and cover photograph, the role of blacks in the 
segregated U.S. military was marginalized to emphasize cultural progress made in other 
fields.  
 The brochure opened with Owen’s six page essay, which compared the evils of 
Nazism to the more tolerant culture of the United States.  The text began with an attack 
against those African American critics who argued that life under Hitler would be similar, 
or at least no worse, to current conditions.  To support his claim, Owen cited several 
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particularly abhorrent quotes from Mein Kampf, including Hitler’s reference to Negroes 
as “half-apes” (p. 1).  Additionally, Owen contrasted the role of government in Germany 
to the U.S. by noting that the Gestapo organized mass executions of the sick and elderly 
before describing how thousands of African Americans had recently benefited from 
federal housing programs.  The essay continued by arguing that the Nazis would close 
African American churches while also squelching all forms of black art and culture.  
Owen warned that under Hitler the “drawings and paintings of E. Simms Campbell, 
Aaron Douglas, Sam Brown, Jacob Lawrence, Hale Woodruff; the sculpture of Richmond 
Barthé and Sargent Johnson would be forbidden; the books of all Negro writers from 
Phyllis Wheatley to Richard Wright would be forbidden and burned” (p. 4-5).  Owen also 
noted, “Hitler says half-apes need no newspapers,” (p. 5) and that the Nazis would 
silence the black press as well as organizations such as the NAACP and the Urban 
League.  After outlining a potentially disastrous future, Owen’s closing remarks praised 
Dorie Miller and Joe Louis before concluding with the latter’s quote: “we’re going to do 
our part, and we’ll win ‘cause we’re on God’s side” (p. 6).
 Following Owen’s introduction, Negroes and the War segued to the first of nine 
photographic sections, each composed of four to nine pages and separated by bold title 
copy and large, artistically cropped photos.  The first three sections noted the manner in 
which blacks improved their own lives through labor and education.  Labeled “We’ve 
come a long way,” the initial section makes a cursory reference to slavery under a large 
photograph of two young black boys standing at the Lincoln memorial.  The next four 
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pages described how blacks excelled in a range of occupations, and included photographs 
of African American doctors, lawyers, policemen, firemen, laborers, and postal workers 
(fig 3.41).  The following section, titled “We have built great institutions,” highlighted 
black colleges and newspapers.  These pages show male and female students studying at 
the Tuskegee Institute and Howard University (fig. 3.42) before mentioning a handful of 
news editors.  African American religious traditions are celebrated in the following pages 
under the headline “From the humblest beginnings...  out of our deepest need we have 
built the Negro Church” (fig. 3.43).142  Accompanying photographs show pious 
worshippers at small, rural churches as well as more elaborate institutions of various 
Christian denominations.
 The following several pages addressed benevolent government programs that 
provided social and economic aid to rural and urban areas.  The fourth section, devoted to 
agriculture, depicted black farmers laboring under the words: “On the land... The Negro 
farmer’s life improves steadily with Government help” (fig. 3.44).143  The accompanying 
text described how federal programs improved farming conditions “by loans, by 
adjustment of farm debt, [and] by teaching modern farming methods” (p. 24).  Similarly, 
the next section, titled “In the city,” featured a photographic comparison that emphasized 
how the recent population increase of blacks in urban areas benefited from government 
assistance.  The text, placed beneath photographs of dilapidated dwellings, first explained 
how many urban families lived in “slums” (fig. 3.45).  The image on the right, taken by 
Russell Lee in Chicago, depicts a “kitchenette,” a small, notorious living space 
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commonly created by greedy landlords who divided larger apartments into one-room 
dwellings.  The following page provided a powerful contrast by showcasing the recently 
created Frederick Douglas housing project in Washington D.C. (fig. 3.46).  The 
accompanying caption noted that in comparison to population proportions, a larger 
percentage of these new government homes will go to blacks “because our need is 
greater” (p. 39).  Thus, as with the previous agricultural section, the reader is reminded of 
government attempts to improve the lives of its black citizens through temporary 
assistance, and not legislation.  
 The section on “the City” additionally noted leaders in business, athletics, and arts 
and culture.  The latter category mentioned numerous musicians, writers, and visual 
artists, and included photographs of Richard Wright, Richmond Barthé, Hale Woodruff, 
and Marion Anderson (fig. 3.47).  Though few specific details were provided, the 
supplementary text stated that the “serious Negro artist is now coming into his own” (p. 
46).  Accompanying photographs depicted Barthé and Woodruff with examples of their 
work, which were not discussed or identified.144 
 The following three sections each suggest institutional advances in African 
American healthcare and education as well as recent legislative progress promoting racial 
integration in labor.  Titled “We go forward in health,” the sixth section featured 
photographs of black nurses, doctors, and hospitals, and noted the improvements to 
health and wellness, including infant care and overall life expectancy.  The following 
section, labeled “The young generation in the city,” emphasized the strength of public 
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schools in urban areas and included one of the brochure’s few photographs of racial 
integration (fig. 3.48).  This image depicted three young smiling boys of various 
ethnicities at a New York City public school cafeteria.  Curiously, the caption made no 
reference to the scene’s racial diversity.  However, the eighth section, “We are moving 
ahead,” pointed out recent improvements to hiring practices that increased opportunities 
for minority workers, including Executive Order 8802.  An accompanying photograph 
included a multiracial group of union members.
 The ninth and final section, titled “In the Armed Forces,” addressed the role of 
African Americans in the military with six pages of photographs depicting black soldiers 
training with a variety of weapons and equipment.  Although the captions offered few 
details, an entire two-page spread celebrated the Tuskegee Airmen while also noting 
General Benjamin O. Davis, appointed the first African American general in the U.S. 
Army on October 25, 1940.145  The brochure’s final interior photograph featured the same 
image of Joe Louis seen six month earlier in the OFF’s well-known poster (fig. 3.49).  
Although Louis dominated the last page of Negroes and the War, a much smaller image 
of Dorie Miller receiving his Navy Cross appeared opposite.146 
 Following its release in early 1943, Negroes and the War received a mixed 
reception from its intended African Americans audience.  Writing in the Chicago 
Defender that February, the journalist Harry McAlpin provided a concise analysis of both 
its content and the response among readers.  He noted the brochure’s “pictures are clear, 
well arranged and displayed.  It’s attractive.”  To gauge its reception with readers more 
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accurately, McAlpin visited a local OWI office, where he read dozens of letters from 
blacks who praised Negroes and the War as “excellent,” “timely and electrifying,” and 
“one of the finest pieces of morale building literature that has come from OWI.”  One 
reader responded that “It is far and away the best thing that has been done along this line 
to my knowledge.  Personally, I wish it were possible to have it sent to every Negro 
family in America.”  McAlpin noted these comments came from various sources, 
including branch offices of the NAACP, other black organizations, as well as teachers and 
ministers.147  Even critics such as Walter White, who opposed the brochure’s publication 
previously, acknowledged it was not as “objectionable as it was in its original form,” and 
that “the pamphlet will do some good.”148
 Despite some favorable reviews, Negroes and the War also received much harsher 
criticism.  For example, in a letter to MacKaye, White criticized the OWI’s approach by 
noting that blacks needed little reminder of what life would be like under Hitler.  Instead, 
White argued, the government would likely gain more support from blacks with 
“effective and uncompromising action against some of the evils from which Negroes 
suffer.”149  As Theodore Berry discovered previously, generating such a response proved 
all but impossible.  Similarly, in his Defender column McAlpin pointed out that while 
“it’s a fine study of Negro life... as war propaganda—it just ‘ain’t.’”  McAlpin’s primary 
criticism, echoed by many others, emphasized how Negroes and the War provided 
information already well-known to its intended audience.  Most critics felt the OWI’s 
brochure would prove more effective if directed at white Americans, including, as 
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McAlpin argued: “the Southern block in Congress, the racial supremacy advocates in 
industry and labor, the fog-minded man in the street who still fights the Civil War, the 
brass hats of the Army and Navy who preach a fight for democracy but in practice fight 
to keep Negroes ‘in their place.’”150  Similarly, the New York Amsterdam News noted that 
the brochure “serves no special purpose since Negroes know most the material in the 
pamphlet by heart.  The millions of copies spread throughout Negro communities should 
instead have been spread among white people who don’t know what the Negro has done 
and who haven’t taken the trouble to find out....”151  Finally, other critics attacked the 
brochure for the manner in which it overlooked the realities of racism.  For example, 
John Haynes Holmes, a minister in New York City who helped found the NAACP, wrote 
Elmer Davis to criticize the brochure as a “disreputable publication” that attempts “to 
cover up” the facts of racial injustices.152 
 Though Negroes and the War received various reviews from blacks, the response 
from white social conservatives, particularly Southerners, was overwhelmingly 
negative.153  A Virginia man wrote Senator Harry Byrd complaining that he could not 
comprehend how this brochure contributed to the war effort, and that “this mawkish, 
minority glorifying hand-out, bearing the Government Printing Office label, is a rank 
waste of public money.”154  Louisiana Senator John Overton wrote Davis criticizing the 
brochure as “only one example of a concerted effort toward the apotheosis of the negro 
which gives much concern to the white people of the South where the two races have 
been living side by side in perfect harmony and mutual workable understanding.”155  
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Modified criticism came from Northern whites, including Representatives Hamilton Fish 
and John Taber, both New York Republicans, who characterized the brochure as wasteful 
“tripe and baloney” for assuming blacks needed morale boosting in the first place.156  By 
February 1943, soon after its release, white criticism of Negroes and the War grew so 
intense that the black press began covering this unintended reception.  In an article titled 
“Dixie Whites Riled By ‘Negroes and War’ Mag,” an unnamed Defender writer noted 
that civic leaders in Caddo County, Louisiana were incensed at what they considered a 
promotion of “racial equality between Negroes and whites, something that is unheard of 
in the South.”  The same article noted that blacks had criticized Negroes and the War 
since its distribution for “its brazen attempt to propagandize the colored citizen with the 
use of “rose-colored” picturizations.”157  By late April 1943, increased criticism from 
whites and blacks led the OWI to cease distribution of the brochure altogether.158 
 Along with the controversy it generated, Negroes and the War distinguished itself 
from other OFF/OWI brochures not only by focusing on African Americans, but also 
through its size and extensive use of photography.  Other brochures, including the OFF’s 
popular Divide and Conquer (discussed in chapter two), featured a smaller, text-heavy 
design, no photographs and only a handful of illustrations.  In comparison, Negroes and 
the War demonstrated an appealing layout dominated by dramatic photographs that 
shared a formal similarity with popular magazines.  Additionally, the length and 
sequential combination of text and imagery in Negroes and the War evoked an even 
stronger conceptual affinity with well-known photographic essays from the era including 
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You Have Seen Their Faces (1937) and Say, is this the U.S.A. (1941).  Featuring 
photographs by Margaret Bourke-White and text by Erskine Caldwell, these and other 
publications with a photographic emphasis gained popularity during the 1930s.159  The 
FSA photographic archive contributed significantly to such photographic essays as well.  
For example, Land of the Free (1938) featured an extended poem by Archibald MacLeish 
supplemented by documentary photographs captured by FSA photographers including 
Dorothea Lange, Walker Evans, Arthur Rothstein and Ben Shahn.  These and similar 
publications featured images of Americans struggling, hardened though resolute, through 
the later years of the Depression.  Despite the popularity of such imagery, which was 
accompanied often by text advocating democratic values, issues related to race received 
comparatively less attention.160 
 However, Negroes and the War shared visual similarities with 12 Million Black 
Voices, a photographic essay published less than two years earlier that focused on the 
African American experience.161  Featuring an extended essay by Richard Wright, 12 
Million Black Voices addressed the realities of American racism from slavery to the early 
1940s.  This publication was developed by Edwin Rosskam, a FSA photographer and 
designer who invited Wright to compose a text to compliment a series of nearly 150 
photographs depicting different aspects of African American life.162  Culled almost 
entirely from the FSA archive, these photographs included images taken by Shahn, 
Lange, Evans, Rothstein, and others.  Additionally, in April 1941 the FSA photographer 
Russell Lee accompanied Rosskam and Wright to Chicago’s South Side to create a series 
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of images for the project specifically.163  Though its format resembled contemporary 
photographic essays, 12 Million Black Voices combined a sobering visual emphasis on 
the African American experience with Wright’s text, which resulted in an unflinchingly 
critical analysis of the racial and class-based inequalities in the U.S.
 While 12 Million Black Voices and Negroes and the War addressed similar 
themes, including African American history, agriculture, religion, housing, and art, the 
rhetoric they employed differed substantially.  Both publications demonstrated an 
attractive layout, used photographs extensively, and divided content into sections.  
However, 12 Million Black Voices provided Wright’s expansive text generous room to 
mix with photographs across nearly 150 pages divided into four sections with 
overlapping themes, including: the history of slavery in the U.S., the postbellum South 
and the region’s economic dependency on cheap agricultural labor, the migration of 
blacks to urban areas, and possibilities for a more racially tolerant future.  The resulting 
design allowed a complimentary relationship between text and image unlike that seen in 
Negroes and the War, which comparatively featured a layout dominated by photographs.  
Moreover, both publications approached similar content with starkly different language.  
For example, although each text addressed African American history, Negroes and the 
War only mentioned slavery before transitioning quickly to a page full of photographs 
depicting blacks employed in a variety of jobs, including medicine, law, civil service, and 
industrial labor (fig. 3.41).  The accompanying text emphasized that, “For many years we 
have picked the cotton, done the housework, carried on strong shoulders the work-day 
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burden.  Beyond these limited opportunities there are now new horizons” (p. 10).  
Conversely, in 12 Million Black Voices Wright provided an extended history of the slave 
trade before addressing how increased industrialization strengthened capitalist control of 
the working class and weakened solidarity among laborers.  The images accompanying 
Wright’s text, including a photograph by Shahn, emphasized the harsh, agrarian 
conditions that characterized the labor many blacks still performed (fig. 3.50).
  An additionally stark contrast is revealed with the manner in which both 
publications used the same photograph.  As discussed above, Negroes and the War 
included an image of a family crowded into a kitchenette before explaining that new 
government housing projects aimed to alleviate such conditions (figs. 3.45, 3.46).  When 
the same photograph of the kitchenette (fig. 3.51), taken by Lee during his 1941 trip to 
Chicago with Wright, appeared in 12 Million Black Voices, a much different effect was 
achieved.  Wright explained how the kitchenette resulted from greedy landlords who took 
advantage of a lack of housing by dividing apartments into single room dwellings.  These 
cramped, abhorrent conditions led to disease, crime, and familial stress.  “The 
kitchenette,” Wright wrote, “is our prison, our death sentence without a trial, the new 
form of mob violence that assaults not only the lone individual, but all of us, in its 
ceaseless attacks” (p. 106).  In the text below Lee’s photograph, Wright informs the 
reader how the “kitchenette blights the personalities of our growing children, 
disorganizes them, blinds them to hope, creates problems whose effects can be traced in 
the characters of its child victims for years afterward” (p. 110).  Rather than continue 
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with examples of government assisted housing, Wright described how discriminatory 
housing practices ensured that many blacks remained in substandard homes.164  Thus, 
while exhibiting some thematic similarities, these two publications demonstrate how the 
photographic essay was used for strikingly different methods during the era.
 Perhaps most importantly, Negroes and the War emphasized how the looming 
threat of life under Hitler would lead unquestionably to hardships beyond that of Jim 
Crow.  The brochure opened with Owen’s emphasis that despite whatever difficulties 
blacks faced at the time, Nazi ideology promised worse suffering and none of the 
Roosevelt Administration’s altruism.  The photographs chosen by the OWI reinforced this 
rhetoric by celebrating the successes of selected individuals, while also alternating back 
and forth between images showing undesirable situations and major improvements 
brought by government assistance.  Of course, Negroes and the War represented more 
than an attempt to raise awareness of the plight of the poor during the Depression.  With 
this brochure, the OWI sought not only to persuade readers of the government’s 
philanthropic agenda, but also to encourage blacks to support the war effort.  By doing 
so, the agency deemphasized the realities of legalized racism.  
 An effective description of the strategy employed in Negroes and the War 
appeared in an OWI memo written not concerning the brochure itself, but regarding the 
agency’s ideological approach to blacks in general.  This statement, written by George 
Barnes, an OWI administrator, praised Starr as knowing “more about Negroes and Negro 
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reactions than anyone in OWI,” while also describing the agency’s approach to African 
Americans thusly:
We must go direct to the Negro with an appeal for participation in the war, 
using methods that will bring the quickest, most positive results.  That 
means filling him with information about his stake in the war, what 
Negros are doing in the armed services and otherwise; it means, in effect, 
a direct and powerful Negro propaganda effort as distinct from a crusade 
for Negro rights.165
Such comments, found in the OWI archives frequently, characterized the attitude of many 
agency administrators regardless of their opinion of Jim Crow.
Conclusion
 By the spring of 1943 the controversy over Negros and the War combined with 
intense pressure from Congressional critics, including Congressman John Taber, that led 
to significant changes at the OWI’s Domestic Bureau.  At the same time the Graphics 
Bureau began its ideological overhaul (discussed in chapter two), the OWI also came 
under fire for what Republican politicians categorized as promoting a pro-Roosevelt, 
liberal agenda.  As a result, the agency altered its domestic efforts significantly, including 
those intended for African American audiences.  By May 1943, Starr resigned from the 
OWI to take a job with the War Production Board (WPB).166  At the time, Domestic 
Bureau Chief Cowles remarked that while a replacement for Starr was being sought, no 
African Americans were being considered.  According to the Amsterdam News, Cowles 
noted that race was not a requirement for the position of advisor on racial issues.  Instead, 
the only qualifications were that the individual know something “about the matter, have 
good judgment and a level head.”167  Shortly thereafter, the agency saw significant cuts to 
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its domestic budget, and by the summer of 1943 the black press began reporting that the 
OWI had officially changed its policy regarding African American audiences.  As noted 
by the Courier on July 17, Palmer Hoyt, an advertising executive who succeeded Cowles 
as Director of the Domestic Bureau, stated that: “we are not putting out any more 
pamphlets or posters, and our field staff has been scraped...  We will issue no printed 
matter directly to the public.”168  Six months after the release of Negros and the War, the 
OWI thus ceased distributing material designed for African Americans, and withdrew 
similar operations intended for general audiences as well.  By the fall of 1943, 
approximately fourteen months after its creation, the OWI Domestic Bureau remained a 
shell of its previous self.  The next and final chapter examines how the agency relied 
increasingly upon commercial advertising agencies to fill the resulting void in the 
distribution of domestic propaganda.
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Chapter 4: “Womanpower”: Wartime Images of Working Women
 In May 1943, Norman Rockwell’s Rosie the Riveter graced the cover of 
approximately four million copies of the Saturday Evening Post (fig. 4.1).1  In this iconic 
image, Rockwell depicted a worker taking a break from the factory floor to enjoy a 
sandwich.  Seated before a giant American flag, Rosie holds a rivet gun across her lap and 
a metal lunch box featuring her name in white letters.  A row of patriotic pins adorns her 
chest, and a copy of Hitler’s Mein Kampf rests beneath her feet.  The figure’s muscular 
upper body and ungraceful manner of sitting provide a distinct masculine contrast to 
more feminine features such as her rouged cheeks and red lips.  At ease and confident, 
feminine yet obviously strong and capable, Rockwell’s Rosie reminds twenty-first 
century viewers that wartime economic conditions required a loosening of cultural 
standards concerning the relationships amongst gender, labor, and industry.2  
 Rockwell’s Rosie shared strong similarities with countless images of working 
women seen throughout wartime visual culture, including government posters, print 
advertisements, and cartoons.3  The name “Rosie” developed as a popular colloquial 
designation for working women when a song titled Rosie the Riveter became a hit in 
March 1943.4  Written the previous year by Redd Evans and John Jacob Loeb, the 
accompanying sheet music cover for this tune depicted a thin and more feminine “Rosie” 
than Rockwell’s later version, thus providing an example of how contemporary 
depictions of working women differed (fig. 4.2).  In this image, rendered by an unknown 
artist, Rosie works happily with a much smaller rivet gun than that which appears in 
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Rockwell’s illustration.  The distorted musical notes that emanate from the aircraft she 
rivets suggest that the noise, or work she produces, may not be ideal.  Moreover, 
Rockwell’s later Post cover lacks the idealized sexual features of the sheet music Rosie, 
who has bright red lips, long eyelashes, and clothing that emphasizes her slim waist and 
breasts.  As with many other examples of sheet music illustrations, this image exhibits 
some differences from the song’s lyrics.  While the cover figure displays sexualized 
physical attributes, the song’s words emphasize the patriotism and capabilities of working 
women to succeed in the previously male-dominated realm of industrial labor.  The lyrics 
included the following:
All the day long, Whether rain or shine, 
She's a part of the assembly line.  
She's making history, Working for victory, Rosie the Riveter.  
Keeps a sharp lookout for sabotage, Sitting up there on the fuselage.  
That little girl will do more than a male will do....
There's something true about, 
Red, white, and blue about, Rosie the Riveter.
Song lyrics such as these, as well as Rockwell’s illustration, emphasized the strength and 
skill of the millions of female workers who held industrial jobs during the war.  
 The influx of women laborers drastically altered representations of working 
women, which quickly became one of the war’s most well-known and repeated visual 
tropes.5  Yet many contributions to the “Rosie the Riveter” mythology often overlooked 
significant details concerning the realities of wartime labor.  Most mass-produced 
representations of working women, in advertisements and government propaganda in 
particular, featured young, white, and attractive individuals.  Wartime labor statistics 
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show however, that women who worked during the war represented a decidedly more 
diverse group.  The proportion of African American women in industrial labor nearly 
tripled during the early 1940s, yet few depictions of female workers reveal this reality.6  
Additionally, while most female workers came from working class families and held 
similar positions before the war began, popular conceptions of “Rosie” often emphasized 
her middle class background and lack of previous work experience.7  Many women who 
pursued employment during the war did not work in factories at all, but in other fields 
ranging from public transportation to farm labor.  Finally, while women who worked 
during the war often wished to keep their job, the possibilities of postwar work decreased 
upon the return of servicemen following the Japanese surrender in 1945.
 Much of the visual rhetoric that strengthened the “Rosie” mythology developed 
from government efforts to encourage Americans to accept this cultural shift as a 
necessary condition of the war.  However, such promotions did not result from 
government propagandists alone, nor were they limited to scenes of factory workers.  
Beginning in 1943, the Office of War Information (OWI) combined efforts with the War 
Advertising Council (WAC), an advertising association, to encourage advertisers to 
depict women engaged in a range of jobs, not just industrial labor.8  Dubbed 
“Womanpower,” this campaign appeared across American culture, including women’s 
magazine advertisements, OWI posters, radio spots, film, popular fiction, and even a 
related exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in New York City.  As with 
several similar propaganda efforts, Womanpower represented a synthesis of corporate and 
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government interests designed to mold American opinion by utilizing multiple forms of 
modern media.  
 This chapter examines the evolving visual representation of female laborers 
during World War II.  The first section considers how art and advertising depicted the 
relationship between women and work in the early twentieth century.  The second section 
analyzes how the wartime influx of “Rosies” into the labor force reframed popular 
notions of female workers.  Besides government posters, this analysis also addresses 
“Rosie” themed ads from widely read women’s magazines such as Good Housekeeping.9  
The third section examines how the OWI worked collaboratively with advertisers through 
the WAC to encourage American women to participate in the war effort, a goal the 
government would not have achieved as effectively without corporate assistance.  The 
fourth section addresses how the OWI/WAC alliance used the Womanpower campaign to 
modify the “Rosie the Riveter” mythology to encourage women to pursue jobs outside of 
industrial labor.  This section places additional emphasis on institutional forces that 
strengthened the Rosie mythology, including museum exhibitions.  
 As seen in the previously discussed “Rosie the Riveter” illustrations, depictions of 
female workers demonstrated various stylistic and conceptual details.  While Rockwell’s 
burly Rosie is notable for her strength and size, visual variations exhibited sexualized 
characteristics more in line with mainstream standards.10  The resulting diversity revealed 
that the wartime relationship between gender and labor represented a highly contested 
concept.  Nevertheless, as the war progressed advertising imagery placed an increasing 
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emphasis on women’s return to the domestic sphere and postwar consumer prosperity.  
This move relieved many social conservatives, who feared that wartime labor 
requirements would upset established gender roles in American culture.
Pre-War Images of Working Women 
 Wartime depictions of working women represented a distinct change from 
previously accepted conceptions of American femininity and labor.  To understand this 
shift, this section considers depictions of working women from the preceding years in art 
and popular culture.  Early twentieth-century American painters, including members of 
the Ash Can School such as John Sloan, often depicted the everyday lives of urban 
workers.  Sloan’s well-known Hairdresser’s Window (1907) takes the work of a 
beautician, shown here elevated above the crowd, as its overt theme (fig. 4.3).  By 
including details of the surrounding urban chaos, such as signage and various passing 
gawkers, Sloan suggested an interest beyond female laborers that extended to the 
complexities of modern vision.11  The differences between Sloan’s depictions of women 
in paintings and his political cartoons additionally complicates his interest in labor, as 
noted by the art historian Patricia Hills.12  Whereas Sloan’s paintings tended to suppress 
his socialist sympathies, his work for magazines such as The Masses often criticized the 
economic gap between the wealthy and the working poor.  For example, in a drawing that 
appeared on the cover of The Masses in March 1913, Sloan depicted two large, wealthy 
concert goers above the caption “The Unemployed” (fig. 4.4).  This caustic criticism of 
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the idle rich, shown here as heavy, ornately decorated caricatures, contrasted sharply with 
the working class scenes Sloan painted.
 Sloan’s prewar political cartoons exhibited strong similarities with work produced 
by modern painters during the 1930s.  As discussed in previous chapters, economic 
conditions during the Great Depression left many Americans struggling to find 
employment, and contemporary artists often addressed themes involving labor, including 
women’s roles.  At the time, office work offered female workers a rare opportunity for 
not only employment, but also a chance to receive promotions and job security.  
Numerous artists depicted women as office workers during the 1930s, including Reginald 
Marsh, whose Paramount Picture (1934) addressed the chasm in class realities amidst the 
Depression (fig. 4.5).  In this urban scene, Marsh placed two women near a movie theater 
entrance.  The woman at left, dressed in clothing suitable for office work, holds a folder 
overflowing with papers.  She stands alone, seemingly exhausted and dreaming, in front 
of a huge advertisement for Cleopatra, a 1934 film starring Claudette Colbert, whose 
heavily decorated visage appears in the image above.  To the right, a well-dressed and 
presumably wealthy woman stands with a man wearing a fedora.  Colbert’s elegant 
surroundings, costume dress, and handsome male costar contrast strongly with the office 
worker below, who clearly lives in a different reality than the wealthy woman at right.  
Marsh further distances the office worker and this woman in white by emphasizing the 
strong vertical architectural forms of the movie house.  The scene contrasts working class 
239
reality, Hollywood fantasy, and the ostentatious wealth of the rich to produce a sly 
commentary on class distinctions and urban life during the Depression.13 
 While Marsh noted the separation between idealized notions of femininity and a 
more sober reality, his friend Isabel Bishop painted female office workers that exhibited a 
more subdued, dignified tone.  As seen in Lunch Hour (1939), Bishop created scenes of 
young women in moments of private conversation (fig. 4.6).  Though likely in the middle 
of an urban setting, the background context appears blurred, a technique that focuses the 
viewer’s attention on the interaction between these two figures.  Both young women hold 
ice cream cones and seem in thoughtful conversation.  Dressed conservatively in attire 
appropriate for office work, these figures demonstrate Bishop’s tendency to depict young 
women as neither sexualized stereotypes or matrons.  As noted by the art historian Ellen 
Wiley Todd, many female office workers valued their jobs “not only because offices were 
quieter and cleaner than factories but also because office work provided a chance to get 
ahead,” even if promotion meant to the head of the stenography pool or in rare instances, 
to an executive status.14  Still, many women were clearly relegated to subordinate status 
in the office workplace.  For example, a 1935 Fortune article argued that a “woman’s 
intention to marry and her willingness to be directed by a man relieved her of the 
ambition that would have made a man restless in her job.”15  Thus, though such work 
provided income during tough economic times, women remained second-class 
employees.  
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 Artists active in federal art programs depicted women as laborers during the 1930s 
as well.  Painters on the Treasury Department’s Section of Fine Arts often included 
women working alongside men as equals in rural, idyllic scenes.16  Artists that 
participated in the Federal Art Project (FAP) and Works Progress Administration (WPA) 
such as Isaac Soyer depicted a more sobering reality.  In Employment Agency (1937), 
Soyer portrayed a melancholic African American woman surrounded by men waiting for 
unemployment assistance.17  Additionally, the Farm Security Administration (FSA) 
photographic survey documented working women during the era as well.  Discussed in 
previous chapters, this massive photographic archive included images of men and women 
suffering under difficult circumstances who either had no job, or were sharecroppers, day 
laborers, or other members of the economically disadvantaged working poor.  
Photographers such as Lewis Hine and Jacob Riis had set a precedent for such 
documentary images, yet the FSA project was unique for its range of topics, locations, 
and dissemination.18  Numerous examples from the archive depict working women, 
including photographs taken by Ben Shahn of African American women picking cotton in 
the South in October 1935 (fig. 4.7), and a series by Arthur Rothstein created in 1940 that 
documented a migratory labor camp in California where women worked in both domestic 
and farm labor.19  These examples display a sobering reality akin to that addressed by a 
handful of printmakers as well.  Though graphic artists often portrayed working class 
heroes as muscular men, urban female laborers also appeared in etchings and lithographs 
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during the Depression, including seamstresses (fig. 4.8), burlesque dancers, and 
occasionally, office workers.20 
 While many Depression-era artists depicted women as active laborers in 
unsentimental scenes resulting from social instability, interwar advertising largely 
avoided related issues.  Instead, ads featuring women often relied on sex appeal or sought 
to relate to female consumers’ budgetary concerns.  Both of these strategies resulted from 
larger changes to Victorian conceptions of American femininity that developed during the 
early twentieth century.  By the 1920s, middle class American women saw increased 
economic power as the result of women’s suffrage, passed in 1919, and a surge in the 
number of female workers outside the domestic sphere.21  Advertisers and manufacturers 
soon realized the importance of the “New Woman” identity that promoted an increased 
level of female influence in a male-dominant society.  The subsequent expansion of 
women’s purchasing power led to noticeable changes in advertising trends.  Although 
major department stores addressed female consumers beginning in the late 19th century, 
by the 1920s national advertisers began to regard women as “liberated, active, and 
desiring ‘consumers.’”22  Whereas many previous ads addressed either both genders, or 
men only, advertisers began displaying an increasing amount of content intended for 
female consumers alone.23
 Ads targeting middle class women whose primary responsibilities included 
domestic work developed distinct themes during the 1920s and 1930s.  The advertising 
historian Roland Marchand has noted that such ads often glamorized housework by 
242
aligning domestic labor with business management.  Such examples, prevalent during the 
1920s in particular, deemphasized the mundane aspects of domesticity by promoting 
housewives as executives who managed the home as a business enterprise.24  Other ads, 
including but not limited to those promoting home appliances, emphasized how modern 
conveniences provided domestic female laborers with an unprecedented amount of 
leisure time.  In many cases the product being advertised, and the labor associated with 
its use, was subordinated in order to depict a housewife enjoying her newfound free 
time.25  Acceptable leisure activities these ads depicted involved reading or spending time 
with children.  The possibility of pursuing a career outside the home was absent from 
these images.  
 While many advertisements emphasized women’s domestic roles, imagery that 
promoted luxury goods often featured an “idealized” female form that demonstrated the 
era’s fascination with Art Deco styles.  Though the women shown in such ads rarely if 
ever engaged in work, their bodies often became highly stylized in order to promote 
expensive goods sold to wealthy, and often male, consumers.  The idealized female form 
in the late 1920s and early 1930s appeared often in the work of the illustrator McClelland 
Barclay, whose print ads for General Motors featured the well-known “Fisher Body 
girl” (fig. 4.9).26  Though the term “body” in this popular phrase referenced the form of 
the Fisher brand automobile, few ads depicted a car.  Instead, the recurring theme of 
Barclay’s illustrations were thin, tall, and stylish women, shown in poses that accentuated 
their angular bodies.  The clothing, posture, and overall elegance of Barclay’s subjects 
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connoted their wealth, class, and sophistication.  While men sometimes appeared in 
similar advertisements, illustrators rarely contorted male bodies into “Art Deco figurines” 
as were women’s, which as Marchand notes, at times veered into abstracted forms.27 
 As the amount of advertising directed at women increased during the interwar 
years, so too did the importance of commercial photography.  Ads featuring photographic 
images increased during the 1920s, and by the 1930s photography became the dominant 
form of representation in advertising.28  Commercial photography typically varied 
between a “high art” aesthetic and documentary-style imagery.  Edward Steichen, a well-
known practitioner of glamor advertising, often used formalist methods such as cropping, 
dramatic points of view, and shadows to create a unique effect.29  Steichen’s work, as 
with other photographers, often aligned female bodies with advertised goods to portray 
both woman and product as desirable commodities (fig. 4.10).30  Other photographers 
created more direct, less “artistic” imagery that evoked either store displays, or suggested 
a domestic scene where a problem is solved easily by the product advertised.  
 These and similar 1930s advertisements featuring women shared few similarities 
with images of “Rosie” and her fellow wartime laborers.  Most obviously, representations 
of female workers during the war often engaged in “manly” professions that required the 
strength, skills, and mechanical know-how that 1930s stereotypes exhibited rarely.  
Similarly, wartime working women such as Rockwell’s Rosie were sometimes shown 
with large, physically imposing bodies that did not conform to idealized standards 
promoted in ads such as those by Barclay.  Furthermore, the polished style and humorous 
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content used by Rockwell and other commercial illustrators represented a far cry from 
modern artists such as Marsh and Bishop, whose work evoked the Ash Can School 
painters in their content and style.  Still, Rockwell’s Rosie did have a direct connection to 
the history of art.  As pointed out by the Kansas City Star shortly after the Post printed 
Rosie, Rockwell borrowed his subject’s pose from Michelangelo’s depiction of the 
prophet Isaiah, a 1510 fresco located on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel (fig. 4.11).  As 
noted by the art historian Melissa Dabakis, both images suggest a sexually androgynous 
figure.31  The ambiguous relationship between gender, sexuality, and labor seen in 
Rockwell’s Rosie alludes to larger issues concerning depictions of wartime workers in 
commercial, federal, and modern art imagery.  The following section addresses these 
differences, which often challenged women’s established roles in American society.
The “New Amazons” in Visual Culture
 The U.S. entry into World War II challenged numerous cultural standards related 
to labor and gender.  Military enlistment drained the number of available male workers, 
and unemployment levels plummeted.  As a result, millions of women soon entered the 
workforce.  These laborers represented a diverse group: 56% of women workers were 
married, and while a small majority were between twenty and forty-four years old, as 
many as one-third were under twenty.32  Many women relocated to pursue new jobs, as 
increased efforts in American manufacturing led to “boom towns” springing up across the 
country.  This transition often presented problems, as few communities demonstrated 
adequate housing, childcare, and health services to provide for sudden population growth. 
245
 Not all Americans welcomed these cultural shifts.  Critics feared female workers 
presented a hazard to themselves and to their coworkers, as women were not thought to 
possess the skill or strength to perform at the same level as their male counterparts.  
Others feared the physically demanding characteristics of industrial work would lead to 
the decline of American femininity, and ultimately to a decrease in women’s interest in 
traditional duties such as childcare and homemaking.  Critics also charged that large 
numbers of working women contributed to tangential social ills.  For example, 
editorialists argued that the large number of working women led to truancy and roving 
gangs of underage troublemakers.33  Finally, sexist opinions held by both genders 
characterized employment at any level as unladylike, a sentiment that discouraged many 
women from working during the war.34 
 The journalist Max Lerner criticized these and related fears in a 1943 article titled 
“The New Amazons” that appeared in the New York daily PM.  After visiting a factory in 
Ohio, Lerner noted that the diverse groups of working women he observed not only 
performed capably, but also embraced their work enthusiastically.  He argued that for 
many women, “slacks have become a badge of honor” and that in their work uniforms, 
female laborers were scarcely “distinguished from men.”  Although he admitted many 
regional communities lacked adequate housing and services for the flood of new workers, 
Lerner pointed out that critics’ fears concerning the abilities of the “New Amazons” were 
unfounded: “The traditional maidenly modesty, I am told, shows signs of cracking.  A 
group of girls coming out of a war factory behaves very much like a gang of young 
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fellows... there is a new type of tough girl emerging, although still in a minority; she can 
outdrink, outswear, outswagger the men.”  Lerner closed on a hopeful note by speculating 
that wartime labor conditions might lead to the end of antiquated gender standards that 
only allowed women “to show off her husband’s or father’s wealth by conspicuous 
consumption, and to prove his leisure by proxy.”35  Lerner thus alluded to the possibility 
that the needs of wartime labor might contribute to women realizing a more socially 
progressive postwar era.
 Supporters noted female workers had numerous reasons to relish their roles in the 
war effort.  Factories offered good money, and freedom from financial worries that low-
paying “women’s jobs” typically carried.  These “New Amazons” often found industrial 
work a collegial adventure akin to, albeit in different circumstances, that which the men 
of their generation experienced.  Furthermore, government propagandists and advertisers 
promoted working as a noble activity, and many women found that the war gave work a 
patriotic element it would have lacked otherwise.  Working outside the home also 
provided some women with an opportunity to avoid what one scholar characterized as 
“the boredom of mothers” during the excitement of the war.36  Still, while Lerner’s essay 
alluded to the newfound freedom many women realized in the wartime workplace, 
entrenched standards concerning women’s sexuality and appearance remained.  As one 
commentator noted, women still desired to “remain pretty and feminine For the Boys, to 
boost their morale and give them Something to Fight For, preserving herself—the Home 
Front—exactly as he remembered it, for her guy, when he came home.”37  Thus, many 
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women workers maintained their feminine sexuality through established cultural 
practices while engaging simultaneously with physically challenging “man’s” work.
 Wartime depictions of working women in visual culture varied between 
displaying an affinity with the “New Amazons” and more established gender stereotypes.  
Whereas Rockwell’s Rosie displayed features not aligned with the stereotypical ideal, 
other images portrayed female laborers that adhered more closely to established 
standards.  Examples appeared in a variety of spaces, including a poster designed by J. 
Howard Miller for Westinghouse manufacturing (fig. 4.12).  This poster, one of the more 
iconic (and appropriated) images from the war, shows a young and confident woman 
aggressively rolling up her sleeves while confronting the viewer with a flexed bicep.  Her 
declaration, “We can do it!” plainly states her positive spirit.  Shown only from the waist 
up, she wears a red kerchief with white polka dots, which, along with her blue shirt, 
completes a patriotic color combination.
 Though both exhibit strong, capable workers, Miller’s design displays significant 
differences next to Rockwell’s Rosie.  Perhaps most clearly, Miller’s “We Can Do It” 
poster depicts a woman who possesses a more obviously idealized beauty.  Though 
clearly challenging prevailing notions of feminine passivity, Miller’s worker 
simultaneously exhibits an awareness of popular styles through her prominently dark 
eyelashes, finely drawn eyebrows, polished nails, full, ruby lips, and high, rouged 
cheeks.38  Contrastingly, Rockwell’s Rosie is a much larger woman who seems unaware 
of, or unconcerned with, contemporary fashion and the viewer’s gaze.  Besides these 
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formal differences, the spaces these images inhabited also contributed to their cultural 
significance.  While Rockwell’s Rosie appeared on the cover of the Post and thus entered 
the homes of millions across the nation, Miller’s poster saw a much smaller audience, as 
it hung in Westinghouse factories for just over two weeks.39 
 The images created by Miller and Rockwell, while clearly supportive of women 
workers, also demonstrated a distance from the actual labor performed.  Contrastingly, 
government posters tended to emphasize the relationship between women and the act of 
labor.  For example, a U.S. Bureau of Employment Security poster released in 1943 
shows a woman drilling through a piece of metal connected to an unidentifiable structure 
(fig. 4.13).  Her hair is covered by a red kerchief, and she wears blue coveralls with white 
gloves, a combination that creates a colorfully patriotic uniform.  Though the tightly 
cropped scene gives few clues as to the type of labor the woman performs specifically, 
this “Rosie” is shown hard at work, unaware of the viewer.  The poster thus emphasizes 
the woman’s skill as a laborer and knowledge of industrial equipment.  Still, though she 
seems intent and capable in her job, the text above, which states “Do the job HE left 
behind,” reminds the viewer this woman replaced a male worker.  A second example, 
distributed in 1943 by the War Manpower Commission, combines an OWI photograph 
with text (fig. 4.14).  As with the previous example, this worker seems unaware of the 
viewer’s presence.  In this case however, the entire background context has been removed 
from the original OWI photograph taken a year earlier by Howard Hollem.  The original 
image depicted a woman working at a toy factory converted to produce flare casings in 
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New Haven, Connecticut (fig 4.15).40  By eliminating the photograph’s background, the 
poster designer reinforced the work performed capably by the woman shown.  The 
surrounding text in the poster states “Women in the war... We can’t win without them.”  
In this case the necessity of female workers is stated outright, and the absent male laborer 
goes unmentioned.
 Graphics that depicted women in command of mechanical tools represented a 
distinct shift from promotions created during the previous World War.  During that 
conflict, American propaganda posters rarely depicted women as workers, and more often 
emphasized women’s sexuality, portrayed female figures allegorically, or cast women as 
helpless creatures in need of defending.  The highly successful commercial illustrator 
Howard Chandler Christy’s recruitment posters during the late 1910s often included a 
seductively posed woman with a come-hither expression next to statements such as “I 
want you for the Navy” (fig. 1.4).  Such examples used established stereotypes of 
feminine sexuality similar to those seen in Barclay’s “Fisher body” ads.  A more 
allegorical example from World War I is seen in J.C. Leyendecker’s “USA Bonds” poster 
that featured Columbia being handed a sword by a kneeling Boy Scout (fig. 4.16).  
Dressed in a large American flag that nearly covers her body, Leyendecker’s Columbia 
wears a seven-spiked crown similar to that worn by the Statue of Liberty.  She 
additionally holds a giant shield featuring an eagle seemingly borrowed from the U.S. 
presidential seal.  In this context Columbia serves both as the nation’s symbol and 
defender, a message connoted by her weary though vigilant gaze and the large sword she 
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receives from the kneeling Boy Scout in the foreground.  The young man’s action of 
providing “weapons for liberty,” noted at the poster’s bottom frame, serves as a subtle 
reference to the Boy Scouts’s wartime bond selling activities.41  Finally, many World War 
I posters featured women as either the victim of foreign troops (portrayed usually as 
“savages”), or as grieving mothers.42 
 Conversely, depictions of working women appeared throughout American culture 
during World War II.  Hollywood films addressed variations on the “Rosie” theme often, 
and even criticized those who spoke ill of female workers.  The 1944 MGM picture Since 
You Went Away, an epic directed by John Cromwell whose production the OWI monitored 
enthusiastically, presents such an example (fig. 4.17).43  Starring Claudette Colbert, 
Joseph Cotton, and Shirley Temple, Since You Went Away received nine Oscar 
nominations.  The plot followed the wartime experience of a wife and her two adolescent 
daughters whose husband and father was fighting in Europe.  Besides the predictable 
melodrama and casual racism, the film featured a wealthy female character played by 
Agnes Moorehead who patronized the black market and spent lavishly amidst calls for 
austerity.  In one highly charged scene, Moorehead declares her staunch opposition to 
newly employed women.  As with real-life critics, Moorehead’s character bemoans 
female war workers for what she fears will result in a decline of American femininity.  
Her caustic, ignorant comments are rebuked by Colbert, whose character worked part-
time in a factory.  Other Hollywood films encouraged audiences to support working 
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women in more lighthearted musicals, including Rosie the Riveter, a 1944 feature from 
Republic Pictures.44
 Similar support appeared in newspaper cartoons that used humor to encourage the 
acceptance of the female labor force.  Typical examples addressed the difficulties of 
childcare and unexpected occurrences between coworkers of different genders.  In one 
example by Richard Taylor, a male welder remarks to a coworker: “You know, Bud, I’m 
glad we have no danged women working on this job” (fig. 4.18).  His fellow welder at 
right, hard at work, provides no response, but her high heels reveal her coworker’s 
ignorance.  These cartoons often played on established stereotypes concerning women’s 
sexuality and fashion.  One example featured a female worker speaking to another about 
an unforeseen but welcome byproduct of her new job: “I lost twenty pounds and the men 
are whistling at me again.”  Another cartoon, drawn by Daniel “Alain” Brustlein, 
depicted the results of a competition between male and female factory workers (fig. 
4.19).  Here Brustlein, who began contributing cartoons to the New Yorker in 1935, 
showed a group of female workers explaining to an astonished man in the foreground 
that: “We just settled a little argument about women’s ability to turn out ammunition.”  
While these women stand proud and relaxed, a group of male workers, recently bested by 
their coworkers, appear in the background in various states of pain and embarrassment.  
Though Brustlein’s cartoon acknowledged women’s abilities to perform capably, 
common stereotypes also appear, including the manner in which two women apply 
makeup nonchalantly.  Finally, as noted by the accompanying caption, Brustlein drew this 
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cartoon for the OWI, which encouraged cartoonists to create war-themed imagery 
through a publication titled The Graphic Artists’ Newsletter.  With this periodic mailer, 
sent to cartoonists directly, the OWI made specific thematic suggestions that later 
reappeared in newspapers, magazines, and other printed material during the war.45  
 Popular magazines also addressed the “New Amazons” in editorials, short fiction, 
advertising, photography, and various other imagery.  A particularly noteworthy example 
appeared in the June 5, 1944 edition of Life magazine.  This issue included paintings of 
female factory workers by Edna Reindel, a graduate of the Pratt Institute who during the 
1930s worked as a commercial illustrator, participated in WPA art programs, and 
exhibited at the Whitney Museum of American Art and the Metropolitan Museum of Art.  
Reindel’s  paintings for Life appeared under the headline “Women at War,” and resulted 
from her own observations of factory workers (fig. 4.20).  This series began in 1943, 
when Reindel wrote Life inquiring as to the possibility of contributing paintings of female 
laborers.  After securing the assignment, she observed working women at a Lockheed 
Aircraft plant in California.  The final Life layout included photographs of Reindel 
sketching while inside the factory, and noted that these paintings were currently on 
display at the Macbeth Gallery in New York.46 
 Reindel’s series offered a documentary approach akin to the government posters 
discussed previously while also contributing additional details.  For example, Life 
included captions providing the names and brief biographical information on the women 
Reindel depicted, as well as technical notes on the work they performed.  Reindel’s 
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paintings varied in that some emphasized individual women, while others showed women 
working together (fig. 4.21).  She also created scenes of women working with interracial 
and male employees as well.  Moreover, Reindel’s women, though hard at work, were 
shown in a dignified manner that emphasized their capabilities and placed little interest in 
their sexuality.  Unlike Miller’s “We can do it” poster, each of the women shown seems 
oblivious to the viewer, and instead focuses intensely on her work.  Additionally, 
although Life had begun featuring series of war-themed paintings by artists such as Paul 
Sample, Reindel’s series was the first spread that focused primarily on not only women, 
but also on industrial labor.47
 Reindel’s methodology of observing laborers before depicting how each worker 
contributed to a larger process shared affinities with that employed by Diego Rivera in 
his well known Detroit Industry (1932-3) murals.  Commissioned by Detroit’s civic 
leaders including the Ford family at the Detroit Institute of the Arts, Rivera’s series 
addressed the process of automotive creation in the midst of the Depression.  However, 
while Reindel emphasized the role of female workers, Rivera marginalized women either 
to the mural’s edges or portrayed them as allegorical figures.  In the only panel to show 
female laborers, located at the upper left corner of the south wall, Rivera depicted a scene 
of office workers in rows on either side of a male administrator (fig. 4.22).  Reindel’s 
canvases clearly did not have the monumental size or generate the political controversy 
that surrounded much of Rivera’s life and work, yet it is worth noting the similar 
naturalistic style and observational method employed by both artists.  Additionally, 
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Reindel and Rivera emphasized the relationship between workers and machinery by 
depicting each laborer as a unique, capable contributor to a larger operation.  This 
approach provided not only a humanity to the workers shown, but also allowed viewers a 
glimpse of the manufacturing process.48
 The dignity and individuality Reindel granted her subjects contrasted with most 
other magazine imagery, particularly advertising, which often depicted female war 
workers with stereotypical, sexualized characteristics.  Magazine ads rarely featured 
women as large, “unfeminine,” “New Amazon” types as seen in Rockwell’s Rosie, and 
instead emphasized female beauty rather than the labor they performed.  For example, a 
Pan-American Coffee Bureau ad in the May 1944 issue of Good Housekeeping depicted 
two female factory workers on their break (fig. 4.23).  The copy reads “for extra energy 
on the job... have another cup!”  The accompanying image provides several signifiers that 
the job these women are employed at is industrial, and likely related to the war.  For 
example, the women both wear coveralls, their hair is up and covered, they hold metal 
food containers, and the background includes machinery.  Furthermore, both figures wear 
buttons of the type that typically carried patriotic messages.  While such details refer to a 
wartime factory environment, these women could hardly be referred to as “Amazons.”  
Both women clearly wear makeup, and are petite and attractive.  Furthermore, they grin 
at each other while sharing coffee, an “acceptable” female activity that distances them 
from such “masculine” surroundings.49
255
 Other ads modified the non-Amazon war worker theme by using more than one 
image.  In another example from Good Housekeeping, from January 1944, a female war 
worker promoted Ponds Cold Cream (fig. 4.24).  The large center photo depicted a 
woman in coveralls, holding a drill, with her hair up and covered.  Shown smiling 
broadly while facing the viewer, the model seems to have paused momentarily from her 
work.  In another photo in the lower left, the same woman appears as a more alluring, 
domestic type, now dressed in conservative clothing with her hair no longer hidden 
behind a kerchief.  The copy at right, which reads “She’s engaged, she’s lovely, she uses 
Ponds,” reinforces the notion that “Rosie” could be feminine and desirable in addition to 
a factory worker.  Such advertising provided a counter argument to critics who charged 
that women’s employment in factories would leave them unattractive and undesirable.  
 Advertisements such as these that displayed attractive, young women happily 
engaged in various types of war work benefited manufacturers, advertisers, and the 
government.  Working women could look at such imagery as a validation of their 
sacrifice, while those who had yet to find a war job might be encouraged to become 
“Rosies” themselves.  Furthermore, corporate ads and government propaganda 
encouraged women to participate in the war effort while also attempting to convince 
Americans this deviation from cultural norms represented an acceptable wartime 
sacrifice.  Significantly however, the flood of such imagery did not occur organically.  In 
fact, many advertisers participated in a campaign organized by the OWI intended to 
strengthen the public’s acceptance of women in the labor force.  Before analyzing the 
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implementation and visual characteristics of this campaign, the following section 
examines the significance of American advertisements, particularly in magazines, as 
carriers of culturally powerful ideologies.
Women’s Magazine Advertising and the OWI
 Women’s magazines represented a key platform for advertisers to exhibit their 
support for the war while also addressing female consumers.  Before examining how the 
OWI and corporate advertisers collaborated to generate imagery featuring working 
women, the following section first considers the role of magazines in American consumer 
culture.  Relatively scarce in the early 19th century, magazines became more common 
around 1885, when printing technology improved and postal costs decreased.50  At this 
time, the role of magazines began evolving from journals that provided primarily 
literature, news, opinion, and advice, to carriers of a wider range of entertainment and 
advertising.51  While American magazines had long included advertising, after the Civil 
War ads appeared in large numbers.52  By the early 20th century, publishers’ increasing 
reliance on advertisements changed the content of magazines drastically.  Advertising 
became so institutionalized that major advertising agencies began using magazines to 
promote their own services, and not just the products of their clients.53  A business model 
soon developed whereby magazine publishers sustained a loss on subscriptions and 
newsstand purchases and relied primarily on advertisements for income.  By the early 
1920s, a magazine publisher could be considered a success if his publication took in 
$200,000,000 a year in ads alone.54  Magazine advertising expanded during the first three 
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decades of the 20th century and eventually swelled to the corpulent December 7, 1929 
issue of the Saturday Evening Post, which at 272 pages weighed almost 2 pounds, and 
contained mostly ads.55  The national influence of magazines continued to expand during 
the Depression as subscription numbers increased along with advances in photographic 
technology.56  By 1938, the popularity of magazines in the U.S. led a contemporary 
journalism professor to quip that “magazines are as much a commonplace in America as 
neckties.”57
 During the early 1940s, magazine advertisers and publishers began using the war 
to solidify the industry’s cultural and economic influence.  Evidence of this strategy 
appeared early in the war in the pages of a booklet created by the National Publisher’s 
Association, a magazine industry group.  Featuring quotes from George Washington and 
Thomas Jefferson extolling the value of “journals,” this brochure, titled Magazines and 
the War, argued that building morale through print media was a key component to 
winning the fight abroad.  According to the unnamed author, victory could only be 
achieved through psychological forces in the media such as magazines, newspapers and 
radio.  The author noted that: “Like members of a bomber’s crew, these forces are highly 
specialized.  Success depends upon enabling each to function to the utmost.  Anything 
less would impede victory.”58  Although this brochure acknowledged other media, it 
argued staunchly for magazines as a critical platform for analysis with comments such as: 
“We need our newspapers for the news, but we need our magazines for interpreting the 
news” (p. 3).  However, the author also noted that in addition to their analytical value, 
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magazines demonstrated a “nationalizing influence” that homogenized America culture 
and “made the nation stronger” (p. 4-5).  
 By conveniently avoiding how this “nationalizing influence” also gave advertisers 
a powerful promotional platform, the brochure’s author downplayed one of the most 
fundamental changes in modern American publishing.  As magazine historian Theodore 
Peterson notes, on the eve of World War II, publishers were no longer interested in the 
reader as such.  Instead, publishers became “interested in the reader as a consumer of the 
advertiser’s goods and services... As a specialist in groups of consumers, the magazine 
publisher became a part of the whole system of marketing in the United States...”59  As 
marketing strategists began identifying which groups held cultural influence and potential 
for capital distribution, key consumer demographics emerged.  Magazine publishers and 
their advertisers increasingly sought to address women, particularly middle class white 
women, whose purchasing power increased during the era.  Not surprisingly, female 
magazine readers became a key demographic that advertisers, and the OWI, sought to 
address.60 
 While the OWI did not create magazines intended for domestic distribution, the 
agency did develop a method to communicate with magazine editors that allowed 
government propagandists to influence the content of popular publications.61  To reach 
specific demographics, including female magazine readers, the OWI established a 
Magazine Section, whose Chief, Dorothy Ducas, was one of the agency’s only female 
department heads.  Providing plot lines for magazine fiction represented one of the 
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primary goals of Ducas’s Section.  The process of generating this content was outlined by 
Gardner Cowles, the OWI Domestic Bureau Chief, in a memo written in 1942.  
According to Cowles, a publisher himself, the Magazine Section was the “central clearing 
house for magazine material connected with the war.  Through this Magazine Section the 
Information Divisions of all Government agencies are able to obtain wider magazine 
coverage of subjects which are timely rather than by scattered efforts...”62  The OWI thus 
acted as both a sponge that collected data from other government agencies, and a filter 
that distributed information to publishers.  To provide content efficiently the OWI 
developed its Magazine War Guide, a publication that, Cowles noted, editors followed 
closely as a “check-list of subject matter relating to the war and suitable for their 
magazines.’”63  Edited by Ducas, the OWI sent the Magazine War Guide to 548 magazine 
editors, 940 writers, and 237 government information officers monthly.  According to 
OWI records, it suggested “appropriate war information for magazines three months in 
the future,” and thereby influenced content seen by as many as 100 million readers during 
the war.64 
 As the relationship between the OWI and magazines solidified, the agency 
regarded the publishing industry as an increasingly valuable collaborator in the 
dissemination of information.  Writing in an interoffice memo, Colwes noted that 
magazines spread details of the war that “cannot be conveyed to the public as fully or as 
impressively by newspapers and radio.  All the problems of the home front... are made 
real by the treatment they receive in magazines.”  The OWI thus strengthened its 
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relationship with magazine publishers to benefit both parties.  As Cowles noted: 
“magazine publishers and editors have come to look upon the OWI as their guiding 
governmental source for war material.  Therefore they feel OWI, which knows all they 
are doing, will wish to protect their interests...”65  It must be acknowledged, however, that 
the OWI’s Magazine War Guide did not determine advertising content per se.  Instead, 
this small but influential publication had a more direct impact in magazine editorials and 
short stories.  For example, the historian Maureen Honey has explained how much of the 
literary content the OWI directed to female magazine readers appeared in romantic 
fiction.66  Through the Magazine War Guide, the OWI suggested plot lines that typically 
incorporated aspects of life on the home front, such as rationing or the black market, 
along with predictable tales of romance.   
 Just as magazine fiction incorporated war themes into story lines, advertisers also 
wove the war into promotional imagery.  Regardless of the product sold, magazine 
audience, or the advertiser’s relationship to the OWI, many wartime ads carried one of 
two different themes, as noted by advertising historian Cynthia Henthorn.67  The first type 
of ad, known as “reconversion narratives,” explained to consumers that specific materials 
used in the production of domestic goods may be scarce as a result of the war.  Through 
this technique, manufacturers kept brand names in the public’s mind while also appearing 
patriotic by promoting their conversion from producers of civilian goods to military 
equipment.  For example, the March 1943 issue of Good Housekeeping featured an ad 
from Scovill Manufacturing, which during peacetime produced fasteners for clothing (fig. 
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4.25).  The ad depicted a stylized drawing of a woman mending a button on a pair of long 
underwear while sitting in a pile of clothes.  The copy stated that “It’s no fun...  but its 
Patriotic!” The text below noted that Scovill “is making all kinds of war materials for 
Uncle Sam.  As a result... much of the metal intended for Gripper fasteners is going into 
armaments.”  In this case, instead of using a Scovill product, the woman shown applies 
the more time consuming method of sewing without the fastener mentioned in the text.  
Such “reconversion narratives” celebrated the patriotism of both producers, through the 
production of military goods, and consumers, in their acknowledgement and 
understanding of the scarcity of raw materials.
 The second technique advertisers employed featured a “mobilization narrative.”  
These ads attempted to inform and motivate consumers on how they should change their 
habits as a result of the war.  For example, a lack of raw materials required tire 
manufacturers to use advertising space to stress basic preventive maintenance.68  Not 
surprisingly, a variation of these ads often promised a “brighter tomorrow” in the postwar 
world.  As seen in a General Electric ad from the Saturday Evening Post in 1943, many 
ads depicted a young couple, typically with a man in uniform, dreaming of owning a 
home after the war (fig. 4.26).  Such examples encouraged readers to purchase war bonds 
as a means of ensuring a new, modern home fully furnished with GE products.  In such 
examples, “mobilization” meant investing in bonds and postponing goals relating to 
family and homeownership.69
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 At times the two concepts of “mobilization” and “reconversion” became blurred 
in ads that exhibited little if any association with the product being advertised.  For 
example, a strange American Locomotive ad featured a photograph of three young 
American women standing in a line up before a group of Nazi officers above the caption 
“A High Honor for Your Daughter” (fig. 4.27).  The ad copy explains the Nazis promoted 
“selective breeding,” and that years from now, the Nazis “may ship American girls to 
some far corner of the earth... may select your daughter... if you relax, if you fail to do 
your part now.”  While the ad implores the reader to take vague action to support the war, 
it makes no effort to tie Nazi breeding practices to railroads.  Furthermore, images such 
as this portrayed women as passive, potential victims, and not active participants in the 
war.  Many advertisements similarly shifted from simply promoting goods to addressing 
fears and ideologies related to the war.70 
 While advertisers addressed the war eagerly, developing a system by which 
government propagandists and advertising agencies communicated effectively proved a 
difficult task.  Government debates over the use of advertisements in the war effort began 
before the OWI’s establishment.  The agency’s predecessors, including the OFF, 
considered using ads to distribute federally approved messages, but little progress had 
been made, even after the American entry into the war.71  William Lewis, an OFF/OWI 
administrator and former executive at CBS, described early efforts to synthesize 
government messages and corporate imagery in a confidential memo written in May 
1942.  Composed a few weeks before the establishment of the OWI, Lewis here 
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addressed the unique opportunity and challenges of war-themed advertising.  Sent to Ken 
Dyke, Advertising Chief at OFF, Lewis’s letter outlined a collaborative strategy between 
corporate advertisers and the federal government.  He began by noting the power of 
advertising and suggesting its application for the war effort:
The important part which American Advertising and advertising men can 
play in the successful carrying out of psychological warfare needs no 
sales presentation or detailed analysis here.  The facts are obvious.  
Advertising has been a major motivating factor in influencing our 
people’s habits, actions and thinking in times of peace.  Properly directed 
along the same lines of orderly procedure which govern its successful 
commercial use, it can and will become a major factor in carrying out the 
government’s wartime objectives.72
Lewis then sketched a plan where federal agencies would collaborate with advertisers to 
create ads with dual messages: one message for the commercial advertiser, and one for 
the government.  He warned however, that the resulting ads “must be designed not to 
interfere with the effectiveness of the advertiser’s own selling story.  There must be a 
natural, unforced ‘marriage of ideas’ between the advertising message and the 
government ‘rider.’”73  This “rider,” or connoted government message, would supplement 
the advertiser’s own message, ideally forming a symbiotic relationship.  Developing an 
efficient method of generating, then inserting these “riders” proved complicated, as 
officials feared Americans would regard overt government influence in advertising as 
unacceptable.  
 This situation raised serious questions concerning the relationship between 
industry and government.  Lewis’s comments reveal that government officials recognized 
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that Americans did not wholeheartedly trust the government’s ability to disseminate 
objective information.  At the same time, officials acknowledged corporate advertising as 
an acceptable vehicle for the distribution of messages that might otherwise be delivered 
through blatant government propaganda.  The apparent distrust of government 
information agencies highlights one of the overarching trends of not only this chapter, but 
this entire dissertation: namely, the gradual dismantling of the New Deal and with it, the 
rise of public wariness concerning the government’s role in public policy at the benefit of 
corporate interests.74  Whereas Roosevelt had cultivated the belief among many 
Americans that the federal government had a benevolent mission to work “for the 
people,” Lewis’s comments, made in this case in the middle of the war, allude to a 
postwar climate that encouraged the growth of big business as a necessary and highly 
patriotic endeavor.  Certainly most Americans at the time likely regarded corporate 
advertising for what it was: nonobjective promotional content.  Yet as scholars such as 
Lizabeth Cohen have shown, the underlying theme of many ads, during and after the war, 
promoted not only a product, but also a consumerist ideology that encouraged 
consumption as highly patriotic.75 
 While the growing power of pro-corporate, consumer ideology represented a 
significant shift from the 1930s, several obstacles blocked the advertising industry’s 
efforts to strengthen their influence in U.S. society during the war.  As noted in previous 
chapters, many Americans still expressed a weariness over any form of pro-war 
propaganda following the over-heated rhetoric employed during World War I.  
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Advertisers faced a greater concern, however, in a dedicated consumerist movement that 
grew in strength during the Great Depression.  The previous decade hurt not only 
consumers but big business as well, as many Americans regarded excessive spending on 
advertising during the 1920s as a primary cause of later economic turmoil.  Critics of 
advertisements (and big business in general) included Helmuth Engelbrecht and Frank 
Hanighen, whose 1934 book Merchants of Death became well-known for its attack on 
what the authors saw as general corporate greed and war profiteering in arms production 
before, during, and after World War I.  Similar themes appeared in the pages of The New 
Masses, which in October 1935 printed a lithograph by Mabel Dwight that addressed 
these issues directly (fig. 4.28).  Titled Merchants of Death, Dwight’s image depicts a 
skeletal bandleader, complete with baton and shako headgear, leading a group of portly, 
well-dressed, capitalist leaders of industry.  Though the figures directly behind the 
skeleton are human, near the back of the line they transform into vultures, a reference to 
corporate greed.76  The consumerist movement sought to diminish the related 
consolidation of capital by proposing government regulations designed to limit corporate 
industry’s influence in modern media, which critics characterized as excessive and 
unnecessary.77  According to Henthorn, these efforts “weakened the ideological 
foundations of the Machine Age and corroded the authority of its institutional presence in 
American thought and life.”78  Thus, by the early 1940s the advertising industry was 
largely on the defensive against what it regarded as hostile, misinformed, and “un-
American” activists.
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 In response, corporate leaders complained that constraints to big business and 
advertising stemmed from federal policies pushed by the Roosevelt administration.  
Specifically, the Office of Price Administration (OPA) developed a reputation as the 
business community’s primary foe.  Established in August 1941, the OPA was headed by 
Leon Henderson, one of Roosevelt’s strongest allies during the 1930s and a vocal 
proponent of government regulations on business.  Designed to administer and maintain a 
system of rationing and price controls, the OPA arguably influenced the everyday lives of 
more civilians than any other government agency.  OPA oversaw rationing coupon 
programs, established price settings for products from food to clothing, monitored 
markets nationwide, and enlisted nearly a quarter of a million employees and 
volunteers.79  Due to his support for regulated markets, Henderson’s appointment as OPA 
chief received harsh criticism from business leaders who feared that government 
oversight would limit future growth and restrict advertising’s ability to encourage 
spending.   
 While many business executives feared that government restrictions would 
impede economic recovery during the early 1940s, a surprising champion of the 
advertising industry soon emerged.  The turning point came in the fall of 1941 when the 
OPA’s Henderson addressed a crowd of 700 advertising professionals at a joint 
conference of the Association of National Advertisers and the American Association of 
Advertising Agencies in Hot Springs, Virginia.  Before his speech, Henderson’s 
appointment generated fears in the business community that the government would 
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restrict advertising during the war, according to an Editor and Publisher editorial, “on the 
ground that [advertising] will not be needed to place a diminishing supply of consumer 
goods in civilian hands...”80  Though generally regarded as highly suspect in his attitudes 
towards advertising, in a surprise reversal Henderson’s speech at Hot Springs 
“completely won over his audience and [he] received an ovation...”81  Instead of 
promoting federal restrictions, Henderson called for more of the “right kind of 
advertising,” as he felt such promotions were the cheapest method of expanding the 
economy.82  Encouraged to increase wartime advertising efforts, big business soon began 
regarding the war as an opportunity to regain the public’s favor after the Depression, New 
Deal, and consumerist movement of the 1930s by providing patriotic imagery.83 
 Buoyed by Henderson’s favorable speech, advertising leaders began organizing 
their efforts to use the war as a vehicle to promote the ad industry.  The results of their 
cooperative efforts led to the founding of the War Advertising Council (WAC).  First 
known as the Advertising Council, this agency was unofficially formed in January 1942 
and established formally in March.  Headed by Chester La Roche, Chairman of Young & 
Rubicom, a major ad agency, the WAC consisted of a volunteer group of ad executives 
and commercial artists.  The Council’s stated purposes included the use of advertising to 
inform Americans of the needs associated with the nation’s first “Total War,” a modern 
form of warfare that required the involvement and sacrifice of all citizens.  In its 
campaign literature, the WAC argued that only advertising could “tell the story simply, 
clearly, and get the job done quickly.”84  The “job” this group sought to accomplish 
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included encouraging advertisers to engage directly with the war effort.  Thanks in large 
part to the WAC, by the middle of 1942 the number of magazine advertisements featuring 
war themes increased dramatically.  According to advertising historian Ingre Stole, 
“between May and September of 1942... 40 percent of all [magazine] ads contained some 
sort of war appeal.”85  This rise resulted not only from the public’s increasing acceptance 
of such imagery, but also due to the work of the WAC.
 The OWI formally recognized the WAC as its major liaison with the ad industry 
in August 1942.  Together, these agencies generated imagery to support specific 
campaigns developed by the OWI that ranged from labor to rationing.  The major point of 
contact between the WAC and the OWI was through the OWI’s Bureau of Campaigns.  
This office, headed by Ken Dyke, formerly an advertising executive at Colgate-
Palmolive, established several methods to communicate with advertisers.86  One of the 
earliest was through the OWI’s War Advertising Guide, a publication which, according to 
government records:
included the many Government war campaigns and will indicate how 
best these campaign themes can be utilized by thousands of local and 
national advertisers.  This publication will have a circulation of 
approximately 20,000 including advertisers, agencies, department store 
execs, advertising clubs, etc.87
The Advertising Guide provided the latest federally approved language for ads, as well as 
information on which types of war machinery should not be depicted for security 
purposes (such as the latest aircraft engines).  In short, these guidelines assisted 
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advertisers with the creation of ad content by providing information to the WAC and its 
members generated previously by the OWI.
 Generally, most ads the OWI provided assistance with fell into two categories.  
The first type contained government-sponsored messages and did not promote a specific 
product.  In these examples, akin to public service announcements, the OWI provided 
content while a participating ad agency, selected by the WAC, would execute the ad.  
Such ads often appeared at no cost to the government.  One example, printed in Buildings 
and Building Management magazine, addressed the risk of inflation (fig. 4.29).  In this 
and other examples, the reader sees content from the OWI, a graphic developed by an 
advertising agency working through the WAC, but no promotion of a specific product.  
As seen here, small text at the bottom would note the ad’s sources.88
 The second type of ads the OWI helped create contained messages endorsed by 
government sources that also promoted specific products.  Often part of organized, cross-
media campaigns, the themes seen in these ads originated with the OWI and were 
designed by commercial advertisers in cooperation with the WAC.  In many ways Bill 
Lewis, the OFF/OWI official who in his previously mentioned memo referred to the use 
of a government “rider,” anticipated this second type of ad.  The process by which 
advertising agencies worked with the OWI through the WAC to execute this type of ad 
has been documented by historians including Dan Lykins and Frank Fox.89  A typical 
campaign began when a government bureau, such as the Department of Agriculture or the 
War Manpower Commission, identified a war related problem that required a 
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propagandistic effort to shape the public’s opinion.  The requesting agency notified the 
OWI, which then repackaged related messages so as to not contradict previous campaigns 
or pose problems with censors.  The OWI next contacted the WAC, which assigned an ad 
agency to design the campaign’s visual components.  In this manner, the OWI did not 
generate the ad’s graphic component.  Instead, the agency shaped content before passing 
it along to professional advertising agencies who created the finished product.  
 This process required the WAC and the OWI to maintain regular interaction, as 
government records document.90  Cowles outlined the reasons for this in a statement to 
retailers that clarified not only the OWI’s role in the war effort, but also the close 
relationship between his agency and commercial advertisers.  Cowles acknowledged that 
the OWI’s primary method, the often cited “strategy of truth...” sought “to mobilize 
behind the war the support, initiative, imagination, and genius of the American people.”  
According to Cowles however, the public often displayed a general resistance to war 
information.  He argued that this resistance came “not from a lack of willingness to 
cooperate but from a lack of understanding as to why a given action is requested.”  
Cowles continued that in the OWI’s goal of spreading “truth,” advertisers are “peculiarly 
equipped to help us with this job of developing an intelligent understanding of the war 
problem facing the government and the people... We in the OWI are deeply appreciative 
of the work retailers have united to do... I believe it will pay [advertisers] dividends for 
years to come.”91  Significantly, by referencing the postwar world and the dividends 
271
advertisers would reap later, Cowles alluded to the advertising industry’s ulterior motives 
for supporting the war.  
 WAC members noted such motivations during the war, as when Council member 
Harold B. Thomas, a pharmaceutical executive, remarked that the WAC’s goal was to 
make sure that the advertising industry got a deserved place at the table “in the great task 
of reconstruction after the war.”92  The ad industry’s motives can also be seen in the 
WAC’s name change.  Although originally known as the Advertising Council (the name 
the group uses today), in 1943 the agency changed its name to the War Advertising 
Council (WAC) for unclear reasons.  In a letter to Cowles announcing the change, a WAC 
officer noted the justification for this change was to clarify “the objective of the 
organization which is, as you know, to make advertising of the maximum usefulness to 
the war.”93  However, this change also came around the time that Colston Warne, an 
Economics Professor at Amherst and leading consumer advocate, was attacking 
privileges given to advertisers during the war (such as tax breaks).  At least one scholar 
has credited Warne’s criticism with the name change.94
 While the OWI and WAC developed a relationship that benefited both parties, the 
OWI’s Domestic Bureau gained a powerful ally at a critical moment.  As discussed in 
previous chapters, Congressional cuts to the OWI’s Domestic Bureau in the spring of 
1943 severely limited the agency’s capability to create visual material in the form of 
posters and brochures.  Thus, the establishment of the WAC gave the OWI an 
experienced partner eager to deliver messages through advertisements.  The resulting 
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relationship played on the strength of both institutions: the government determined the 
messages to be disseminated, and the WAC developed and implemented these messages 
through ad agencies.  The advertising industry, therefore, developed an efficient method 
of supporting not only the war, but its own interests.  
Womanpower and Liberty Girl
 Beginning in 1943, the WAC worked with the OWI to generate content for a 
campaign known as “Womanpower” that attempted to alter the myth of “Rosie” by 
shifting notions of what constituted acceptable women’s work during the war.  A 
noticeable sign of this campaign appeared four months after Rockwell’s Rosie the Riveter 
first appeared on the cover of the Saturday Evening Post (fig. 4.1).  Rockwell’s second 
Post cover featuring a female war worker, referred to as Liberty Girl (fig. 4.30), offered a 
variation on the “New Amazon.”  In comparison to his earlier Rosie, Rockwell’s Liberty 
Girl is not a riveter, nor does she possess the former’s imposing physical features.  Based 
on her clothing, which included red and white striped pants with a blue top featuring 
large white stars, Liberty Girl seems a highly patriotic individual.  Even her hair, a bright, 
blaze red, matches her outfit.  Though her appearance is eye-catching, the various items 
she carries and her aggressive march forward signify this figure’s true importance.  
Rather than a factory worker engaged in a singular activity such as riveting, Liberty Girl 
carries a cache of different objects — 31 according to the Post — related to wartime 
work acceptable for women.  The tools she carries (and the jobs they suggest), included: 
keyring (boardinghouse manager and housekeeper); dust pan, brush, and mop 
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(chambermaid, cleaner and household worker); time clock (service superintendent); 
earphone and mouthpiece (switchboard and telephone operator); and milk bottles 
(grocery store woman and milk-truck driver).95  Additionally, her cap shows the red, 
white, and blue logo designed by Charles Coiner for the Office of Civilian Defense, 
suggesting that Liberty Girl additionally volunteers for the OCD (see chapters one and 
two).96 
 Rockwell’s Rosie and Liberty Girl each support the war effort through patriotic 
iconography and a kind hearted humor.  While the physically large Rosie casually 
balances a large piece of industrial equipment across her lap, Liberty Girl appears 
comically overburdened with objects and devices, yet seems undaunted and energized by 
their weight.  Similar to Rosie, Liberty Girl exhibited physical features not aligned with 
the stereotypical ideal of feminine beauty.  Though mostly obscured, her lanky frame 
serves as a vehicle for patriotism, not sexual innuendo.97  In fact, her excessive collection 
of objects and outlandish clothing approaches caricature.  More importantly, through her 
numerous attributes Liberty Girl emphasized that engagement in the war effort did not 
necessarily involve heavy industrial work, and perhaps not even “man’s work.”  
 The humorous profusion of objects carried by Liberty Girl alludes to a distinct 
change in the rhetoric of OWI/WAC efforts that characterized the Womanpower 
campaign.  Established in the fall of 1943 by the OWI, the Womanpower campaign 
encouraged women to pursue jobs not aligned with factory labor.  Advertisers and 
publishers demonstrated their support for this program through the display of the 
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Womanpower logo, which appeared on ads, posters, and on magazines such as the Post to 
the right of Liberty Girl (fig. 4.31).  Used until the end of the war, this small icon 
depicted a hand holding a torch similar to that carried by the Statue of Liberty, a 
monument that projected accepted ideals of feminine strength and patriotism.  The letters 
‘W W W’ appear just underneath the flame, and the words ‘women war workers’ ran in a 
half circle below the wrist.  
 Previous OWI/WAC efforts encouraged women to participate in the war with 
imagery that often depicted factory work.  These efforts had not been called 
“Womanpower” specifically, but were instead part of the “Manpower” campaign 
established previously.  This effort recruited laborers of both sexes for a range of jobs, but 
tended to emphasize factory work.98  However, by the spring of 1943, the need for 
factory work no longer represented the crisis it had once been.  Instead, employers of 
many other fields ranging from agriculture to transportation began realizing a severe 
shortage of job applicants.  Upon recognizing this need, the War Manpower Commission, 
the government agency that oversaw wartime industry, contacted OWI Deputy Bureau 
Chief Cowles, who in turn wrote the WAC for assistance.  In April 1943, Cowles 
requested a new ad campaign that would focus on “necessary civilian jobs for women.”99  
Cowles’s request officially established the Womanpower campaign, leading to a flood of 
imagery that encouraged women to find non-factory jobs.  The Womanpower campaign 
thus resulted from the government’s need for women to take jobs that had a less iconic, 
though no less significant, effect on the war than factory positions.100
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 Internal agency documents delineate how the OWI promoted the Womanpower 
campaign as an economically rewarding and patriotic practice.  One such example, an 
oversized media guide titled “Women in the War Campaign,” argued that as “the last 
great remaining pool of available MANPOWER,” American women must be recruited by 
advertisers to participate in the war.  This brochure, meant for agency presentation 
purposes and not for public consumption, began with a simple premise: “We believe that 
the basic restraining factor on recruitment now is NOT that the woman does not know 
what to do, but that she is not interested in doing anything” [emphasis in publication] 
(fig. 4.32).101  Accompanied by a cartoon of a sleeping woman, these words contradict the 
stereotype of the patriotic, willing Rosie.  “Therefore,” the brochure continued, “if we 
can change this attitude, and convince enough women that they should do something and 
at once, the requirements of all agencies will be met” (p. 6).  The brochure went on to 
explain the following six media outlets would be the most helpful in recruiting female 
war workers: newspapers, movies, graphics, magazines, radio, and the War Advertising 
Council.  The strength of the Womanpower campaign, therefore, resulted from the efforts 
of participating advertising agencies, radio stations, and movie studios to engage in an 
effort that stretched across different media.102  
! Immediately following the implementation of the Womanpower campaign, OWI 
posters continued to depict industrial labor while making a more subtle reference to other 
types of work.  For example, an OWI poster from 1943 featuring artwork by George 
Rupp, a commercial artist, depicted a smiling woman working at a lathe (fig. 4.33).  The 
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copy that floats in the space above, shown in quotes to suggest the voice of the women 
shown, reads “I’ve found the job where I fit best!” Larger type appears below, which 
stated “FIND YOUR WAR JOB— In Industry - Agriculture - Business.”  The resulting 
message mixed industrial labor with jobs in the business and agricultural fields, the latter 
two occupations having failed to capture the public’s attention in the manner that 
“riveting” did with “Rosie.”  This poster also emphasized the close relationship between 
laborer and mechanical equipment.  However, it should be noted that the woman’s movie-
star features, including perfect teeth, red lips, arched eyebrows, and long, dark eyelashes 
seem mismatched with the machinery in the foreground, not to mention the filth of the 
unseen factory floor.   
 Other OWI posters displayed female laborers engaged in non-factory jobs, often 
with male coworkers.  For example, an OWI poster designed in 1943 for the U.S. Crop 
Corps depicted a chipper young man and woman dressed in overalls (fig. 4.34).  
Featuring artwork by Spencer Douglass Crockwell, a commercial illustrator, the poster’s 
top text encouraged viewers to “Work on a farm... this Summer.”  In an optimistic image 
that resembles the type of healthy, hopeful figures depicted both in Rockwell’s 
illustrations and in Soviet propaganda, Crockwell’s graphic suggests farming to be a 
patriotic, pleasant wartime experience.103  Other OWI posters depicted similarly 
enthusiastic women enlisting in the women’s military services, including the Women’s 
Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), or serving as nurses.  
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 The Womanpower campaign also influenced women’s magazine advertisements.  
While ads did not ignore factory work, the variety of jobs seen as suitable for women 
increased dramatically beginning in the spring of 1943.  As seen in the previously 
mentioned OWI poster by Rupp (4.33), not all ads ignored industrial work.  A Dr. Pepper 
promotion from the October 1943 issue of Good Housekeeping included the “Rosie” 
theme as one of many messages (fig. 4.35).  Here, the smiling woman at top holds a soda 
bottle and wears coveralls and a cap, signifying her involvement with factory work.  
Beneath the ad’s text, which emphasized Dr. Pepper’s nutritional qualities, the lower 
images featured women working in multiple roles, including in an aircraft hanger at the 
lower left, and a cafeteria where enlisted women rub elbows with lunch counter 
employees at the lower right.  Most importantly, the center image shows a domestic scene 
where a woman hands soda to two children.  Such ads reinforced the key objective of the 
Womanpower campaign by emphasizing the need of women in multiple fields, not just 
factories.  Furthermore, these multiple images suggested women could engage in more 
than one wartime occupation while maintaining their traditional domestic roles as 
homemakers and mothers.104
 In another example from Good Housekeeping, a Camel cigarette ad campaign 
offered a version of Womanpower that featured women working in various fields related 
directly to the war.  These ads, which displayed women working as draftsmen, code 
interpreters, and other jobs aligned with the military, nearly always featured two images.  
The first image, as seen in this example, depicted a woman at work, usually alongside a 
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handsome young man, typically in uniform (fig. 4.36).  The ad’s text informed the reader 
that the woman shown, formerly a fashion designer, now draws blueprints for military 
engineers.  The second image, seen here at the lower right, depicted the same woman in 
formal dress, Camel in hand, accompanied by a man at right who again wore a military 
uniform.  This campaign promoted jobs for women beyond the physically strenuous labor 
required by factory work.  Instead, this series of Camel ads featured women who had 
prior training as skilled workers in fields unaligned with manual labor.  These ads thus 
contrasted with the stereotypical notion of female war laborers as previously untrained.  
Finally, such imagery promoted the possibilities for romance, and thus emphasized an 
“acceptable” theme for women viewers that posed little threat to established gender 
stereotypes.105 
 Other ads used a more humorous, lighthearted approach to achieve a similar 
effect.  For example, an ad for Linit soap from Good Housekeeping featured a female 
cartoon character named “Linny” who worked on a farm (fig. 4.37).  The captions for 
each of this ad’s three scenes used language that contemporary readers would have likely 
recognized as combining allusions to the war with the beautifying effects of the product 
advertised.  For example, the middle scene features “Linny” on a ladder, picking apples.  
The accompanying text states: “READY FOR ACTION: The battle on the food front 
means hard work and long hours.  But a woman can do anything if she knows she looks 
beautiful doing it.”  The ad thus argued that even though wartime farm work is tough, 
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users of Linit soap could still look and feel beautiful.  As proof, the bottom image showed 
Linny in a post-work hayrack ride, flirting with a uniformed serviceman.  
 As the Womanpower campaign progressed, magazine advertisements stretched the 
definitive limits of “war work.”  A series of Avon Cosmetics promotions, praised 
specifically by Cowles, who noted that it was “easy to see why this campaign has 
received such favorable comment,” offers an example.106  These ads, again from the 
pages of Good Housekeeping, aligned modern women to well-known, historical female 
precedents.  Drawn in a style similar to fashion illustration, this campaign typically 
included a headline such as “To the Heroines of America.”  Each example depicted a 
stylish, attractive woman along with a “painting” of a historical female figure in a 
stylized frame.  In an early case, the contemporary woman, shown at right, looks to an 
image of Martha Washington (fig. 4.38).  The copy states: 
Martha Washington by her charming manner, devotion and 
understanding did much to inspire her husband to greatness.  Now, 
when men are again fighting for the survival of their nation, women are 
by their sides inspiring them to the greatness that is demanded by Total 
Victory.  And one of the modern American woman’s contributions is 
her calm outward beauty which so eloquently expresses the courage 
and faith in her heart.
The accompanying text goes on to encourage readers to contact their Avon sales 
representative.  Such advertising not only relied on well-known historical female figures 
for meaning, but also suggested that women could support the war simply by preserving 
their beauty, and thus, need not to find employment.  
280
 However, the Avon ads switched back and forth each month between the type of 
imagery discussed above and examples that featured a more militaristic theme.  For 
example, the next month Avon ran a different ad, which showed an enlisted woman in 
uniform glancing back not at Martha Washington, but to Molly Pitcher, who, the copy 
notes, replaced her husband during the Revolutionary War as a sergeant in the 
Continental Army (fig. 4.39).  The ad’s message to readers states: “Today you and every 
woman are American heroines just as Molly Pitcher was.  Whether taking over the duties 
of your husband in the assembly line... or keeping your family fit and happy... you also 
serve your country’s cause.”107 Advertisements such as these Avon examples promoted 
the notion that women’s “war work” could take a flexible meaning and was not limited 
necessarily to welding a bomber or enlisting.108 
 The OWI’s efforts to promote the Womanpower campaign expanded beyond 
corporate advertising in women’s magazines.  Government propagandists also enlisted 
other influential media generators, including movies and radio, to promote women’s role 
in wartime work.  Additionally, the OWI recruited cultural institutions such as museums 
to help spread its message.  For example, in early 1943 the OWI co-organized an 
exhibition titled Women in War Work that displayed photographs of female factory 
workers culled largely from the FSA/OWI archive.  Sponsored by the War Manpower 
Commission, Ladies Home Journal, the Curtis Publishing Company, and the Franklin 
Institute in Philadelphia, this photographic exhibition represented, according to media 
reports, “a panorama of what women are doing now, what they can do, and how they go 
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about doing it.”109  Judging from the well-illustrated catalogue (4.40), this exhibition 
featured photographs similar to those created by Howard Hollem that depicted women 
working in factories (fig. 4.15).  However, in addition to imagery of individual female 
laborers, Women in War Work also depicted diverse groups of workers characterized by 
mixed races and genders.  Organized before the Womanpower campaign began, Women 
in War Work opened at the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia before traveling to venues in 
Bridgeport, Connecticut, New York City, and in March 1945, to an unknown location in 
Moscow.110
 A similar example of an effort to display photographs of working women in a 
specifically “high art” context appeared at an exhibition held at the Museum of Modern 
Art (MoMA) in September 1943.  That this exhibition opened the same month that 
Rockwell’s Liberty Girl appeared on the cover of the Post was no coincidence.  Far from 
a unique representation of the Womanpower campaign, Liberty Girl represented one 
example of a larger effort organized by the OWI/WAC that encouraged national 
magazines to display an image of a female worker specifically not engaged in factory 
work on their September 1943 covers.  The OWI began organizing this effort in the late 
summer of 1943.  In a letter to the WAC written in the weeks prior, Cowles noted that 35 
magazines had signed on to participate in this Womanpower promotion.  Significantly, 
Cowles pointed out that the Womanpower campaign’s emphasis on non-factory work 
would allow the WAC and participating ad agencies an opportunity to benefit from a 
change in an already established advertising theme that relied heavily on patriotism:
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To make this an outstanding coordinated operation there remains one tie-
up on which the advertising industry alone can help.  --- the featuring of 
the [Womanpower] theme in September advertising...  We believe that 
illustrations of women in the varied attire of the necessary civilian jobs 
listed herewith...  can be woven into various advertisements with good 
effect of the campaign and for the advertiser.”111
The resulting effort attempted to tie government propaganda, corporate advertising, and 
magazine imagery together seamlessly.  Results of this campaign stretched across 
multiple advertisements and magazine covers, and examples included the previously 
mentioned Liberty Girl by Rockwell (fig. 4.30), as well as the September 1943 covers of 
Collier’s (fig. 4.41), Women’s Day (fig. 4.42), Click (fig. 4.43), and Life (fig. 4.44).  These 
covers depicted women as barbers, bus drivers, and farm workers respectively.
 Yet this campaign went far beyond a thematic magazine cover promotion and 
advertising tie-in.  To garner even more Womanpower publicity, the OWI orchestrated an 
exhibition and magazine cover design competition held at the Museum of Modern Art.  
Titled Women in Necessary Civilian Employment, the accompanying exhibition supported 
the OWI/WAC effort to encourage the acceptance of female labor during the war.  This 
small show, on view from September 3rd to 26th, 1943, featured copies of the magazines 
that participated in the Womanpower cover competition.  The exhibition additionally 
included photographs from the FSA/OWI archive of women engaged in a variety of 
wartime jobs.  By the exhibition’s opening, the OWI had convinced 186 pictorial 
magazines to participate in its cover competition by featuring an image of working 
women on their September 1943 covers.112  A panel of professional advertising designers, 
283
MoMA administrators, and OWI officials divided the competition winners into eight 
different categories, including “women’s magazines,” “general weekly,” and “general 
monthly.”113  The designers of winning submissions were then awarded a plaque at the 
exhibition’s opening.  
 Photographs of the installation show the exhibited magazines hung “on the line” 
at eye level.  The FSA/OWI prints on display, selected by Roy Stryker, the archive’s 
director, were distributed above and below.  In one example, Dorothy Ducas, the OWI’s 
Chief of Magazines, and Monroe Wheeler, a Museum administrator, hand an award to 
Kirk Wilkinson, at left, the Art Director of Woman’s Day who likely designed the cover 
(fig. 4.45).  Identifiable photographs from the FSA/OWI archive in the background 
display various types of work, and include manufacturing, nursing, and office jobs, as 
well as African American laborers.114 
 The ability of photographs of working women to shape public opinion raises 
significant issues.  Photography could easily reveal a more documentary wartime reality 
than magazine advertisements that often emphasized stereotypical beauty and feminine 
sexuality.  The ability of photography to complicate the sometimes idealized “Rosie” 
mythology is seen in a series of images taken by Dorothea Lange in 1942 (fig. 4.46).  
These photographs, created while Lange was working for Fortune, depicted female 
laborers that seemed to have little in common with the workers seen in women’s 
magazine advertising.  Unlike the ads discussed previously, Lange’s women looked like 
actual workers, not glamorized movie stars.  Moreover, as the art historian Melissa 
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Dabakis notes, Lange’s photographs addressed how the “New Amazon” mystique 
complicated female sexuality by requiring women to dress and act in a “manly” 
manner.115  Not surprisingly, photographs similar to Lange’s appeared rarely in women’s 
magazine ads.  In the few examples that do exhibit a similar challenge to idealized 
notions of femininity, the image tended to emphasize the space of the factory floor, 
including the machinery used in production (fig. 4.47).  In this manner, few details reveal 
the women that actually performed the work, who, in this example, did not possess 
stereotypically ideal physical characteristics.
 Along with magazine covers and FSA/OWI photographs, MoMA’s Women in 
Necessary Civilian Employment exhibition also included “real life Rosie the Riveters.”  
As reported in the New York Times, five young women—a taxicab driver, a farm girl, a 
railroad worker, a telegram deliverer, and a nurse—were summoned to the Museum by 
the OWI to help promote this magazine design competition and related exhibition (fig. 
4.48).  The OWI invited these five individuals to the Museum to serve as living examples 
of one of the war’s most repeated visual subjects: working women.  A Museum statement 
encouraged journalists attending the event to photograph “the ‘live’ cover girls— dressed 
in their work uniforms—with the prize-winning magazine covers in the background.”116  
Intended to coincide with Labor Day, the Museum deemed the entire spectacle, the 
covers, the “live” Rosies, the OWI photographs, “in effect, a salute to the unsung 
heroines of the home front who have rolled up their sleeves and pitched into full-time 
paid work, and a challenge to others to enter such work.”117  Though clearly not 
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“riveters,” but perhaps more accurately “Liberty Girls,” these five young women 
simultaneously strengthened and complicated the myth of “Rosie.” 
 The synthesis of government, commercial, and cultural interests at the Women in 
Necessary Civilian Employment exhibition merged seemingly disconnected institutions.  
Yet the promotional “stunt,” as one OWI administrator dubbed the invitation of the five 
“real life Rosies,” represented an opportunity for the Museum to continue its support for 
the war through militaristic-themed exhibitions.118  MoMA held several additional 
exhibitions during the era that blatantly promoted the war effort, including Road to 
Victory, organized by Edward Steichen.  This exhibition, which opened May 21, 1942, 
was promoted by the Museum as not a “photography exhibition in the ordinary sense but 
one of the most powerful propaganda efforts yet attempted.”119  Compared to the more 
specific focus of Women in Necessary Civilian Employment, Steichen’s Road to Victory 
used large photographs of American material, civilian, and military resources in an 
attempt to visually overwhelm the viewer.  MoMA’s wartime propagandistic efforts, 
therefore, represented a diverse affair that offered both Steichen’s photographic 
extravaganza, and “live cover girls” nearly sixteen months later.120
Conclusion
 Art and popular culture continued to expand on previously held notions of gender 
and labor as the war progressed.  In many cases however, ideological shifts in preparation 
for the postwar world began before the fighting ended.  This change was particularly 
evident in the pages of women’s magazines.  Two juxtaposed advertisements from the 
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December 1944 issue of Good Housekeeping allude to this trend (fig. 4.49).  The ad on 
the right, published by Ipana tooth paste, said nothing about oral healthcare.  Instead this 
black and white ad reinforced the Womanpower campaign by using text and image to 
persuade female readers to support the war effort by finding work.  The ad featured a 
photo of a woman sitting alone in her nightgown.  She looks solemnly past the viewer, 
her left hand raised near her chin, a gesture that suggests a contemplative attitude while 
also revealing a wedding band.  A bedpost appears in the background, which, along with 
her sleepwear, describes the evening’s final, quiet moments.  The ad’s top text reads, “C-
Day for American Women,” which the lower text explains means “Conscience Day,” a 
reference to the feelings of concern and anxiety exhibited in the woman’s face.  The 
adjacent text speaks directly to those readers who had considered finding war work but 
had yet to do so: 
This is something for you to think out... quietly, alone... when you find 
yourself longing for the war to end, when you’ve been shocked by the 
death in action of someone you knew... or after you’ve come across the 
casualty lists in the newspaper and sense the individual family tragedies 
behind each name.  For now, tomorrow and every day of the months 
ahead, is C-Day... Conscience Day... for American women.
 
 The ad copy notes that while more than 18 million women had taken on some 
type of war work, “many more women are needed... needed desperately.”  The text states 
further that the war effort needed both skilled and unskilled female workers, before 
directing readers to the pages of their local newspapers’ “Help Wanted” sections, the local 
U.S. Employment Service, or military recruiting office.  The ad closed with the 
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Womanpower logo—the torch and hand— as well as the campaign’s motto: “The more 
women at war—the sooner we’ll win.”
 While this ad reinforced the Womanpower message, the image on the facing page 
advanced a much different agenda.  This full color ad for Cannon Towels featured an 
attractive young woman drying herself after bathing.  Seemingly unaware of the viewer, 
she relaxes in a modern bathroom, outfitted with a large supply of colorful towels and a 
large mirror, sink, bathtub, and shower.  This bathroom, decorated primarily in pink, 
connotes a modern, luxurious space.  The ad’s text reinforces this notion while alluding to 
the postwar years.  The top copy, which features large text stating “Bright Future,” 
encourages the reader to:
Look ahead... to the room you’ve always wished for... a gay carnival of 
color from floor to walls to cabinets bright with sparkling towels that 
delight the touch.  For, of course, upon their crystal shelves will be a 
wonderful new towel wardrobe designed by Cannon for perfect use and 
beauty and priced to suit your own post-war pocketbook.  Meanwhile, 
we know you’re appreciating the long-lived color and quality of your 
present Cannon towels.  And that you’ll draw sparingly upon the 
limited store selections now available.  Because Cannon’s the world’s 
leading towel maker, we can promise you our new colors, and patterns, 
as they come, will far exceed your rosiest expectations.
The lower copy reminds readers that “War Bonds will build a room like this before long 
and Cannon will furnish it....” 
 These two ads reveal a transitory state in popular notions of American femininity 
and the role of women in the last months of the war.  The Ipana tooth paste ad, which 
reinforced the Womanpower campaign directly, relied on a sentimental message that 
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attempted to reach the reader’s conscience.  While no details concerning tooth paste or 
the woman’s family appear, the ad encourages women to work in order to contribute to 
the larger fight for democracy while acknowledging that the decision to find employment 
may not come easily.  Conversely, the Cannon Towels ad did not mention jobs for women 
or related sacrifices, and instead referred to a postwar abundance of plenty where material 
goods improved the reader’s life.  In this instance, references to the war, made with subtle 
allusions to war bonds and scarce supplies, are trumped by the combination of a 
sexualized, nearly naked young woman set amidst commodities that promote an ideology 
of postwar consumer wealth.121  Finally, these ads emphasized the femininity of both 
figures within domestic spaces, and thus represented two examples of the gradual return 
to prewar gender stereotypes.  Depictions of “Rosie the Riveter,” whose physical 
characteristics and employment outside the home represented a threat to the gender status 
quo, became supplanted by the return of women to their prewar roles as wives, mothers, 
and homemakers in popular visual culture. 
• • •
 The major institutions that formed American attitudes and directed domestic 
opinion during World War II came to very different ends.  Following the Japanese 
surrender on September 2, 1945, the WAC, with President Harry S. Truman’s blessing, 
assumed postwar fundraising efforts in the form of the eighth and final war bonds 
campaign, known as the “Victory War Loan.”122  Associated graphic promotions featured 
smiling servicemen returning home and made no reference to the horrors experienced 
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abroad by military personnel.  Soon after, the WAC changed its name back to the Ad 
Council, a designation the organization uses today, and released its first postwar annual 
report, titled “In the Wake of the War.”  This publication celebrated the Council’s 
previous accomplishments while looking forward optimistically to promoting advertising 
as a “valuable public service” in the postwar world.123  Contrastingly, the OWI Domestic 
Bureau represented a shell of its former self at war’s end, and few of the artists and 
administrators who contributed to the agency’s graphic efforts in the midst of the war 
remained.  After President Truman closed the agency on September 15, 1945, OWI staff 
returned to their civilian careers in publishing, the arts, and broadcasting. The OWI’s 
previous struggles to address issues such as enemy atrocities and the critical role of racial 
minorities in the war, which both led to fierce internal agency debates and raised the ire 
of politicians, were soon largely forgotten. In the place of related wartime struggles and 
anxieties, many Americans began celebrating returning servicemen, a booming economy, 
and the emergence of the United States as a preeminent global superpower.  
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Womanpower campaign logo   OWI brochure “Women in the War 
      Campaign”
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fig. 4.33, George Rupp, “Find Your War Job,” 
OWI poster no. 55, 1943
fig. 4.34, Spencer Douglas 
Crockwell, “Work on a farm...” 
OWI poster no. 59, 1943
fig. 4.35, Dr Pepper ad, Good 
Housekeeping, October 1943 
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fig. 4.36, Camel ad from Good Housekeeping, 
September 1943 
fig. 4.37, Linit soap ad, Good Housekeeping 
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fig. 4.38, Avon ad, Good Housekeeping, April 
1943
fig. 4.39, Avon ad, Good Housekeeping, May 
1943
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fig. 4.40, Women in War Work exhibition catalogue, published Feb., 1943
fig. 4.41, Collier’s, September 1943   fig. 4.42, Woman’s Day, September 1943
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fig. 4.43, Click, September 1943  fig. 4.44, Life, September 27, 1943
fig. 4.45, Women in Necessary Civilian Employment exhibition, Museum of Modern Art, 
New York City, September 1943, Museum photograph
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fig. 4.46, Dorothea Lange, Shipyard 
Worker, Richmond, CA, 1942
fig. 4.47, Chrysler ad, Good Housekeeping, August, 1944
fig. 4.48, New York Times, September 3. 1943, “Glamourless Jobs Get Page 1 Status,” 
taken at Women in Necessary Civilian Employment exhibition opening, MoMA
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fig. 4.49, Ads in Good Housekeeping showing postwar desires (left), war-related fears 
(right), December 1944
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